>The essential moments of the system are really already completely contained in the pre-suppositions of the definitions, from which all further proofs have merely to be deduced. But whence have we these categories which here appear as definitions? We find them doubtless in ourselves, in scientific culture. The existence of the understanding, the will, extension, is therefore not developed from infinite substance, but it is directly expressed in these determinations, and that quite naturally; for of a truth there exists the One into which everything enters, in order to be absorbed therein, but out of which nothing comes. For as Spinoza has set up the great proposition, all determination implies negation (supra, p. 267), and as of everything, even of thought in contrast to extension, it may be shown that it is determined and finite, what is essential in it rests upon negation.
So is he saying that Spinoza's propositions are meaningless because they rest on principles which he himself negates? Or is there something beyond that that I'm missing?
Also
>There is lacking the infinite form, spirituality and liberty
Is he saying that these things must necessarily exist in order for Spinoza to be able to negate their existence?
>>8082548
>www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpspinoz.htm
Link to full text
>>8082548
Hegel is the best. I've never read anything by him but he's my favorite philosopher.
>>8082657
Believe me, I'm well aware of how unlikely it is I'll actually get an answer, but I might as well try.
>>8082548
I think he's saying basically Spinoza is begging the question
>>8082667
Yeah that's what I figured, but how does that lead to the part about "the One into which everything enters"? Is that just referring to Spinoza's conception of infinite substance?
>>8082548
He is criticizing Spinoza for, basically, working backwards: for positing thought and extension (for example) as expressions of infinite attributes, where this is just a conceptual confusion, for to carve out any feature of an entity is simultaneously to mark out what it is not, and therefore to make it a finite being. (This is what Hegel makes of the idea that determination is negation--he and Spinoza are working against a broad tradition that thinks of being as coming in degrees. Think Descartes: there is infinite being (God), and then finite beings (which causally depend on God), modes (which ontologically depend on finite beings,) Hegel opens his Logic with Pure Being, which shows how different he is from Spinoza, who opens with determinate Being.
I think Hegel is not quite right about spinoza, but w/e, this is a start. You might want to check out Yitzhak Melamed's paper "Acosmism or Weak Individuals?: Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite"
>>8083792
You might think that you can make sense of the idea that Being (or just to ease into it, God), has infinite attributes, and has them maximally...to the greatest degree possible. There is a long tradition of thinking in this way, so for instance Goodness is an attribute (say), and God has this to an infinite degree (as a perfect being), and finite beings only have this in a finite way, so that evil isn't a real thing but an absence (or privation) of the Good. The idea that Hegel is working with is that as soon as we start to single out attributes (to determine being), it becomes finite.
Listen, this is really several thousand years of terminology in metaphysics etc., so it's not strange that it is a bit obscure. But it really isn't impossible to get one's head around...it's difficult, but not bullshit like derrida or whatever.
>>8083839
Where did you learn to Hegel like this, do you have text suggestions?
>>8083850
UChicago and Columbia.
Anything I could recommend would be tailored to your background, so what sort of background in philosophy do you have?
>>8083866
Just graduated with a BA in Philosophy in Dublin, took a module on Hegel last semester and a year before that one on German Idealism but I felt like it was just scatching the surface.
>>8083839
So does Hegel agree that individuals are finite beings, or does he have a way to get around the determination/negation problem?
>>8083876
Yeah it took me a long time to feel like I had any sort of ability to read Hegel. But anyway, I think it is important to have some background in Ancient (especially Aristotle), some in modern rationalism, and particularly a bit of a background in Kant. (I can recommend things if you would like.) After that I think some of the best writers on Hegel are Robert Pippin, Christopher Yeomans, Paul Franks, Eckart Forster, Fred Beiser, and perhaps Terry Pinkard and James Kreines. They don't all agree with each other, of course.
Perhaps the most important book for english language Hegel literature is Robert Pippin's book Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness. This is a very Kantian, anti-metaphysical Hegel, though.
If you are specifically interested in Hegel and Spinoza, check out Yitzhak Melamed's work, including a book he edited on the topic. And for a general intro to German Idealism the best books are All or Nothing by Paul Franks and The 25 years of philosophy by Eckart Forster.
>>8083909
Thanks a lot man seriously, I could definately do with readings on Kant too. I've had a long interest in others writing and talking about Hegel but its like nearly a different language to me to try read him myself, I'm impressed by your competence.
>>8083927
In general the literature on Kant is so good that you are fine picking up one of the Cambridge Companions and looking through it as you read the Critique of Pure Reason. (Avoid Paul Guyer though, at least at first.)
But read Henry Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism (another anti-metaphysical Kant), plus check out Karl Ameriks, Peter Strawson, Allen Wood, Michael Friedman, Michelle Grier. Eric Watkins. You might want to look them up and see what aspects of Kant they work on, and pick and choose based on your interests and what you are reading. But there is far, far more Kant literature than Hegel literature and it is probably in general of a higher quality, so it's not as hard to find good stuff as it is with Hegel or some other philosophers.
