Can intelligence exist without consciousness? What mental processes are there that doesn't take place or are noticed by consciousness?
Mental events don't occur, stop talking about them like they're things
>>450326
>not posting the original
>>450326
What do you think our current AI does?
>>450990
Current AI isn't actually intelligent, or conscious
>>450326
Define Consciousness
>>450334
Would it feel better if I called them "properties" instead? So that pain would be a temporary property of consciousness that happens and then ends?
>>450990
I don't know, that's why I asked. I'd assume a functionalist (and as such computationalist) response would be yes since a lot of those people deny the very existence of consciousness. If assuming consciousness exist, could we count something unconscious or non-conscious to act intelligent?
>>451003
Awareness of oneself and/or your environment. Being able to imagine mental objects without them actually existing outside of the mind (me imagining a red ball doesn't mean there's an actual red ball in my head). I'm sure there's better definition to it but I believe said definition would do for the question at hand without being in the way or making this into a "consciousness doesn't exist-thread", since the very premise of the thread assumes consciousness exist.
>>451019
No, because 'consciousness' would be a mental event if it existed
>>451032
Ok, define intelligence
A computer today can do things that a human never could but they are still not considered intelligent.
>>450334
What the fuck does this even mean?
>>451333
Consciousness is an illusion.
>>451503
I feel like I'm 90% of the way to understanding this, but then what is being fooled? What experiences the illusion?
Am I looking at it wrong? I must be.
>>451032
>Being able to imagine mental objects without them actually existing outside of the mind
Not possible, everything stems from experience.
Bacon...
>>451515
Nothing is experiencing the illusion, you're just thinking you're thinking.
>>451050
> Ok, define intelligence
I'm not sure I can do that. Part of why I'm throwing out the question for people to discuss.
>what are supercomputers
>>451032
>Awareness of oneself and/or your environment.
Proprioception isn't exclusive to humans.
>>451032
>Being able to imagine mental objects without them actually existing outside of the mind (me imagining a red ball doesn't mean there's an actual red ball in my head).
Hallucinations and other perception errors can occur in dogs, for instance.
Meta-cognition is exclusively human at this time. That is, only humans are aware of their inner workings, aware that they think and feel and aware of what they think and feel (though not completely and sometimes mistakenly). Other critters simply feel, without awareness of the it, even if these sensations can be more complex than we usually give them credit for.
>>451503
Consciousness is a mental experience. It's as real as, say, pain. It's not real in the concrete sense, but most people that actually study cognitive processes and neurobiology still refer to emotions, thoughts, memories, etc, because these are useful concepts. They convoy more meaningful information than statements like "there is a spike of activation in my frontal cortex" and describing the physical phenomena that is occurring within.
In shorthand, it's faster to say that yes, these mental phenomena are real, though they are (virtually*) reducible to physical phenomena.
*it would be possible to understand the mind solely as physical phenomena IF we had a lot more data about it and a lot of processing power, but alas we can't currently understand the emergent phenomena of the mind, at more fundamental levels
>>452698
>Consciousness is a mental experience. It's as real as, say, pain.
What is pain but a mental event, that is, something that doesn't exist?
>>452798
Did you read the rest of the post or are you just baiting?
Be honest, please.
>>452798
I did read the rest of it, but I don't see how your post addresses the claim that mental events don't exist. I see assertions that they do, but not reasons to believe they do.
>>452847
Do you believe in solids?
>>452892
OK, I'm not going to wait for the reply so here goes:
You perceive solid objects to exist. You perceive solids to behave the way solids to behave (rigid structural integrity, holding together). But when you move down in scale to more fundamental levels of physical reality, such as the level of subatomic phenomena, these things aren't observed. But you don't say solids don't exist, just because they don't exist at the level they, as phenomena, can be reduced to.
Likewise, you perceive emotions (total organismic states that prepare the organism for some sets of action) and perceive organisms to behave accordingly. It matters not that at the chemical level you can't observe emotions, you observe them at the behavioral level of the organisms.
>>452927
>You perceive solids to behave the way solids to behave
*You perceive solids to behave the way you expect solids to behave
>>452927
I would say that mental events and solid objects aren't comparable. Matter is visible and doesn't consist primarily of qualia. Mental events wouldn't e visible and would consist primarily of qualia if they existed. Again, you aren't addressing the claim that no mental events exist, you're making analogies.
>>452947
>Matter is visible and doesn't consist primarily of qualia.
The evidence for the existence of matter is visibility (I assume you actually mean "observable" rather than "visible", but I won't muddy up the issue)? Your visions of matter are sensations. To say there are no sensations is to say there is no evidence of the existence of matter. To say sensations are illusions is to say that evidence of the existence of matter are illusions.
But I digress.
I find these analogies valid. I honestly think it's all about scale.
>Are chemicals conscious? No. Are neurons conscious? No. Are brains conscious? Possibly.
>Are atoms solid? No. Are molecules solid? No. Are groups of molecules arranged in rigid structures solid? Sure.
You can extend this thinking to other hard sciences. There is no physical difference between living things and non-living things at the molecular level, so are biologist pursuing a fantasy? I say no. Our definition of "life" is a construct but is a useful one and it sure allows a lot of interesting research at that.
Ultimately you can argue that just because brains can work in a way that is compatible with my understanding of consciousness, that isn't proof of it being true, but then you'd be entering "you can't know nothing" territory. At this point, I'd say belief in consciousness is justified and it would be rather less parsimonious to expand my model to justify why consciousness isn't real, when considering consciousness to not be real doesn't increase the explanatory or predictive power of my theories.
>>453053
>I honestly think it's all about scale.
Why, though? Again, this is just an assertion.
>Our definition of "life" is a construct but is a useful one and it sure allows a lot of interesting research at that.
Why should we keep defining consciousness into existence, though? Again, life and mental events are different orders of beings. One is in principle observable, the other isn't. Give a reason to think mental events should be thought of as real things.
>>453070
>One is in principle observable
"Life" isn't directly observed, it is inferred from an object's behavior (reproduction), much like consciousness is inferred from certain behaviors (those that are deemed intelligent).
>>453070
>Give a reason to think mental events should be thought of as real things.
What do you understand by "real"? Do they have to be concrete things? Are mathematics and physical laws "real"? Or useful abstractions that do enable us to make sense of our observations of nature?
Anger, fear, sadness, and such things are useful concepts. Recognizing these states in organisms allows us to explain and predict behavior to a degree. To say they are illusions while being compatible with observed reality without offering a better model for explaining the behavior of sensible creatures is nonconstructive.
>>453254
An asteroid is real and not an abstraction. Is consciousness real in the way an asteroid is real?
>>453262
You didn't answer any of my questions.
Are you saying the asteroid is real because it is not an abstraction? So "3" is not real because I can encounter instances of 3 things but never isolate the quantity from the substance?
I'll say it's real. It's an emergent property of the brain's functions much like any solid (an asteroid, for instance) is an emergent property of n molecules/atoms/subatomic particles bound together.
It's not concrete in the sense that software, and behaviors are concrete, but they always have a concrete basis (they are functions of physical objects).
Feels like you are stuck in an awkward spot between naive realism and radical materialism.
>>453300
Are you claiming that numbers, asteroids, and mental events are all equally real? Why do you think the idea that any of these are real is uncontroversial?
>>453304
They are real in that they help describe, explain and predict reality. Some people can't conciliate their material monism with the understanding that just because everything is made of matter, not all things are inherent to matter.
I wanted to drop this pic with my last post (>>453300) but I forgot. I think it illustrates well my stance. "Consciousness" describes functions of the brain. I feel it meshes well with the notion of brain-computer and mind-software.
>>453351
>They are real in that they help describe, explain and predict reality
Asteroids help describe, explain, and predict reality?
>Thinks he's making a point about mental states
>Posts brain scans
You know brain states and mental states are different, right?
>>450992
>It's only intelligence if I say so
>>453368
Well, the concept of asteroid. Asteroids themselves are real in the sense that they are part of the reality that is described, explained and predicted. Likewise, there really is conscious experience and emotions happening inside my brain.
>>453368
>You know brain states and mental states are different, right?
Mental states (knowingly or unknowingly) refer to brain states.
Like I said in >>452698
>most people that actually study cognitive processes and neurobiology still refer to emotions, thoughts, memories, etc, because these are useful concepts. They convoy more meaningful information than statements like "there is a spike of activation in my frontal cortex" and describing the physical phenomena that is occurring within.
So, that part of my stance had already been established.
I never consider conscience to be apart from the brain. I never argued for dualism, and I do not think dualism is compatible with my stance.
>>453428
>Anything is intelligent if we define intelligence badly enough
>>451503
>an observable phenomenon is an illusion
Please let's not do this.
>>453438
>Likewise, there really is conscious experience and emotions happening inside my brain
Why should I believe that? The concept of asteroids and asteroids are not identical, you can't just say 'I see an asteroid so my concept of it is a substantial and real entity' without explaining how you arrive at that conclusion. You repeatedly fail to offer an explanation.
>Mental states (knowingly or unknowingly) refer to brain states.
Again, you're presupposing the existence of mental states and not offering an explanation as to why I should believe your propositions. Whether or not it's been established that you think mental states exist, it hadn't been established that brain states (in fact observable) 'late 'referred to' by mental states (in principle unobservable).
Why am I only me and not someone else?
Why do I occupy a position in time and space that is peculiar to one clump of matter with a brain? Why am I not simultaneously experiencing all consciousnesses?
>>450326
We'll never know. You can't measure consciousness, only intelligence, so you'll never know if the human/machine/alien/other sitting opposite you is actually conscious, no matter what tests you run.
I'm inclined to believe that a certain level of intelligence would inherently bring consciousness along as an emergent property, but I can't prove this.
>>453472
>I see an asteroid so my concept of it is a substantial and real entity' without explaining how you arrive at that conclusion.
My concept of asteroid isn't substantial. I never said it was and it doesn't have to be for my stance to make sense. I don't see how you made that jump.
>>453472
>Again, you're presupposing the existence of mental states and not offering an explanation as to why I should believe your propositions. Whether or not it's been established that you think mental states exist, it hadn't been established that brain states (in fact observable) 'late 'referred to' by mental states (in principle unobservable).
>>453472
>it hadn't been established that brain states (in fact observable) 'late 'referred to' by mental states (in principle unobservable).
That isn't much of a sentence.
Are you saying you don't feel when you are awake, or when you are hungry, or when you are in pain? How are they not observable? Neurosciences find physical correlates between these experiences and physical processes, so I find that the distinction is of little meaning. It's like saying colors aren't real because, "really", there are only different wavelenghts of light and color is "just" your subjective perception of the photons that reach your photoreceptors, man. *hits bong*
>>453486
How do you forget and fail to notice things? Your brain is pretty limited even within its perception of its own experience
If artificial intelligence developed to the point where you could program a robot to have every intellectual nuance of a human being, would it then matter whether it was placed in a body or whether it was merely a phenomenon taking place within an artificial environment?
For example, let's say I was playing Grand Theft Auto, and the artificial intelligence programmed for the human NPCs was the same as the artificial intelligence used for modern androids. Meaning each of them perceived the game world as being reality that they exist within. Would it then be unethical to shoot one of them in the face?
>>453486
You mean
>why am I me and not a billion different neurons, or a trillion different atoms
The answer being that the rate of data transfer between the parts of your brain is so fast that the whole thing stays more-or-less united. This can be seen most clearly in people with certain mental disorders, where some parts of the brain have very low transfer with the rest of the organ and develop their own personalities as a result.
If you could plug everybody into some future Internet with an extremely high baud, individuality would disappear.
>>453574
>Would it then be unethical to shoot one of them in the face?
I would say so.
But, you'd probably wouldn't want your cannon fodder to feel pain, so only absolute sadists would want to play a game like that.
I'd rather have the AI functioning as a very competent Game Master, using the NPCs (really just empty husks shaped like people) as puppets.
>>453605
That's actually not what I mean at all. You changed the question into one that was easier to answer.
>>453605
>the rest of the organ and develop their own personalities as a result.
Split brain is scary, yo.
>>453605
>individuality would disappear
From the hivemind's perspective, it would just seem like it lived 7 billion separate lives up to a point. I try to imagine what that would be like and I feel a bit nauseous.
I think one of the pics in the CAPTCHA is a flaming poo bag.
>>453618
I've answered your question as I understood it (which is all anybody can do). If you don't have an answer, one of us has clearly misunderstood the other. I think it's you, but then, of course I would. I've explained why consciousnesses form broadly discrete units, which leads to the conclusion that you are a discrete unit, and therefore do not experience everything. How is this not answering your question?
>>453564
>I don't see how you made that jump.
I asked if they were real in the same sense and you implied they were.
>Are you saying you don't feel when you are awake, or when you are hungry, or when you are in pain?
I'm saying that there's no reason to rope minds into something that can be adequately explained by brain states. Occam's razor says we should accept the simpler explanation: the one which doesn't need minds or consciousness to exist for brains to work.
>
Are you saying you don't feel when you are awake, or when you are hungry, or when you are in pain? How are they not observable?
How are they observable? I feel hungry when my body is in the right conditions. It doesn't follow that 'hunger' exists as a mental state. We have evidence of brain states. We have none of mental states.
>*hits bong*
So you don't like the idea that the sensations we feel are products of brain states. That's no reason to stoop to this level of discourse.
>>453635
Maybe he is the guy that thinks that you can only either be a dualist or an eliminative materialist.
>>453635
I'm sorry. I re-read your comment and it actually did answer my question after all, in a really interesting way too. Thank you.
>>453642
>I'm saying that there's no reason to rope minds into something that can be adequately explained by brain states. Occam's razor says we should accept the simpler explanation: the one which doesn't need minds or consciousness to exist for brains to work.
The thing is that eliminative materialism doesn't offer alternative explanations for the things that more mentalist frameworks can explain. If you pick up a book on neurosciences, the references to mental states are always there. The fact that they can virtually be reduced to more fundamental physical phenomena does not mean that they are actually convertible when push comes to shove. Like I said, at this time we don't have all that capacity.
If you have alternative models to those used by, say, Damásio (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damasio's_theory_of_consciousness) do keep us on the loop.
>>453642
>So you don't like the idea that the sensations we feel are products of brain states. That's no reason to stoop to this level of discourse.
I never said they aren't. Right in my first post >>452698 I said:
>mental phenomena are real, though they are (virtually*) reducible to physical phenomena.
>>453689
>I never said they aren't.
Why did you make that bong comment then? This isn't a reductivist position, this is an eliminativist position.
>>450326
>that comic
Vikingboos, when will they learn?
>>453713
Because I mentioned colors and subjectivity in the same sentence. You never smoked weed or had a philosophical friend in high-school? You must've have heard something like "how do you know we see the same colors? maybe we see different colors but call them the same names" sometime.
Anyway, the serious point I was making is that color can be used to refer to real things, even if color doesn't directly refer to a concrete physical property of objects. You understand that some wavelengths of light cause you to see some color or another and that some surfaces will reflect only a part of the light that reaches it into your eyes and [insert here information which clashes with the conception of colors as concrete physical properties of objects and favors a representationalist stance with color as the flawed interpretation of data you can't directly access]. But only a willfully obtuse person would insist that color is not real. It might not be a 1:1 match to concrete reality or even the emergent properties of external reality in general, but you understand that color refers to something real. Mental states are the same for brain states.
>>453780
>Because I mentioned colors and subjectivity in the same sentence. You never smoked weed or had a philosophical friend in high-school? You must've have heard something like "how do you know we see the same colors? maybe we see different colors but call them the same names" sometime.
I smoke weed every day. I thought you were making a disparaging comment about that argument.
>color can be used to refer to real things, even if color doesn't directly refer to a concrete physical property of objects.
So you admit there is no concrete physical property identical to mental states. I just don't see why you feel like mental states are an important explanatory tool.
>>453789
>So you admit there is no concrete physical property identical to mental states.
There is no concrete physical property identical to anything you perceive because perception is a flawed, limited, interpretative process that occurs mostly automatically outside your consciousness. In this, mental states aren't different from other things that you treat as real, like the color of someone's jacket.
>I just don't see why you feel like mental states are an important explanatory tool.
Because it's bitching hard explaining important stuff like how and why we act the way we do without referencing mental states (the behaviorists tried but they were replaced by cognitivists simply because the cognitivists could explain more stuff).
Ultimately, if we could reduce all our models to physics and retain all their utilities, that would be excellent. One grand unified theory. But we can't. Not right now.
>>453832
>In this, mental states aren't different from other things that you treat as real, like the color of someone's jacket
Why do you equate these phenomena like this? I really am not seeing much similarity between electromagnetic radiation and mental states.
>Because it's bitching hard explaining important stuff like how and why we act the way we do without referencing mental states
What do you mean? Mental states are complicators, they don't make anything simpler.
>>453864
>Why do you equate these phenomena like this? I really am not seeing much similarity between electromagnetic radiation and mental states.
That's oversimplifying the nature of color. We went over this in the last few posts.
>What do you mean? Mental states are complicators, they don't make anything simpler.
I don't want to repeat myself anymore. So instead of going on about how actual experts on the brain refer to mental states again, I'll point to one aspect of scientific theories: they are meant to be conservative, as in, the new theory should be able to explain and predict as much if not more than the old theory. Theories on brain disorders and such refer to mental states. If you can make a new theory that explains and allows us to make predictions as accurate as these, without referring to mental states (consciousness, attention, memory, perception, preference, decision, emotion, pain, pleasure, etc), you'd be a revolutionary thinker.
