Why did the german general staff decide to attack france before russia? Why not fortify alsace-lorraine and hold off a french attack over a much more narrow area, while attacking the less prepared russian army?
>>947089
Because they hugely underestimated the strength of France, having kicked the crap out of them in the last war, and hugely overestimated the strength of Russia, who was big, scary, and building railroads like nobody's business.
France, seeming the weaker opponent, was the one that they thought would crumple if they hit first and hard enough, which would then let them turn their full attention on Russia.
>>947105
I don't understand why that is the case. Successfully executing their plan would require a meticulous understanding of the French operations, and given how close they were to paris at the battle of the marne, they almost achieved their goals. I'm not really confused by the minutiae of the operation, I just don't see the strategic reasoning behind it.
Germany didn't have a contiguous border with russia at the time, so it would be more difficult to hold them off with a limited force and would leave them overly reliant on austria. A strong anti-russian offensive would have given france and britain a way to avoid the war if they wanted to and strengthened their austrian ally.
>>947089
I think fighting defensively on the western front would have been a better idea. Defensive tactics would have suited the static warfare which defined the western front, while avoiding drawing in the UK and Belgium into the war. Looking at their record on the eastern front, they could have concentrated their efforts on defeating Russia before taking care of France.
The Schlieffen plan was Germany's fatal error to begin with (even if they did get close to Paris)
>>947153
>I don't understand why that is the case.
Look up the Franco-Prussian war and get back to me.
> I'm not really confused by the minutiae of the operation, I just don't see the strategic reasoning behind it.
The strategic reasoning is that if they occupy Paris, France will almost certainly either bow out of the war or be too crippled to continue fighting effectively. It's much closer to your own bases than any sizeable target in Russia, whom, as the Napoleonic wars demonstrated, can often absorb huge blows and incursions into their own territory without folding.
Say you do kick off the war by launching an offensive into Poland. Then what? Russia can fall back and keep fighting almost indefinitely.
>. A strong anti-russian offensive would have given france and britain a way to avoid the war if they wanted to and strengthened their austrian ally.
Are you seriously implying France and the UK would just sit on their hands and do nothing if Germany looked like they were beating Russia and paving their way to become continental hegemon?
>>947217
>Franco-Prussian war
>if they occupy Paris, France will almost certainly either bow out of the war
Wasn't half that whole fucking war a six-month-long unsuccessful siege of Paris?
>>947217
t. aggresive poster
>>947229
The 1870-71 siege was successful, and it pretty much ended the war.
>>947153
>A strong anti-russian offensive
They didn't need a Russian offensive. They just needed a defensive.
Which they would've had if SOMEBODY hadn't hawkishly decided to throw Austria's entire manpower at Serbia.
>>947217
>Say you do kick off the war by launching an offensive into Poland. Then what? Russia can fall back and keep fighting almost indefinitely.
Destroying army groups is more important than occupying territory. If occupying territory became a priority, do it in bite size pieces. Napoleon failed because he over extended his supply lines. At a certain point, the russians would decide the continuous occupation is to costly for them and begin negotiating.
>Are you seriously implying France and the UK would just sit on their hands and do nothing if Germany looked like they were beating Russia and paving their way to become continental hegemon?
The same thing would happen if they achieved a rapid victory over france.
>>947217
Wasn't the UK only brought in when Belgian neutrality was violated?
>>947239
Wait, Paris eventually fell? I thought the war ended on a stagnant stalemate that required negotiational absurdity to even get Elsass-Lothringen from them.
>>947252
Russia isn't starting the war fully mobilized. The entire Schlieffen plan is hinged around knocking out Russia before they're able to mobilize, drill, and throw their manpower at Germany. This isn't Barbarossa, where some 90% of their army is within 100 km of the border.
And in any event, such a salami slicing strategy will take time, which is very much against Germany, they're not in a position to fight as long of a war as their adversaries, especially Britain and France.
France, on the other hand, has an enormous amount of their vital industry and population centers within a day's march of the border. You can deliver a knock out blow, if you manage to land it, far more quickly than anything you can throw at Russia.
And if it does work, you knock France out, you're sitting pretty. Britain has a huge fleet, but they don't have much of an army, and gallipoli demonstrates the enormous difficulty mounting amphibious invasions. Without a second front to have to deal with, you can take your time with the Russkies. And an indemnity against France, especially levied in the form of food tribute, will ease a lot of the effects of the blockade.
>>947261
That was the trigger, but they were ratcheting tensions with the German empire since the beginning of the century. And British foreign policy for the past 300 years or so was "Prevent anyone from getting too strong in Europe". There's no reason to change tack in 1914. If not Belgium, they'd find another reason to get involved as things got bad.
>>947266
Just copying from wiki, but
>On 25 January 1871, Wilhelm I overruled Moltke and ordered the field-marshal to consult with Bismarck for all future operations. Bismarck immediately ordered the city to be bombarded with large-caliber Krupp siege guns. This prompted the city's surrender on 28 January 1871. Paris sustained more damage in the 1870–1871 siege than in any other conflict.
>The Prussian Army held a brief victory parade in Paris on 17 February 1871 and Bismarck honored the armistice by sending train-loads of food into Paris and withdrawing Prussian forces to the east of the city, to be withdrawn from there as well as soon as France paid the agreed war indemnity.
>>947282
I'll have to look into the points you raised about the distribution of each industry.
>...they're not in a position to fight as long of a war as their adversaries, especially Britain and France.
I don't necessarily see that as the case given the length they held out in the war. I assume it would be easier for the Germans if Britain didn't have the pretext to engage. If we're being parsimonious, maybe the germans could engage in a war for 4-5 years. Though, the reality of this is obviously different from the perception of the german generals at the time.
With that said though, the majority of the russian population is centered to the west of the urals. With the prewar borders, the german/austrian forces could have reached the dnieper and formed a salient there.
Extracting resources from that region could compensate for germany's deficiency while incentivizing the russian army to engage them.
The weaknesses the russians showed in the russo-japanese war and the following revolution suggest to me that engaging the russians in a decisive battle would be enough to force a peace agreement. Particularly, if the Austrians succeeded against serbia.
>>947364
>With that said though, the majority of the russian population is centered to the west of the urals.
The majority of the Russian population is centered along the Volga; that's some 2,300 kilometers you need to cover if you're starting at the Oder, and occupy an area that's roughly as big as Germany. You're not getting there quickly. I'm not sure why you're so resistant to the concept.
Yes, looking with hindsight it's different, but the guys who came up with the Schleiffen plan very much thought that Russia was a lot stronger, especially politically, than it turned out to be, and that's what formed the principal basis of "Hit France first".
>>947364
>Extracting resources from that region could compensate for germany's deficiency while incentivizing the russian army to engage them.
They tried that in the Baltic (Ober Ost colony), but they found that the local population was too much of a drain on resources even when put on starvation rations and made to do forced labor.
>>947382
>The majority of the Russian population is centered along the Volga...
Isn't that modern russia, not an empire containing ukranians and poles? If I remember correctly, ukranians constituted about a fifth of the empire's population alone. You don't need to conquer all of the population, just capture enough to deny the russians the ability to recruit army that could effectively defeat you.
>Yes, looking with hindsight it's different, but the guys who came up with the Schleiffen plan very much thought that Russia was a lot stronger, especially politically, than it turned out to be, and that's what formed the principal basis of "Hit France first".
I suppose that's a failing on their end. They had roughly a decade to respond to the 1905 revolution.
>>947388
Will, the baltic is not the totality of the area. I wouldn't be surprised if they had the same results though.
>>947266
dude...just wiki.
>>947153
>given how close they were to paris at the battle of the marne, they almost achieved their goals
Schlieffen's plan wasn't that bad.
The basis of the plan was the Battle of Cannae, where the centre gives in to the initial advance and the enemy is then surrounded by the extended wings. The Bavarian troops in the south should have retreated in response to the French advance and lead them away so that the strong right wing could get behind and throw them against their defences. However, the Bavarians did not do that. They brought the French advance to a halt. This was later ruinous to the German planning, since it allowed Joffre to relocate his troops on time during the Marne battles.
Certainly, Schlieffen's plan was a risky thing, but I'm absolutely sure that if it had succeeded - and it could have succeeded just like the sickle-cut thing in WW2 - it would have been regarded as a move of military genius.
>>947159
>I think fighting defensively on the western front would have been a better idea.
No continental power planned defensively. France, Germany, Russia, Austria, ... - none of them wanted a lengthy war. Especially not Germany. Germany was in an indefensible position due to its geo-strategic disposition, and the German generals knew that in a two-fronts war, a lengthy war would always be ruinous. The other powers also felt that their societies weren't up for lengthy wars and feared they would collapse. They were wrong in hindsight - but that's how things were. Only Britain planned with a lengthy war in mind - not out of exceptional foresight but due to the geostrategic disposition of a sea-power that is favoured by lengthy wars.
>>947159
>Defensive tactics would have suited the static warfare which defined the western front
Very much what
>>947837
said.
No one went into the war thinking "let's dig in and fire artillery at each other for four years lol". The trench warfare of the western front was basically an exceptional phenomenon when compared to the entirety of the eastern, Balkan or MENA fronts. It also arose from the specific conditions of the front - relatively little space but large and well enough matched armies first clashed in very open warfare, but then the Germans failed in their objectives and only then decided to turn the war into trench warfare by pulling back to highly defensible positions and digging in (and changing their entire plan for the war which envisioned a quick victory in the west).
Von Schlieffen plan didn't defeat France because the frenchies learned their lessons of the previous war and build way more efficient railways, in which they could reinforce the frontlines more quickly. The krauts could not get more men than the frenchies ready to fight like before and so the war went into a stalemate.
>>947089
You have the benifit of hindsight, as you are assuming that because Russia collapsed in 1917 that they would also collapse in 1914. But if Germany invades in 1914 the Russians have a very different war on their hands and areally not yet at the revolutionary point
>>947300
>If not Belgium, they'd find another reason to get involved as things got bad.
Not necessarily. The decision to go to war in 1914 was far from unanimous, and had Belgium not been invaded it is likely that Parliament would not have approved a declaration of war. Bear in mind that the greatest perceived threat in Europe was Russia, not Germany, and the UK was staying onside with the Franco-Russian bloc.
