>There is an irreducible element in the subjective experience, that is, a complete physical description of the world won't exhaust the state of affairs, meaning that there is a intrinsically subjective element in the world, and the direct verification of such element is epistemologically impossible. There may never be a proper theory of mind, for that is beyond our epistemic scope.
True or false?
take your shitty philosophical arguments from incredulity to >>>/lit/
>>8106979
That is just a thesis stating sentence, an argument would offer justifications for it...
A philosophy class would help you realize that, you insufferable faggot.
>>8106985
>blurts out irredeemable nonsense
>calls it a thesis as if that excuses the lack of real reasoning
This is "prove me wrong"-tier puppyposting that happens to be trivially-correct philosophy rather than science of any sort. Why are you posting it here?
>>8107003
Show me that what he presented in a matter of fact way is wrong instead of bitching about how he presented things in a matter of fact way....
>>8107019
>show me that the claim I made without having any justification for has no justifications
>please make my arguments for me senpai
you might even be too dumb for /b/...
>>8107033
So i guess it is safe to assume that you cannot offer reasons for why the sentence in the OP is false, because if you could you wouldn't be ad homining like a mentally retard monkey the way you are now.
>>8106972
False.
Though many won't get over themselves and accept it.
>We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not
analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing. It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior—for similar reasons. I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the
problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be
extended to include consciousness. With out some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of physicalist theory.
>>8106972
False according to the Church–Turing thesis
>>8109259
The Church-Turing thesis is false. There are things a Turing machine cannot simulate. Consciousness is one example. The collapse of the quantum mechanical wave function is another example.
