Free will debate
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If everything happens for a reason, then how can we do otherwise than that which we do?
And if some things happen for no reason, then how can that give us free will?
Quick video from youtuber "bitbutter" explaining why the concept of free will is incoherent.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joanVUoXY0s
Going to give a bump.
I really would like someone to debate me on this.
I thought about this long and hard, and came to the conclusion that free will is a logical and physical impossibility. I mean think about it, how do you make choices? You weigh the options against each other, in a way that your brain allows you to, based on your previous experiences and knowledge and even subconcious influences that you have no control over.
If we define free will as the ability to make decisions free from any external or internal influences (like law does), it just isn't possible.
>>29638323
Great point. Thanks for contributing.
>>29637666
The future only exists in consciousness. Mere matter has no concept of time; if not for conscious observers, the material world would only exists in whatever it's current state is, with no potentiality. The idea of future possibilities is a concept contingent on the mind, more specifically the faculty of imagination, and therefore any given possible future that one can imagine creating through action alone can be actualized by the human will, and truly originate from those actions.
My second argument is that, because we are rational beings, and to believe otherwise necessarily results in a contradiction, we can think about and imagine possible actions to take without actually taking them. This implies that a choice truly was made EVEN IF we would have always done what we did given identical conditions. The fact we would have made the same choice given the same conditions only implies that, given our individual character and rational capabilities, we would have chosen that same option; not that we had no choice at all.
Third argument is from reason. I believe in free will simply because the reasons people do things cannot be reduced to physics. The only way to explain why someone does something is in terms of their reason, not their neurobiology. To try to explain it in terms of physics can never really explain anything unless you deny the consciousness in that person.
>And if some things happen for no reason, then how can that give us free will?
I don't see how the former contradicts the latter
>>29638553
>The future only exists in consciousness. Mere matter has no concept of time; if not for conscious observers, the material world would only exists in whatever it's current state is, with no potentiality. The idea of future possibilities is a concept contingent on the mind, more specifically the faculty of imagination, and therefore any given possible future that one can imagine creating through action alone can be actualized by the human will, and truly originate from those actions.
If our wills are caused by an unbroken chain of cause and effect, then what we will is determined by causal antecedents. If our wills are the products of acausal or random events, then what we will is up to chance/luck.
>My second argument is that, because we are rational beings, and to believe otherwise necessarily results in a contradiction, we can think about and imagine possible actions to take without actually taking them. This implies that a choice truly was made EVEN IF we would have always done what we did given identical conditions. The fact we would have made the same choice given the same conditions only implies that, given our individual character and rational capabilities, we would have chosen that same option; not that we had no choice at all.
This is a compatibilist argument, and compatibilist free will is antithetical to libertarian free will--the positions contradict each other.
I don't see a contradiction in a rational being not believing in free will. I believe my "choices" are really either the products of a chain of cause and effect, or maybe the products of probablistic quantum phenomena. Neither of those gives me libertarian free will, and I consider compatibilist free will (a qualitatively different and contradictory thing to libertarianism) to just be an unhelpful semantic shift.
>>29638553
>Third argument is from reason. I believe in free will simply because the reasons people do things cannot be reduced to physics. The only way to explain why someone does something is in terms of their reason, not their neurobiology. To try to explain it in terms of physics can never really explain anything unless you deny the consciousness in that person.
Actually, there is incredibly strong evidence that chemicals such as neurotransmitters can and do compel human behavior.
People with a dopamine overload in their motor circuits can end up moving their body parts in bizarre or dangerous ways. When this is happening, the brain can generate spurious rationales for doing so ("I have to get the bugs out from under my skin", for example, even when there are no bugs). People with dopamine overload in the motor circuits can tear their own flesh off, it can seem perfectly "rational" to do so at the time. But the cause is the dopamine's physical effect on the motor circuits.
I cant wait for the day they teach that free will is an illusion in schools.
>>29638697
>People with a dopamine overload in their motor circuits can end up moving their body parts in bizarre or dangerous ways.
I should have said "will", rather than can.
When the dopamine gets to a certain level, the muscles in the human body WILL begin to violently contract, just like two stroke engine with a sufficient excess of gasoline to oil WILL seize.
>>29638869
It would be a cultural paradigm shift.
>>29638869
I don't think that would be a good idea. People who are told they don't have free will easier give in to instant gratification, act selfish and irresponsible and generally behave worse. There is a reason that we are so averse to accepting the notion that free will is an illusion. Free will allows us to do things efficiently, without worrying about cause and effect chains that are so complex it would take hours to analyze them, even for really simple decisions.
I have autism and I always had trouble making decisions, because I see all the options, factors and consequences. There are hundreds, even for stuff like deciding what drink to get at the supermarket.
>>29639076
>People who are told they don't have free will easier give in to instant gratification, act selfish and irresponsible and generally behave worse.
There's very little evidence to support this idea. It's basically like what theists say about atheists.
"People who are told that God doesn't exist will easier give into instant gratification, act selfish and irresponsible and generally behave worse"
Basically the same argument, but the evidence is lacking.
>Free will allows us to do things efficiently
I don't agree.
Take the example of a kid who's having a hard time concentrating in school.
Under free will belief, his teachers will think, "That little shit is CHOOSING not to pay attention, OF HIS OWN FREE WILL".
With the understanding that free will isn't true, they would have to ask, "What is *causing* him to not pay attention?" and looking for a solution.
Another example could be the issue of poverty. Why are some people poor?
Under the free will idea it can be "Because they made bad decisions of their own free will"
Without it, you would have to look at the *causes* of poverty.
I've seen free will belief even used as an excuse for abusing drugs ("It doesn't matter how fucked up I get, or even if I become psychotic. I have FREE WILL and I can CONTROL MYSELF, even if I'm fucked up") and abusing kids ("If my kid does poorly just because I slapped him around, he's just choosing to be a little bitch and should man up")
>>29639076
>I have autism and I always had trouble making decisions, because I see all the options, factors and consequences. There are hundreds, even for stuff like deciding what drink to get at the supermarket.
With small things like that, I don't pay much attention because while the brand of soda I get conceivably could have huge consequences via the butterfly effect, the consequences of each option are conceptually so far removed from the "decision" that there's no way I can make the connections, so I just accept it as a crapshoot.
>>29637666
Nice trips
Here's a good image for the debate.
>>29639221
Personally I don't think we should fully trust ourselves. Our culture puts too much emphasis on being "confident", when really a little self-doubt is not a bad thing.
>>29639126
>There's very little evidence to support this idea. It's basically like what theists say about atheists.
Ok fair point, I only read that once somewhere. But speaking from my point of view, if I remind myself that I don't have free will, I get kind of stuck in an "I still have to do my best" loop.
>Take the example of a kid who's having a hard time concentrating in school.
Ok thats not what I meant, should have said that more clearly. I mean this only in the sense that each individuum beliefes himself to have free will, responsible for their own actions.
What you mentioned is of course a real problem
of this view.
>>29638657
>If our wills are caused by an unbroken chain of cause and effect, then what we will is determined by causal antecedents. If our wills are the products of acausal or random events, then what we will is up to chance/luck.
Our wills are determined; they are determined by reasons of our own conception. That is the idea of freedom. Autonomy is the capacity to act based on reasons originating in one's own consciousness.
>This is a compatibilist argument, and compatibilist free will is antithetical to libertarian free will--the positions contradict each other.
Yes, I am a compatibilist, but pointing that out is not an objection to the argument. You have to give an argument for why my idea of free will is not valid or sufficient.
>I don't see a contradiction in a rational being not believing in free will. I believe my "choices" are really either the products of a chain of cause and effect, or maybe the products of probablistic quantum phenomena
When I say that to not believe in free will is a contradiction, I mean that when one denies their freedom, they are also at the same time denying their reason, since reason and free will are both imply that the other exists; you cannot deny one without denying the other. What follows from this is that, by denying free will and therefore reason, your belief that free will does not exist, if it is true, cannot be based in reason, and is therefore an irrational belief.
>Unhelpful
Whether you find something to be helpful or not, however you are defining that word, is irrelevant to what is true. The truth has no obligation to be "helpful".
>Semantic shift
It is semantics insofar as I am conceiving of free will in a different and hopefully more accurate way. Finding the truth is about finding conceiving of things in the right way. If I define free will in a certain way, then the only question is whether this concept of free will makes sense or not, and whether this concept is exemplified in reality.
>>29639333
>But speaking from my point of view, if I remind myself that I don't have free will, I get kind of stuck in an "I still have to do my best" loop.
Well, yeah. I mean technically you're always doing "your best" at a particular point in time with that particular set of circumstances (including the levels of neurotransmitters in your brain, the surrounding temperature, and the subconscious effects of the events you've experienced), but it's normal to want to do well.
Even without free will, I want to do well too.
If I misunderstood your meaning somehow, do feel free to tell me btw.
>Ok thats not what I meant, should have said that more clearly. I mean this only in the sense that each individuum beliefes himself to have free will, responsible for their own actions. What you mentioned is of course a real problem of this view.
Personally I think even with the understanding that no one is ultimately responsible for his own actions, we sort of need to assume a "pragmatic" responsibility. If someone does something bad, then for the greater good it may be necessary to punish them as a form of positive reinforcement, to disincentivize them from repeating their bad act. But this is really different from punishing people out of a sense of sadism or retribution.
why are fedoras so obsessed with free will
>>29638697
To say that reason can cause actions is not to say that physics can never cause behaviors. All I'm saying is that not all actions can be fully described and explained in terms of neurology; to try to do so will always ignore that person's conscious experience, which is a real and valid part of a human being.
>>29639519
>Our wills are determined; they are determined by reasons of our own conception. That is the idea of freedom. Autonomy is the capacity to act based on reasons originating in one's own consciousness.
Then let me ask you this. Say someone slip a drug into your coffee that will overload your motor circuits with dopamine. This gives you the desire to grasp and pull on your cheeks in such a way that will result in the removal of the removal of them from your face. You end up doing just that.
You acted in accordance with your desire, but in this case "your" desire was the product of what was at one point an external force (which became an internal force once it entered your brain).
Did you tear off your face out of your own free will?
Remember, in this hypothetical scenario, you WANTED to do it.
>>29639561
The fact that you're asking WHY presupposes a cause.
>>29639519
>Yes, I am a compatibilist, but pointing that out is not an objection to the argument. You have to give an argument for why my idea of free will is not valid or sufficient.
My beef with compatibilism is the idea that the "free will" it defends is worth calling "free will". I don't think so.
>When I say that to not believe in free will is a contradiction, I mean that when one denies their freedom, they are also at the same time denying their reason, since reason and free will are both imply that the other exists; you cannot deny one without denying the other. What follows from this is that, by denying free will and therefore reason, your belief that free will does not exist, if it is true, cannot be based in reason, and is therefore an irrational belief.
I don't agree. I see no way in which reason presupposes libertarian free will, and as you're a soft determinist (aka compatibilist) and I'm a hard incompatibilist, our disagreement over the existence of "free will" is semantic, not substantive.
I don't argue that people can never act in accordance with their desires. I simply don't see that as being worth calling "free will".
>>29639592
As long as I was conscious able to think about what I was doing, then yes, I would still be an essentially free being. Even though the desire itself was caused by an external force, the fact that I consciously acted on the desire mean that I consciously took my desire to be the ground or reason for my action. Just like when I saw my mug of coffee and smelled it's aroma, it caused my to desire to take a sip, but that desire did not force me to take a sip; my rational, conscious mind chose to act on my current desire.
>>29639668
You haven't given an argument for why compatibilistic free will is not worth calling free will, though. You can't just say you don't think that it is worth calling free will like it's just your opinion; either it's sufficient for freedom or it's not.
>I see no way in which reason presupposes libertarian free will
If I truly can reason about things, then that implies that my reason is absolutely free and that my thought can act according to the laws of reason rather than just the laws of physics. In other words, if I really am a rational being, then I can therefore determine my actions based on a reason originating in my own mind and am not completely at the mercy of external forces.
Obviously it doesn't necessarily presuppose libertarian free will, but I think it definitely does imply compatibilist free will; i.e. acting according to one's own rational capacities.
>>29639932
>As long as I was conscious able to think about what I was doing, then yes, I would still be an essentially free being. Even though the desire itself was caused by an external force, the fact that I consciously acted on the desire mean that I consciously took my desire to be the ground or reason for my action. Just like when I saw my mug of coffee and smelled it's aroma, it caused my to desire to take a sip, but that desire did not force me to take a sip; my rational, conscious mind chose to act on my current desire.
So by that logic, if you find out "Jim" drugged you and caused you to ruin your face by giving you the desire to mutilate it, he should not be liable for damages to your face--only punished for having drugged you. Even though you were acting in a bizarre way you would not normally have acted in due to someone else having drugged you, what you did while your brain was poisoned was your fault.
This is a really tough pill to swallow. I think it's an incredibly harmful perspective that puts far more responsibility on the individual than any reasonable system would.
>You haven't given an argument for why compatibilistic free will is not worth calling free will, though. You can't just say you don't think that it is worth calling free will like it's just your opinion; either it's sufficient for freedom or it's not.
How about the above for starters.
Under your definition of "free will", brainwashed people have "free will". People drugged without their consent who are caused by the drug to behave in certain ways have "free will".
A totalitarian dictator could slip mind control drugs in the water, and the population could still have what you call "free will".
It's unreasonable.
>>29639932
>If I truly can reason about things, then that implies that my reason is absolutely free and that my thought can act according to the laws of reason rather than just the laws of physics.
The ability to reason itself is dependent upon the laws of physics. The ability for you to reason is only present because your brain is arranged in a certain way, with a certain balance of neurotransmitters.
Physically alter your brain enough, and your reasoning ability will go out the window.
>>29640090
>So by that logic, if you find out "Jim" drugged you and caused you to ruin your face by giving you the desire to mutilate it, he should not be liable for damages to your face--only punished for having drugged you.
Right, I would be responsible for how I react to the drugging, on the assumption that I am still conscious of my actions.
If we change what the action is from tearing my face to, say, rape, it wouldn't matter that someone drugged nor how badly you desired to rape the person; you would be the only one responsible for how you reacted to your situation.
>Under your definition of "free will", brainwashed people have "free will". People drugged without their consent who are caused by the drug to behave in certain ways have "free will".
>A totalitarian dictator could slip mind control drugs in the water, and the population could still have what you call "free will".
Right, because I'm basing my belief in free will on the essential properties of humans, which make people essentially free insofar as all of their faculties are working properly. That in no way however excuses assault on autonomy. The essence of humanity in all individuals should be respected at all times.
>>29640155
>The ability to reason itself is dependent upon the laws of physics. The ability for you to reason is only present because your brain is arranged in a certain way, with a certain balance of neurotransmitters.
I think you're confusing something being dependent on something to exist with something being dependent on something with respect to it's activity. Obviously reason depends on the brain for it's existence, but that doesn't mean that every aspect of reason is dependent on the brain.
Sorry, but this will be my last post. Thanks for the interesting discussion, guys.
>>29640585
>Right, I would be responsible for how I react to the drugging, on the assumption that I am still conscious of my actions.
And that's where you and I disagree. I would say no, you would be neither fundamentally responsible (because no person is fundamentally responsible for anything), but also not pragmatically responsible, because holding people accountable for their actions when they have been involuntarily drugged is not conducive to a functional society.
>If we change what the action is from tearing my face to, say, rape, it wouldn't matter that someone drugged nor how badly you desired to rape the person; you would be the only one responsible for how you reacted to your situation.
I couldn't disagree more strongly. It would matter tremendously from a pragmatic perspective. Someone who normally rapes others should be treated differently than someone who only committed that rape because they had been involuntarily poisoned. The difference is huge.
>Right, because I'm basing my belief in free will on the essential properties of humans, which make people essentially free insofar as all of their faculties are working properly.
I don't consider someone who has been drugged without their consent in such a way that they are compelled by the laws of physics (such as the affect dopamine physically has on neural circuitry) to have their faculties working properly.
>That in no way however excuses assault on autonomy. The essence of humanity in all individuals should be respected at all times.
But you seem to be saying that coercion does not take away free will. In that case, why should we respect autonomy? And if "the essence of humanity" is altered or slighted by involuntary drugging, then how does that not slight free will?
>Sorry, but this will be my last post. Thanks for the interesting discussion, guys.
Good chat. Have a nice day.
>>29640762
Fixing an error. Part of my post should read
>I don't consider someone who has been drugged without their consent in such a way that they are compelled by the laws of physics (such as the affect dopamine physically has on neural circuitry) to harm themselves or others as someone who has their faculties working properly.
>>29637666
>how can that give us free will?
If there's some internal ability to ignore external stimuli, it's close to "free will" (but there's internal stimuli).
We're a body and that body is able to make decisions, the debate for me is to know how "autonomous" we really are. It seems to me that people would like to think of "me" as some high spirit inhabiting a flesh vehicule, but I'm just "me".
> An example, since I'm probably unclear (sorry)
I'm posting on r9k. I should go to bed, but like every night I'm here. Yet I want to go to bed. I would like to. I promised to myself yesterday that today will be different.
I'm posting on r9k.
Is this free will?
If not "me", then who wills it?
