For two things Thing A and Thing B, does Thing A require time to "cause" something Thing B to happen? Does Thing A require space? Are time and space required for anything, be it Thing A or anything else, to undergo the act of "causing?"
>there is something outside of time and space
>>442745
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>>/sci/
I don't think so. We could say red things cause there to be redness, and that wouldn't be a spatio-temporal relationship.
>>442745
>What is a light cone, the post
>>442776
No, we define red as a narrow selection of optical frequencies, the unified notion of association of an object with redness requires that the observer of the object is within the lightcone of a definition of redness and the object that is being observed.
>>442787
I don't think definitions of redness have lightcones.
>>442797
Someone calls that selection of frequencies "red", this event then has a light cone. In practice it's more limited by the rate of information propagation between humans. I'm also going to assume that there were probably multiple independent events that caused this, each with their own associated light cone.
Schoppy says that causation is as much a sum of the two
>>442808
I get you. Going about forming a concept of redness is a spatio-temporal thing, but saying "red things cause there to be redness" comes off as tautological to me. It does't express anything about events taking place in space or time, just a linguistic or conceptual relationship.
>>442831
Nah, red is just an arbitrary definition we give to some small element of the optical frequencies; there's no way of expressing whether something is red without comparing it to your basis.
And before you have an understanding of electromagnetism, the only basis of "redness" you have are other things that you have defined as being red.
>>442841
I'm trying, but I'm not sure how that addresses what I said? Do you think I'm arguing for a Platonic red?
>>442868
I'm not entirely sure, but you seemed to be disliking the notion that "red things cause there to be redness". I may be mistaken but either red exists as a human definition, in which case red things do cause there to be redness (or rather if there existed no red things, we would have no concept of redness), or there exists a platonic redness (for which we will define this as the frequencies associated with red) and that this exists independently of the human definition of redness as a platonic ideal.
