How could the Allies fuck up so badly?
It's almost unimaginable how one-sided the Battle of France was when two sides were pretty much evenly matched on paper.
France was using WW1 technology and tactics. Simple.
>>972330
France did want to entrench the northern border as well, but the Belgians began bitching about how it would isolate them from their ally France, which they ditched when it was to late to lengthen the Magionet line that much.
The Belgians should just have realized their fate is to get invaded either by Germans heading towards France or Frenchmen heading at Germany.
>WW1 technology
That's not true.
>>972330
Maybe the tactics were erroneous for too much reliance on the WW1 experiences but the technology was most definitely not on the level of the previous war. Although they were still far behind the 1944/1945 levels, I'll give you that.
>>972335
>WW1 technology
I meant that they technology was behind the german technology
>>972352
Fuck. Me Englishes wery goot.
>>972314
Politics buttfucked France because policy and monies directed and flowed irregularly for fifteen years.
Before anything, socialism determined France's fate.
>be England
>desperately need to defeat the Germans
>don't invade Texel, like they have done for centuries
Anglos...
>>972314
>It's almost unimaginable how one-sided the Battle of France was
Exactly how was the Battle of France one-sided? Both sides suffered huge casualties and traded set backs.
>>972352
It wasn't really though. German doctrine was far better suited to modern war but their equipment wasn't space age. 1 on 1 french armour was generally a match if not better.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_France#cite_note-2
wiki i know but the ww2 section is a decent overview.
>>972330
That didn't work in WWI so why did they think it would then?
>>972330
>France was using ww1 technology and tactics
Except they weren't.
Allied equipment was equal or superior to German equipment as far as ground forces went. It's really easy to lose though if your entire offensive action gets cut off and surrounded. The French and BEF went into Belgium where they thought the Germans were going to be, but it turned out that those sneaky krauts got behind them.
>>972364
France had been rearming since 1936 and compared to the other Great Powers they had spent a larger chunk of their GNP on the military. The French political establishment generally understood the need to spend cash on the military and French equipment was very good. Poor doctrine and bone-headed generals were the bigger issue rather than the cash flow.
>>972314
Battle of France is a textbook illustration about how technique, morale, and political will matters a lot more than equipment.
The French had more command and control issues than the German army; radios were in much shorter supply and a lot of communications relied on telephone (the wires of which could be cut or severed). They had also called up a lot of reservists as well and I think it's fair to say German morale was riding much higher.
On the purely tactical level the French dispersed their armour into 100-tank battalions sprinkled piecemeal among infantry divisions, which prevented them from being used as a mobile reserve to make rapid counterattack.
A typical German Panzer division in 1940 would have something like 350 tanks, with mechanized infantry and AT gun support; more than enough to overwhelm a given point on the front.
Even if the French had concentrated their tanks, the lack of radios, infantry-centric tank design (French tanks were well armoured, but slow), and the lack of any development of offensive doctrines meant they probably wouldn't have been very effective either.
Also while the French had a lot of aircraft on paper their serviceability was very low, something like a 30%.
That's not getting into the political issues or the memories of WWI's ghastly casualty rates either.
>>972314
Mass armored warfare had never been tried before. The Germans didn't know that their strategy of concentrating force in Belgium to bypass the Maginot line was the best way to use the new technology. It wasn't really a fuck up, more like the typical chaos and randomness of warfare.
>>972484
To highlight this, observe, the workhorse of German armored units during the Battle of France, the humble Panzer 2. By the time of the Battle of France, there were early mark 3s and 4s, but they were certainly not the majority, and in a few divisions were outnumbered by far by Czech design tanks, the 35t and the 38t.
>>972509
Other major issues was the complete disregard by French High Command for reports of the Germans clearly pushing through the Ardennes, the operational tempo of the German command being much faster at decision-making than French High Command (who doctrinally were expecting a much slower paced trench war in the style of WWI), as well as the resolve of the French leadership being badly shaken by a string of defeats like the complete collapse of the 9th Army.
>>972520
pic related
>>972509
>On the purely tactical level the French dispersed their armour into 100-tank battalions sprinkled piecemeal among infantry divisions, which prevented them from being used as a mobile reserve to make rapid counterattack.
Except you are completely mistaken and just repeating shitty old memes.
>>972509
>infantry-centric tank design (French tanks were well armoured, but slow)
You do realize the French had more than one type of tank, right? Specifically, they had slow, infantry tanks and fast, cavalry tanks. Their fast tanks were much faster than PZ 3s and 4s.
>>972521
>the operational tempo of the German command being much faster at decision-making
This also had something to do with the Auftragstaktik doctrine, that was deeply ingrained in the German way of fighting.
it wasnt a collosal fuckup and it wasnt a landslide victory
the distances are short, roads everywhere once you are out of the woods
britbongs not really eager to fight for frogs
frogs helpless once their initial plan fails
btw the maginot line was broken through aswell
the german losses were heavy aswell
it was fast because of circumstances
USSR suffered greater losses and fought on
>>972601
There were 3 Armored divisions for the French but they all were not ready for action by 1940 May.
>>972601
The French did have a number of mechanized divisions but the larger chunk of their tank strength was assigned to the independent tank battalions.
I'm not trying to portray the French as incompetent either; tanks and infantry are meant to support each other - but in practice this was hampered by the lack of combined arms training and more importantly the French doctrine of "methodical" battle, which emphasized carefully planned and executed set-piece engagements (which was admittedly somewhat required due to lack of radios).
>>972624
Yes, the French has a similar cruiser/infantry tank design philosophy as the British, but as said before a large majority of the tanks were assigned to infantry support and dispersed into infantry battalions and not meant to create/exploit breakthroughs.
>>972674
>There were 3 Armored divisions for the French but they all were not ready for action by 1940 May.
Your problem is that you don't know how the French army was organized in 1940 yet you cannot resist the urge to post as if you do. The French did not have formations called "Armored Division." They had rather 3 types of mechanized divisions: light mechanized division, light cavalry division, and light curassier division. The curassier divisions were the ones with the heavier tanks and get translated as "armored" divisions, but they were not the only armored formations, just one of three types.
All in all, by 1940 May, the French army had 3 curassier divisions, 5 light cavalry, and 3 light mechanized divisions. That compares favorably to Germany's 10 panzer divisions in terms of massing armor, and only morons and memesters would claim that the French scattered their armor because they didn't understand that armor should be used in independent, mobile formations. Like this guy, >>973966
