Why did Churchill continually back Bomber Command's requests for more resources and greater strategic direction when he didn't think it would actually work, and had been saying so since the end of WW1?
>>1097333
"There are a lot of people who say that bombing can never win a war. Well my answer to that is that it has never been tried yet and we shall see. Germany, clinging ever more desperately to her widespread conquests and even foolishly seeking for more, will make a most interesting initial experiment."
t. Arthur Harris
>>1097436
And he was wrong. Bombing didn't win the war, certainly not in the way Harris thought of it, by smashing enough of the country that you'd have a "moral collapse" and an overthrow of the Nazi party from the German people.
What's more, you have Churchill pointing out that the German strat bombing didn't induce such panic in the British, and therefore there was little reason to assume it would work in reverse. That's hardly a ringing endorsement of Harris's strategy, at which point it makes you wonder why he kept backing it.
>>1097333
Prior to June 1941 it was essential for Churchill to maintain his Prime Ministership. Post June 1941 it was essential for Churchill to maintain Soviet friendship.
The cabinet also had an incredibly poor understanding of the importance of Coastal Command to the war.
>>1097456
"I do not personally regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier. It therefore seems to me that there is one and only one valid argument on which a case for giving up strategic bombing could be based, namely that it has already completed its task and that nothing now remains for the Armies to do except to occupy Germany against unorganized resistance. "
"We are going to scourge the Third Reich from end to end. We are bombing Germany city by city and ever more terribly in order to make it impossible for her to go on with the war. That is our object; we shall pursue it relentlessly. "
t. Arthur Harris
>>1097496
Are you retarded? Do you understand how what you've quoted has nothing to do with what I've been saying? Were your mother and father brother and sister?
>>1097466
>Prior to June 1941 it was essential for Churchill to maintain his Prime Ministership.
How? It was pretty ineffective prior to 1941, and the actions in France and over Britain would almost certainly be more important.
> Post June 1941 it was essential for Churchill to maintain Soviet friendship.
Except Churchill cared little for Soviet friendship outside of using them as an outlet for German armies, and what's more, Stalin wanted ground commitment, not more aerial attacks.
>>1097558
>How?
Remaining Prime Minister is not about military effectiveness, but the appearance of winningness and fightingness.
>It was pretty ineffective prior to 1941,
Yes.
>and the actions in France and over Britain would almost certainly be more important.
Bomber command were fucking useless for that. The airframes could well have gone to Coastal.
>Except Churchill cared little for Soviet friendship outside of using them as an outlet for German armies
Yes, mildred, that is precisely the point. Precisely the point.
>Stalin wanted ground commitment, not more aerial attacks.
Of course he did. The necessity of Bomber Command was the context of the Cabinet's refusal to open a French front until 1944. Soviet Friendship wasn't just aimed at the Soviet Union, by the way, but at a large majority of the TUC, Labour Party voters and CPGB
>>1097456
Did the British have any other option?
They did night time area bombing for a reason, daytime precision bombing wasnt really possible for the RAF. At least not until America had won the attrition war ma against the Luftwaffe.
>>1097915
Well, they could have bet their stack on something other than bombing to win the war to begin with.
I mean, ultimately, what did the Germans in was a land campaign with aerial forces supplementing it, not the strategic bombing itself, which at best was part of the supplementary force.
>>1097915
This is an important point. To not hit back at Germany--even if not super-effectively--would have had a devastating effect on homefront morale. As long as the British public felt that "we were giving as good as we got," morale would stay fairly high.
And while the large bombers were indeed used for night area bombing of large targets (cities), there were increasing daylight raids using low-level fast light bombers with much better accuracy.
>>1098009
As far as raw tonnage went:
