Hey, I'm currently writing a paper on the origins of modern secrecy in politics and I'm stuck. I focused on Machiavelli and Giovanni Botero, arguing that while Machiavelli introduced secrecy and deceit as mere strategies for success (without explicitly hailing them), Botero justified secrecy as one of the foundations of the state. Now I'm caught between reason of state, religion (and if you should fake piety), propaganda, tacitism etc. etc. I have too much material, too many things that come to play, and I just don't seem to manage to put everything into 5-6 short sections over 20 pages.
I tried mindmapping so far - but that rather made me realize that I have way too many key words and categories.
How do you organize your ideas?
It's strange that I just can't get a grip since it's my 3rd paper already.
>>1114729
From what Im reading your topic is too broad, perhaps narrow it down. What's your thesis?
>>1114729
Politics = secrecy
Or maybe I misunderstood you.
>>1114729
you could maybe organize your argumentation around the concept of different christian codes of behaviour for the political elite contradicting one another : the prince has to behave like a "honorable" person according to older knight conduct code, but his "honor" in a more latin sense, his political duty implies screwing his previously mentioned "honorability", also, but he's allowed to do this cuz whoever he screws up or behaves unchrisitan with isnt "honorable" anyway ( one of Machiavelli's justification, there, you have a dialectical organisation structured around one multisemantic concept like honor, or even "morals", but "morality" is maybe to broad. I wrote a paper like that once and it worked.
>>1117503
the only thing I dont understand is that secrecy wasnt really a new thing in politics around that age, much more deceit, in the sense that deceit has been newly theoretically presented by spaghetti eaters as a legitimate way to maintain ones power.
Actually Machiavelli supported the republic not the Medici
Some say the prince was a satirical work, like he was a renaissance Steven Colbert
Suppose the theme would be doing whatever it takes to stay on top
>>1118368
if the prince was indeed satirical he had the satiral capabilites of the director of Starship troopers desu
your problems seem to stem from a poor definition of your topic, OP. What the fuck is "modern political secrecy"?
I have something for you, OP here's the Hanfeizi on the subject, from An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy by JeeLoo Liu, pages 197-198:
Remain empty, still, and without concern, so that you may secretly observe the defects of others. See others but do not allow yourself to be seen; 'hear others but do not allow yourself to be heard; know others but do not allow yourself to be known. Once you understand someone's words, do not alter or change them, but check them using the comparison of form and name. If you put one person in every office, and do not allow them to speak with one another, then the ten thousand things will all be completed. Cover your tracks, conceal your starting points, and your subordinates will not be able to see where you are coming from. Get rid of wisdom, dispense with ability, and your subordinates will not be able to guess your intentions. Hold on to what people have said before, and look to see if they match it with results. Carefully take hold of the handles of punishment and reward and maintain fi rm control of them. Cut off all hope of using them, smash all intentions to take them, and do not allow people to covet them.
(she's quoting the Hanfeizi from Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, Ivanhoe and Van Norden)
>>1119514
Here's her commentary:
These practical guidelines for rulership are meant for a monarchical political structure. Simply law alone may be suffi cient in a democratic republic, where there is a system of checks and balances that functions to secure its operation. When the system is sound, it will not have severe and lasting tribulations even with a mediocre leader or scheming ministers. In a monarchy, where power is centered on one person alone, the king's position is quite precarious. Not only can power corrupt, the intense desire for power can also corrupt. Those surrounding the king - not just his ministers, but also his wives, sons, brothers, and even servants - will all try to find the opportunity to remove him. Law itself is not adequate to prevent usurpation from the inner circle. Therefore, the king has to be constantly on his guard; he cannot trust anyone. He must not listen solely to one person; he must not confide in anyone. He cannot reveal his true emotions, but must keep others constantly on their toes. He must not allow others the chance to take over his power of control, even though he should not release others from their duties and do everything on his own. He must delegate everything to his ministers; with one exception: he must never give up the practice of checking to make sure that their behavior corresponds to their position and their claim. By using this form of statecraft, the ruler can exercise his power and maintain his political clout. These two elements are essential supplements to law in rulership. Hanfeizi thinks that the art of statecraft and rulership are ultimately derived from Laozi's thought.
>>1119517
The tl;dr of all of this is that secrecy in politics has to be as old as the idea of a "king."
It is inherent to his survival and the success of his reign.
Why? Liu comments the Hanfeizi on the answer:
In Hanfeizi's usage, statecraft is not exercised on society at large; rather, it is specifically geared toward ministers and close family members. Hanfeizi argues that the ruler and his ministers necessarily have conflicts of interests. "What benefits the ruler is employing the able; what benefits ministers is getting employed even when they are impotent. What benefits the ruler is rewarding those who accomplish much; what benefi ts ministers is getting rewards even when they have done nothing. These ministers will try their best to deceive the ruler, to reap undeserved rewards and to avoid due punishments. Therefore, ministers, when unchecked, are the ruler's worst enemies. In ancient Chinese royal courts, the ruler usually had numerous wives and hence numerous descendants. These wives and sons often plotted against one another, and sometimes against the ruler himself, to secure their status as the rightful heir:
>When consorts, concubines, and heirs apparent have organized their cliques, they long for the ruler's death for, unless he dies, their position will never be really strong. They have no feeling of hatred toward the ruler; they merely stand to profit by his death. The ruler therefore must not fail to keep close watch on those who might profit by his death.
(quoting Watson's translation of the Hanfeizi)
>>1119540
Is secrecy the foundation of the State, then?
I believe this is indeed the case when you're dealing with a ruler that has to watch his back, not only from the enemies without his palace, but also the enemies within.
If the king is the embodiment, the personification of the State, as Louis "I am the State" XIV succintly said, he needs a good deal of secrecy.
Now that I think about it, the smoother transitions of premiers and presidents we experience in today's democracies may allow for less paranoid behavior in them.
They're not supposed to hold the office until they die, nor must they wait for (or cause) their predecessor's death to get in their position.
>>1119540
That was from Liu, page 195, by the way
>>1114729
>>1117503
Richelieu is the synthesis of these concept, read the book supposedly written by him - Reason of the State.
Shang Yang, aka Lord Shang is an AMAZING chinese source who is amazingly unheard of. Single-handed masterminded the entire chinese system of government and created Legalism as a unified school.
>>1119663
Shang Yang started it, yes, but t's Han Fei that codified Legalism into a coherent system.
