Boy o boy, this man was a fucking genius.
I think that this board's time in history is ready for a Hegel thread
It's your time in >>>/his/
>>7562538
Hegel writes in the Philosophy of Nature §202b that
The truly philosophical science of mathematics as theory of magnitude would be the science of measures, but this already presupposes the real particularity of things, which is only at hand in concrete nature.
Generally, Physics is a chapter of Nature (namely the second, while the first one is "Mechanics" about space, time and matter (and their unity...) which of course we would subsume with physics), and nature is the externalization of the Idea (here), and the Idea is that which is objective and true in the Notion (here) and the subjective part of the Notion is deductive logical thinking, where one would locate also the activity of mathematics.
Translated suitably, this should resonate well with common modern undertanding: fundamental modern physics is itself a mathematical theory (for amplification see the first few slides here), hence physics is in a sense that which is "objective" in mathematics, in that it is the part of mathematics that connects to, let me say, the real world.
So if we say that the concept of mathematics is magnitude, or measure, then there is an "objective" aspect of that, which is that which gives reality, that is nature, in particular physics.
In case you care, I am preparing notes with more details here, for a workshop next week.
http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/22719/what-is-physics-as-a-hegelian-concept/22745#22745
anyone else notice how the zeitgeist of the 2000s is becoming increasingly different from the one of today?
>>7562582
https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/objective+and+subjective+logic
In his Science of Logic Georg Hegel makes a distinction between subjective logic, which involves concepts, judgements and deduction (as usual for logic), and objective logic which is concerned with something like the logos, a kind of ontology or metaphysics, not unlike the ontological deductions of Spinoza's system.
This objective logic as presented by Hegel is hence rather unlike common predicate logic, a fact that led to the rejection of this school of objective idealism by Bertrand Russell and the school of analytic philosophy.
In (Lawvere 94b) it is suggested that universal constructions in categorical logic and topos theory, such as adjunctions, should be thought of as the formal incarnation of Hegel’s objective logic. Related suggestions are implicit in many of Lawvere’s writings, see at Lawvere – Mathematics relating to philosophy.
Lawvere 92: It is my belief that in the next decade and in the next century the technical advances forged by category theorists will be of value to dialectical philosophy, lending precise form with disputable mathematical models to ancient philosophical distinctions such as general vs. particular, objective vs. subjective, being vs. becoming, space vs. quantity, equality vs. difference, quantitative vs. qualitative etc. In turn the explicit attention by mathematicians to such philosophical questions is necessary to achieve the goal of making mathematics (and hence other sciences) more widely learnable and useable. Of course this will require that philosophers learn mathematics and that mathematicians learn philosophy.
In (Lawvere-Rosebrugh 03, section C.1) the following characterization is given:
hegelians are a cult
>>7562592
Logic:
The science of logic in the ancient philosophical sense means the study of the general laws of the development of thinking. Thinking (1) reflects reality (i.e., has a content) but also (2) is itself part of reality and so has some motions that are oblivious to content. Therefore the science of logic finds two aspects of thought’s motion: (1) the struggle to form a conceptual image of reality that is ever more refined, whose laws we may call objective logic, and (2) the motion of thought in itself (for example the inference of statements from statements), whose laws we may call subjective logic. Although grammar and some aspects of algebra might be considered as subjective logic, we will limit ourselves to the part we will sometimes refer to as logic in the narrow sense – that which is related to the inference of statements from statements by means dependent on their form rather than on their content. (Logic in the narrow sense is explained in more detail in Appendix A.) Logic in the narrow sense is useful (at least in mathematics) if it is made explicit, and the work of Boole and Grassmann in the 1840s, Schr¨oder in the late 1800s, Skolem in the early 1900s, Heyting in the 1930s (and of many others) has led to a high development, most aspects of which were revealed to be special cases of adjoint functors by 1970 [La69b]. The use of adjoint functors assists in reincorporating the subjective into its rightful place as a part of the objective so that it can organically reflect the objective and in general facilitate the mutual transformation of these two aspects of logic.
Logic, Objective:
The long chains of correct reasonings and calculations of which subjective logic is justly proud are only possible within a precisely defined universe of discourse, as has long been recognized. Since there are many such universes of discourse, thinking necessarily involves many transformations between universes of discourse as well as transformations of one universe of discourse into another. The results of applying logic in the narrow sense to the laws of these objective transformations are necessarily inadequate; for example, such attempts have led to the use of phrases such as “let X be a set in which there exists a group structure,” which are essentially meaningless. Rather than using “there exists” in such contexts, one needs instead a logic of “given.” Before category theory, at least one systematic discussion of the laws of these objective transformations was given by Bourbaki, who discussed how one structure could be deduced from another. The concepts of categories, functors, homomorphisms, adjoint functors, and so on, provide a rich beginning to the project of making objective logic explicit, but there is probably much more to be discovered.
Related commentary is in (Rodin 14).
he was only perfected when he was turned on his head
/lit/ is not ready for him.
>>7562801
What's the name of this manga? I know it's an edit but even so.
>>7562538
Maybe in a couple years. Every time I read an excerpt of his, it just sound like so much fucking intellectual work. And there is so much easier low hanging fruit to go through first, it really doesn't make make sense for me at least right now.
I think if I took a class on him or something like that I would be able to do it.
>>7562884
The anime girls are cute.
>>7562894
Hint: get to know Parmenides and Heraclitus.
>>7562584
I hate that fucking word
I'm too dumb to appreciate or even understand Hegel. Why do I have interest in philosophy and literature if I can't fully appreciate it? Seems like a bad joke desu.
>>7562947
He meant to say the spirit of the time
>>7562538
>le poop on my friends and oh yeah everything is mystical fascism man
now that's what i call memes
>>7562945
Why? Because they are obfuscatory too? Or because they influence Hegel?
>>7562983
they are basically the greek versions of Hegel
>>7562990
*about them
*recommendedFuck it's so hot here I can't even type straight.
