What the hell went wrong? How did the Muslim rulers of Iberia continuously lose more and more land to significantly smaller Christian states, who were often fighting with each other as well?
>what went wrong
The mudshits getting there was the only thing that went wrong. Driving them out was the best thing to happen to Iberia.
>>1052894
Thanks for the quality reply that really answered my question as to how the Christians managed to win.
>>1052894
There's no difference between Iberians and Berbers
>>1052884
Al-Andalus got divided into a lot of smaller taifas, each one of them weaker that their christian counterparts, so each one of them became the bitch of a christian kingdom, and when the didn't pay, BAM! military campaign.
>>1052884
Muslims were good at conquering and assimilating local elite but bad at consolidating. Al-Andalusia was divided into dozens of Taifas and hundreds of small noble controlled areas within a few years of the conquest. They fought each-other as often as they fought the Christian Kingdoms and never got the acceptance of native Christians who rebelled all the time.
Mamluks, Turks and Persians were the only ones to make good Muslim states.
>>1052902
>There's no difference between Iberians and Berbers
Now you're just baiting him.
>>1052925
>Murcia
>>1052944
European division was actual good.
>>1052884
By the 11th century, those smaller Christian states weren't actually smaller. Geographical extent didn't translate into a larger military the way it usually did in a Germanic kingdom. The northern Christian states were basically far more militarized societies where every level of government was organized according to military responsibilities to the crown, so for every few hundred square miles of land no matter how poor these kingdoms could mobilize, support, and maintain more military forces under royal control than the taifa emirs of the south.
The Andalusian states, conversely, were more bureaucratic where the only military was in the form of the ruler's private, salaried bodyguard, the lesser households of his immediate family members and trusted governors, and whatever tribes, townsmen, and mercenaries he could afford to hire for as long as his coffers could support in times of war. The rest such as the local nobility, the citizens of the major towns, the learned men of his courts and mosques, did not have any military obligation to the taifa prince. Whereas the governments of the north were geared towards proliferation of military forces, the governments of the south were geared towards taxation and tariffs, and whatever could be skimmed from that income had to support whatever military was possible.
