Is there a way to input text into windows without a keylogger detecting it?
Virtual inputs will be detected by any keylogger and copy/paste doesn't encrypt the clipboard's contents which can be read.
I thought about entering the text through something like a raspberry pi but I figure that would be detected once the inputs are sent to the windows machine (i'm also not sure if you can use a pi as an input device)
Anyway, i'm stumped.
How would you go about this?
Id also like to add, Injecting the text into memory would work, but that sounds ridiculously hard and impractical.
lastpass
Whisper the hex values of your characters one by one through the rear case fan into the cpu
>>54609611
software keyloggers can read any text that calls SetWindowsHookEx() (which autocomplete passwords do)
>>54609666
well if they cover every concievable input short of writing your own program to make a new input, you'd be better off wiping the damn computer and moving the files.
>>54609558
I had the idea to do something like this this, and used it as part of a comms security class in undergrad.
I figure the only way it would REALLY work is, treat the keyboard like a foreign object.
So the keyboard would include
Microprocessor
Hardware and/or Read Only Memory based encryption device
And the computer's "secure peripheral" jack/card/hardware would include the same kind of components, or a more general one.
This way, we could scramble the layers on which a keylogger might operate;
(infiltrated device driver)
(system.kernel-level malware)
(user-level malware)
by maintaining end-to-end encryption across the hardware-firmware-kernel-user-application stack
and allowing ONLY the final recipient to decide it. For example, password & or account information in your browser, stay encrypted from the keyboard hardware all the way to the signed site's server.
Of course most use cases would be much simpler, like typing text into an editor within the os, or even a terminal/shell
Essentially it requires every "secure input device", be it a keyboard or 'trusted' control/field in the UI, to host a security device with support for public-key encryption, along with its own secure keys and signature. And, of course, to maintain that security continuously, across a huge variety of recipients including possible malware hosts...
>>54609977
The lesson I learned was
"You gotta give up sometime"
If there's a keylogger your entire antimalware arsenal doesn't catch, you're probably fucked anyway.
