Is a person with more achievements superior to a person with less achievements?
For example. Is the big time businessman with a Phd, that is making tens of millions, superior to someone making minimum wage with a high school education?
Is the former a more worthy and better person?
No, because the very concept of universal worth is a spook.
But he is more valuable to society as a whole than the minimum wage worker
In the existentialist view? No.
Having said that I find company much more fulfilling with blue collars as opposed to middle management. One gets shit done and the other does jack shit.
A subjective question. If it were objectifyable then a discussion could be held. Proper picture though.
>>1001788
A bear contemplating the misery of bear kind.
>>1001810
Contemplation when there should be revolution?
>>1001817
An intellectual one, if it were possible to bear it
>For example. Is the big time businessman with a Phd, that is making tens of millions, superior to someone making minimum wage with a high school education?
The equivalence here is a bit off. Let's say person A gets a million dollars from his parents, and builds it up to a billion dollar industry. Compare him to person B who is from a poor family, didn't get any loans but managed to star his own company and is now in charge of a small but successful business.
The sheer amount of money is different, but is B putting less effort into it? No, he was just given a worse starting position.
I think the same thing applies to inventions, since knowledge is cumulative. Hypothetically inventing the windmill required as much effort as inventing the computer, even though the computer is vastly more complex
>>1001749
Superior in what way? The PhD businessman is probably more intelligent and hardworking but we'll need more information to determine which of them is morally superior (after we agree on what is moral and what is not of course).
>>1001817
You must first understand the basic nature of the struggle, before you can be the standard bearer of the revolution.
>>1001831
>>1001911
ENOUGH!
>>1001883
As a person.
>>1001883
i guess jews ARE the masterrace
>>1002175
>>1001749
In the local, practical or what I will call the 'provisional' sense, yes.
In the global, all-things considered 'actual' sense, no. Each is an animal yet delimited by the same ontology: be born, live for a few decades on the outside, die and cease to exist again. Everyone, without exception, winds up literally the same as Jesus Christ and Jeffery Dahmer, which is to say: nothing.
Death precludes meaning, and it also precludes any real, long-view status differences among humans. Now, if it should happen that biological immortality gets up and running, then that's a game-changer in ontology - but since we live in a material world, to quote Madonna, the biologically immortal will still be obliged to rely upon and secure a supply chain for themselves. In other words, in any early practicable version of such, they can still in principle be killed, a merciful equalizer.
I should like to add one more comment on my above conventional atheist conception of things, and that is with regard to religion. It seems to me that religion is frequently an outgrowth of a social wish to imagine a /continued/ differentiation of status in an afterlife. People want to imagine some combination of 1) the continuation of the basic features of the known social order, and 2) that even if they are not on the happy side of that social order now, they will be afterwards, when it "counts". The essential feature of a religion is that the good in-group will enjoy the happy side of this schema, while the bad out-group will suffer the unhappy side. That is, the preservation of the notion of differentiation of status gives one something to strive for, /and some unhappy people against whom to compare one's self./
Along comes Mortimer the atheist with the suggestion that after death there is no differentiation in status whatsoever, and this would seem to remove all purpose, all reason to strive for anything whatever. It gives me great pleasure to make this suggestion to you.
>>1001749
No.
