Can someone knowledgeable explain why physicists prefer to do away with locality rather than realism when it comes to Bell's Theorem? What is actually meant by 'realism' anyway?
>>7751976
Abandoning "realism" would essentially mean abandoning science. "Realism" is the principle that something real exists - that there exist things with an existence independent of our own minds and representation schemes.
From Wikipedia:
The physicist's Realism is the claim that the world is in some sense mind-independent: that even if the results of a possible measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer (contrary to the "consciousness causes collapse" interpretation of quantum mechanics). Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or momentum. A property can be dispositional (or potential), i.e., it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not actually break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability.
It makes a lot more sense to abandon locality than realism, favoring the pragmatical world than the immediate one. The world does not revolve around you.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Construct_%28philosophy%29
>>7752100
In response to this, what would you say of the literary, social phenomena experienced? Small things like the way people take a drink after they've finished saying something, or when folks raise their brow when disparaging the other, or how people don't really listen when you speak and are just waiting for their turn to talk? These are ideas, but what would you call this? The best word I've come to conclude is speech phenomena. Another one I've noticed is when people brush their finger to the tip of their nose to express nonchalant feelings.
>>7752147
I'd ask what that had to do with QM or realism.
>>7752151
Nothing at all. Guess I will make a thread on /lit
>>7751976
abandoning realism would for the physicist to acknowledge that he has no answer to the question ''why physics matter?''.
realism means the realism of classical mechanics: that observables exist without humans, that functionality of observables holds also, that results are independent of humans and other parties far away from the system [locality , non-globality].
any rationalist doctrine is based on the faith in the imagination [meaning induction] which would produce concepts, abstractions, fantasies and some of them connect back to the empirical world.
the question is then what deliriums connect back to the empirical world.
any rationalist doctrine which is not solipsism also refute solipsism [which is a rationalist doctrine, since it stems from the imagination, after taking the imagination seriously] which also brings problems since there is the question of faith in speeches by ''other humans''.
solipsism is not destroyed by solipsism nor any other rationalist doctrines since the refutation of a doctrine is purely a concept. Empiricism destroys any rationalism, solipsism included.
Now for Bell theorem, it is equally good to look at the Kochen-speker, which speaks more about realism than bell's.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/
>>7752233
>The theorem proves that there is a contradiction between two basic assumptions of the hidden variable theories intended to reproduce the results of quantum mechanics: that all hidden variables corresponding to quantum mechanical observables have definite values at any given time, and that the values of those variables are intrinsic and independent of the device used to measure them. The contradiction is caused by the fact that quantum mechanical observables need not be commutative. It turns out to be impossible to simultaneously embed all the commuting subalgebras of the algebra of these observables in one commutative algebra, assumed to represent the classical structure of the hidden variables theory, if the Hilbert space dimension is at least three.
>The Kochen–Specker proof demonstrates the impossibility that quantum mechanical observables represent "elements of physical reality". More specifically, the theorem excludes hidden variable theories that require elements of physical reality to be non-contextual (i.e. independent of the measurement arrangement). As succinctly worded by Isham and Butterfield,[3] the Kochen–Specker theorem
>"asserts the impossibility of assigning values to all physical quantities whilst, at the same time, preserving the functional relations between them."
>>7752234
>In the 1950s and '60s two lines of development were open for those not averse to metaphysics, both lines improving on a "no go" theorem presented by von Neumann,[6] purporting to prove the impossibility of the hidden variable theories yielding the same results as quantum mechanics. First, Bohm developed an interpretation of quantum mechanics, generally accepted as a hidden variable theory underpinning quantum mechanics. The nonlocality of Bohm's theory induced Bell to assume that quantum reality is nonlocal, and that probably only local hidden variable theories are in disagreement with quantum mechanics. More importantly, Bell managed to lift the problem from the level of metaphysics to physics by deriving an inequality, the Bell inequality, that is capable of being experimentally tested.
>A second line is the Kochen–Specker one. The essential difference from Bell's approach is that the possibility of underpinning quantum mechanics by a hidden variable theory is dealt with independently of any reference to locality or nonlocality, but instead a stronger restriction than locality is made, namely that hidden variables are exclusively associated with the quantum system being measured; none are associated with the measurement apparatus. This is called the assumption of non-contextuality. Contextuality is related here with incompatibility of quantum mechanical observables, incompatibility being associated with mutual exclusiveness of measurement arrangements. The Kochen–Specker theorem states that no non-contextual hidden variable model can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory when the dimension of the Hilbert space is three or more.
you can say that Bell is more about causality versus locality and KS is about contextuality and realism
>>7751976
>definiteness fails -> many worlds
Nice false dilemma faggot
>>7752233
>abandoning realism would for the physicist to acknowledge that he has no answer to the question ''why physics matter?''
Has little to do with each other. Physics matter because scientists help us make nice things like phones and televisions and what not, and everyone, realist or not, acknowledges this.
>>7752316
>Has little to do with each other. Physics matter because scientists help us make nice things like phones and televisions and what not, and everyone, realist or not, acknowledges this.
yes, the scientist has always catered to the needs of the hedonists.
ok
