>So it was surprising that in Lebanon, rather than once again taking the fight to Iran, the kingdom has taken a step back — a move that risks increasing Iran’s influence and fragmenting its Sunni rivals. It is a tactic that virtually no one here thinks has any chance of actually coercing Lebanon to constrain Hezbollah, a Shiite group.

>Ali Rizk, a Lebanese political analyst close to Hezbollah, echoed many analysts across the Middle East in saying that Saudi Arabia had been prone to hair-trigger reactions since its leaders became incensed over the nuclear deal between Iran and the United States.

>“They just went crazy,” he said.

>The move by Riyadh threatens not only to reshape the politics of the region, but to undermine this tiny nation’s fitful economy and delicate political balance. Already, the tensions have boiled over in small ways: After a television station broadcast a spoof ridiculing Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, the group’s supporters blocked roads and burned tires on Saturday night, setting off brief confrontations in the streets with rival groups.

>In a speech on Tuesday night, Mr. Nasrallah struck back, accusing Saudi Arabia of crimes and massacres in its air war in Yemen and calling on it to “settle scores with Hezbollah and not with the Lebanese people.”

>Diplomats and analysts have spent several weeks trying to understand why the Saudis would precipitously start penalizing Lebanon — and perhaps their own Lebanese allies — over the powerful influence of Hezbollah, which is nothing new.

>Even politicians in the Saudi camp say that the kingdom’s moves have put Lebanon in an impossible position. The Shiite group’s forces are more powerful than the Lebanese military and act autonomously, most notably carrying out a major ground operation in Syria that has helped keep Mr. Assad in power.

>Political figures on all sides point out that what Saudi Arabia has demanded from Lebanon — condemning Iran and Hezbollah, for example — is unrealistic.

>“If some think that Hezbollah will pull out from Syria due to some Arab stances,” Walid Jumblatt, the Druse leader who lately has been allied with the pro-Saudi Future Movement, told Orient TV, a Syrian opposition news outlet, “well, they won’t withdraw.”

>Not even the Future Movement, the Lebanese party closest to Saudi Arabia, could bring itself to call Hezbollah a terrorist group — rather declaring on Wednesday that Hezbollah was involved in “terrorist activities.”

>Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and their allies in Lebanon and throughout the region, have been increasing since the start of the conflict in Syria, which is in its fifth year. Those tensions have risen further since King Salman rose to the Saudi throne last year and pursued a more assertive foreign policy, including the war in Yemen.

>The Saudis have carried out an airstrike campaign that has killed civilians and destroyed hospitals and historic areas, and it has been roundly criticized by Hezbollah — even as Hezbollah was backing an indiscriminate Syrian government campaign to put down the rebellion there.

>The newest round of recriminations began when Saudi Arabia executed a pro-Iranian dissident Shiite cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Iranian demonstrators attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran.

>In January, at meetings of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia sought formal condemnations not only of the embassy attacks but also of Iran’s and Hezbollah’s roles in the region. Lebanon did not sign on.

>The country’s foreign minister, Gebran Bassil — who leads the Free Patriotic Movement, a Christian party aligned with Hezbollah — declared that Lebanon stood “in solidarity” with Saudi Arabia over the embassy attacks. But signing on to the statement, he said, would violate Lebanon’s policy of disassociation, or official neutrality, on the Syrian conflict.

>Saudi Arabia’s main Sunni ally in Lebanon, the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri, criticized Mr. Bassil, saying that his stance did not represent Lebanon.

>Finger-pointing ensued among Lebanon’s political factions, whose stalemate over Syria and conflicts on other issues has kept the country without a president for more than a year.

>Next, Riyadh declared it was canceling $4 billion in aid pledged to Lebanon, $3 billion of which was earmarked for the Lebanese Army. The aid had been offered in a bid to bolster the army and make it more able to hold its own and operate independently from Hezbollah.

>The kingdom and its allies suggested that the decision was based on what it saw as undue influence from Hezbollah in foreign policy, as well as security concerns after several Arab governments in the Persian Gulf said they had uncovered Hezbollah cells in their countries.

>Ghattas Khoury, a Lebanese former Parliament member speaking for Mr. Hariri’s camp, said the kingdom’s Lebanese allies understood its position but would lobby the Saudis to change their minds.

>“The Lebanese Army is essential for us,” he said.

>Last week, Saudi Arabia — and four of its five allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council — declared Lebanon unsafe for their citizens, although there has been no discernible shift in the security situation.

>Those moves may have little concrete effect: The $3 billion in arms had yet to be delivered and Saudi and other tourists have already largely abandoned Lebanon during the Syrian war.

>But Saudi Arabia and its gulf allies have other leverage: They could also throw out the half-million Lebanese who work in the gulf, a major economic lifeline for the country.

>And Saudi Arabia already seems to have cut its support to Mr. Hariri, whose father, Rafik, a former prime minister close to the kingdom, was assassinated in 2005; the Saudis blame Hezbollah.

>Employees of his party’s news media say their pay has become irregular. And the party is short of cash ahead of municipal elections this spring, when they could lose ground to Hezbollah and other rivals without funds to mobilize voters.

>Asked to explain the decline in Saudi support, several diplomats and analysts said that Lebanon was taking a back seat to Yemen, Syria and other conflicts.

>“It’s just not a priority anymore,” one diplomat said.

They were cutting their losses. The aid was to the Lebanese army, which in the past was a counterweight to Hezbollah but that changed. Mandatory draft ended so christians and sunnis stopped reporting to the army and then obviously rising up the ranks. Only the poor classes which shias number among them continued to enlist, and eventually began to take up officer positions, while obviously maintaining their loyalty to Hezbollah. At the same time other shias that weren't obliged to join the army anymore joined Hezbollah instead. And with Hezbollah in the government (and gaining veto power after their siege of the capital) they had their hands both in the government and the army.

So to prevent a situation where Saudi funds and weapons would be redirected to Iran's proxy they just cut their losses and left. The straw that broke the camel's back was the Lebanese government's inability to denounce the Iranian attack on the Saudi embassy, due to Hezbollah influence. At that point Saudi Arabia realized Lebanon was lost.

Stirring the hive and creating some backlash to Hezbollah is a minor bonus, but really, it was mostly a realization that Iran won Lebanon.

>>27090
Israel must be very nervous about this.

>>27095
Free excuse to conquer some land? Not really, theyre probably pretty happy

>Iran now has Lebanon and Iraq
>maybe Syria and Russia

WWIII when? I'm not dying for Israel

>>27090
Good analysis.

>>27096
This

>>27090
Good post