I don't understand.
Was there something purely potential for something purely actual to actualize into whatever the actuality of the potential thing is?
is something potential actualzied and when it is actualized does it become closer to god?
is something potential when becoming actual becomes potential to its pre-actual state, and does that mean that removing the actuality would return it to its potential state (but this would be the new actual) thus removing the necessity of the other actual thing to actualize it?
>>429118
rationalism is a nihilism
>>429120
what's rationalism?
>>429122
nevermind i wikipedia'd it.
so what would be the opposite to the rational view? if something can't be comprehend through reason then can anything be comprehended at all?
>>429123
Nevermind, empricism is the competing view against rationalism
>>429118
>>140350
Catholicism took the rationalist trend as opposed to Orthodoxy's mysticism. That said, the monastic life that is the main draw between Buddhism and Christianity was largely shut down by the Reformation in Europe. The Reformation was not only anti-clerical but anti-monastic so Europe's contemplative tradition is more older material and thus harder to get into for the Catholic parts of Europe that retained the monastic tradition despite. There was exceptions though. The Imitation of Christ is the standard go-to book for Catholic ascetic, akin to Orthodoxy's Ladder of Divine Ascent. More recently there is Thomas Merton who is a mid-20th century contemplative and fantastic author on both the western tradition and it in comparison to Eastern religions.
>>429173
That's nice but I don't care about the catholic church, I'm trying to understand Aquinas here.
>>429118
>This chain cannot be infinitely long.
>An infinite number of inert members cannot do anything.
Those two sentences are unrelated. If we assume that an infinite number of inert members cannot do anything, that's fine. But that doesn't mean the chain of potential and actual events can't be infinite. Who says we ever had an infinite number of inert members? Maybe change and motion are permanent and infinite. If this is the case, then there's no reason to assume that there's a purely actual first member.
Aquinas' argument more or less boils down to
>the universe is built upon causes and effects
>by definition every effect must have a cause
>therefore the universe must have a cause
>let's call that cause God
>God doesn't have a cause even though above we stated that everything must, because I say so
The same argument he makes for God being the first purely actual cause could also be used to argue that the universe itself is the first purely actual cause.
We don't know exactly what was happening more than 10 billion years ago because it's difficult to get data from that far back in time. Scientists are coming up with some interesting ways to try though. Maybe it was an omniscient God creating the universe. But for now we really don't know, and assuming so based on fallacious logic is an exercise in building a constantly shrinking "God of Gaps".
>>429804
>Those two sentences are unrelated.
I'm not so sure. Remember that the whole point of the chain is to explain why the thing at the end of the chain (e.g. water) actualises a potential (i.e. freezing). An infinite chain of inert members wont explain shit, so the chain has to have a non-intert being, which would mark the end of the chain.
>Aquinas' argument more or less boils down to...
Don't be so hasty, remember that Aquinus is using Aristotelian terminology here. The argument you present of course doesn't work, but it's also not a good translation of Aquinus' argument either. A better formulation might be:
>Something (call it s1) that was potentially X, has become actually X
>Something must have actualised the potential of s1, but it could not have been s1 because s1 was only potentially X, so could not have had that causal power.
>So there must be some other thing, s2, that actualised s1's potential.
>But then s2 had a potential (e.g. the potential to actualise s1's potentiallity) that became actualised.
>But neither s1 nor s2 could have actualised s2's potential, since both were inert, being only potentially the way they are now.
>so there exists some other thing, s3..
>...
>This chain can't go on forever, since then there would be no explanation of why s1 became X in the first place.
>Therefore the chain ends with an object that is pure actuality (i.e. has no un-actualised potentialities).
And then, as in OP's image, you can derive that this being has all the classical attributes of God.
The reason this wouldn't work on the universe is because the universe is not a being of pure actuality. The universe, being a thing which changes, has many un-actualised potentialities (i.e. since the universe is growing, it is potentially bigger than it actually is right now, but is not actually bigger than it currently is since that would be a contradiction).
Actuality and Potentiality are nothing more than human constructs for explanation in certain metaphysical systems.
>>429118
>>429804
Too bad for him observations of thermodynamic laws poke holes in this theory: the heat death of the universe is inevitable.
Using his model, this either means that "god" or whatever super-cause at the head of the chain is losing potential (with no explanation as to how), or that the universe is a closed system / 'chain ring' of causes and effects that each operate at a loss and feed into each other perpetually.
In either case, as latter anon says, there is no explanation for the existence of the chain itself.
If the purpose of this theory was to first explain the existence of a creator / how the universe began, and then how the universe operates in the present, then it fails on both counts.
>>429945
But if actuality and potentiality don't exist in nature, then what about dispositional properties? Sugar has the disposition to dissolve in water and in that sense has the potential to dissolve in water, even if it never actually dissolves in water. And things can be potentially X without being actually X. I am not actually in Paris, and am not actually travelling at the speed of light, but the two are differant because I COULD go to Paris and so have the potentiality to be in Paris, yet I cannot travel at light-speed and so do no have that potentiality.
If you deny the actuality/potentiality distinction, then you can't have dispositional properties either, which are all over the place in the natural sciences.
>>429949
You have to remember that Aquinus does not see God as a physical object (such a view would be herasy, in fact), so there's no a priori constraint on God that He has to conform to the laws of physics. In fact, Aquinus would probably say that these very laws flow from God's own will, and so cannot constrain Him as they constrain physical objects/systems.
It's an argument for the existence of a being of 'pure actuality', that is, a being that doesn't have any properties *merely* potentially, but has all of it's properties actually. See >>429974 for an explanation of why this distinction matters. It's not an explanation of why the world exists, but an argument *from* change to the existence of this being.
God, if He is such a being, cannot 'lose potential', because that would imply a change in God, which would further imply that at some point in time He had some property only potentially which was then actualised. But if God does not have any properties potentially, this is impossible.
As for the whole chain-ring thing, this possibility is excluded from the current discussion by the fact that the chain we are talking about is a chain of causal *explanation*. You can't have a chain of explaination that goes 'well p happened because q happened, which happened because p happened', since that doesn't explain anything at all.
>people still take Aquinas seriously
>mfw
>>430046
>>430082
>levitated when praying
Pfft. I'll believe it when I see it.
>>430011
>'well p happened because q happened, which happened because p happened'
That's redundancy. I'm talking about recursion and general equilibrium.
There's no point to personifying the Source Of All That Is as a person or intelligent being. Such a thing does not describe the potential or actual or some strange hybrid of the two, but a third factor - the laws that determine their operation and interaction.
By all counts, even this model, "God" is law and nothing more.
>>430082
>None, Lord, but Thyself
So he was a fag?
>Oh~ Take me, Jesus!
>>430163
>Aquinas gets taken up the rear by Jesus in heaven
>Jesus yells "Get thee behind me, Satan!"
>Lucifer appears, begins to fuck Jesus in the ass
>eventually, the potentiality of Satan and Jesus going double anal on Fineass Aquinas is converted into an actuality
>>429930
>>429930
>Something must have actualised the potential of s1, but it could not have been s1 because s1 was only potentially X
>But then s2 had a potential
>But neither s1 nor s2 could have actualised s2's potential
>so there exists some other thing, s3..
>This chain can't go on forever, since then there would be no explanation of why s1 became X in the first place.
I see no reason why the s1, s2, s3, s4, s5..... chain cannot be infinite.
>The reason this wouldn't work on the universe is because the universe is not a being of pure actuality.
To say that God is "pure actuality" is to say that he has no potential, which I guess is supposed to be Aquinas' point anyway. But Aquinas argues that God is "pure actuality" because he asserted that all potential must have a actual cause to first exist, and he had already decided that God mustn't be caused. He did not believe that God created the universe and then disappeared, he believed that God continues to act in the universe in current time. But if God is "pure actuality" and therefore has no potential, how is it that God continues to act? He's ignoring his own definition of potential, because to apply it here would suggest that God is in fact caused. This argument also leads to >>429949 point that God would appear to be losing his potential. Even if we stick with the assumption that God is purely actual, then he would still appear to be losing actuality.
>>430200
>their dicks shoot gerbils and rainbows
>potential leather clubs realized in an orgy of actual faggotry
>>430203
I want to add that I'm aware my phrase "losing actuality" doesn't really make much sense. Once again, it seems to me that Aquinas is convoluting his own terminology by claiming that God continues to act and will have the ability to act in the future while existing as pure actuality with no potential.
>>430133
>I'm talking about recursion and general equilibrium.
The point is that Aquinus isn't, so it won't you much good if want criticise his argument. You have to engage with Aquainus on his own terms, otherwise you risk putting words in his mouth. Or, if you're not careful, if could lead to accidental strawmanning.
>There's no point to personifying the Source Of All That Is as a person or intelligent being.
Strictly speaking, Aquinus would agree with you that we should not characterise this being *literally* as a person, since he is the archetypical 'Classical Theist'. Classical Theism is strictly opposed to the thesis of Theistic Personalism (i.e. the thesis that God exists and is a person in a very literal sense). I reccomed the stanford encyclopedia actical for more infor about this.
>Such a thing does not describe the potential or actual or some strange hybrid of the two
Well it's not supposed to, God (or 'this being Aquainus' is arguing for', if you don't quite feel like calling it God) is a being of *pure* actuality: absolutely no potentiality whatsoever. Wood can be potentially on fire but not actually on fire, and in this sesne has potentiality, but God cannot have any potentiality according to this argument.
>By all counts, even this model, "God" is law and nothing more.
Nope. A law is of a completely differant ontological catagory than objects/substances. The argument is for the argument of an *object*, not a law. So to say that God is law (whatever this might mean) is to outright contradict Aquainus' conculsion, there's no open question here.
>>430237
That's probably because Aquinas didn't understand physics or object relationship and process modelling.
He muddles his theory by trying to cast God as an object (a human-like object), rather than as a system.
Gotta reinforce that traditional anthropomorphism, you know.
>>430203
>I see no reason why the s1, s2, s3, s4, s5..... chain cannot be infinite.
Because it's a chain of causal explanation. If the 'explanation' went on forever, then nothing would ever be explained.
>But if God is "pure actuality" and therefore has no potential, how is it that God continues to act?
Aquinus, remember, adheres to the doctrine of Divine simplicity, so his response would be that God is not distinct from his causal actions, and furthermore his causal actions are not disctinct from each other. So God does not change: he performs one action, which is simultainiously an action of knowing, loving, causing, creating, etc. And this action is in fact identical with his substance (i.e. with himself). Therefore, God's 'continuing to act' is not something like a 'change' in God, since Aquinus takes God to be absolutely immutible.
God is not caused, because a cause is only necessitated where a substance has a potentiality that is actualised, but God is of couse a being of pure actuality and so cannot ever have any potentiality. And God cannot 'lose' His potential either, according to Aquainus, since that would imply that He, at some stage, has potentiality, which is contradicted by the conclusion of Aquinus' argument.
>>430237
Again, to say that God gains or loses anything is to contradict Aquinus' supposeition that God is immutable (a doctrine which follows from this argument), so it really is a non-starter as an objection to Aquinus.
>>430248
>You have to engage with Aquainus on his own terms, otherwise you risk putting words in his mouth.
Okay.
>A law is of a completely differant ontological catagory than objects/substances. The argument is for the argument of an *object*, not a law.
Then I can't argue with him, can I? Objects are subject to procedures, and he's clearly struggling - and failing - to define what a procedure is with the idea of "potential as energy" and this god object.
It helps to re-define his ancient terms as something less obtuse:
>"potential" describes the processes undergone by the actual
>potential describes a procedure attached to an object
>"actual" describes a thing upon which a different thing's potential is utilized so as to cause its own potential to be activated
>actual describes an object that accepts an input, in the form of a procedure, from another object
In his model, he's referring to some specific procedure (growth) that all objects (seeds) inherently have access to, but only when other object's procedures are used on this object first (rainfall / sunlight). His model has one exception: God, which operates its own procedures upon the next object arbitrarily.
What does this describe?
It's clearly not a procedure, yet it can act upon an object as if it were.
It's clearly not an object, as it requires no input from another procedure.
This is a new kind of entity, a principle of operation that determines how and when a chain of procedures can occur, otherwise known as a law in the scientific sense (also known as a "manager class" of object).
In the end, even if you replace "object" with "actual" and "procedure" with "potential", you still get God as an abstract entity that governs potential. That is a law.
>>430259
>a human-like object
Aquinus was a Classcical Theist, meaning that he did not think that God is a 'person' in the absolutely strictly same sense in which you and I are. Rather, he thought that things like 'knowlwedge', 'love', and 'intelligence' could only be ascribed to God analogically (i.e. they indicate things about Him, but do not actually describe Him in the same way they describe us). He did not think that humans share any properties with God, since accordning to his views on divine simplicity, God has only one property, which is identical with his own self (this property is also identical with His 'power', 'goodness', 'knowledge', etc.). So Aquinus doesn't take God to be human-like at all, though he still thinks that man is created in God's image in the sense that words such as 'knowledge' can be applied to both, even if they do not carry exactly the same meaning in both applications.
>>429949
>not believing in flat earth
>>430526
Whether or not he accepted the "in his image" stuff, he still accepts that he can be jealous, vengeful, angry, loving, etc. as all the scriptures ramble on about.
That's still an attempt to make God - whatever it is - more human-like, aka anthropomorphism.
>>430491
>governs potential
>that is a law
No, that's a force. Laws describe forces.
>>430491
>>"potential" describes the processes undergone by the actual
>>potential describes a procedure attached to an object
>>"actual" describes a thing upon which a different thing's potential is utilized so as to cause its own potential to be activated
>>actual describes an object that accepts an input, in the form of a procedure, from another object
I'm not sure I agree with any of these definitions, and I think you might be misunderstanding the argument because of these definitions.
Potentiality is not a process. Object have potentiality when they have certain properties potentially. For example, Donald Trump, who might for all we know win the election, is potentially the President of the U.S.. Neither does potentiality describe a 'procedure attached to an object': Trump might never become Present (i.e. his afformentioned potentiality might never be 'actualised').
>>"actual" describes a thing upon which a different thing's potential is utilized so as to cause its own potential to be activated
>>actual describes an object that accepts an input, in the form of a procedure, from another object
You're overcomplicating matters here. Actuality is simply what it is to *actually* have a property as opposed to *potentially* having a property. The whole thing with accepting inputs etc. is not part of the definition, and so this definition puts words in Aquinus' mouth.
Now, the process of actualising a potentiality (e.g. if Trump does win the election and actually becomes the President) is indeed a process.
The exception of God is not arbitrary. Rather, Aquinus argues that since an object cannot actualise its own potential (seeing as an object that merely potentially has some property is, in an important sense, inert), we must appeal to some further object to explain why the potentiality of some object was actualised (e.g. the American people actualised Trump's potentiality and made him actually the Preseident).
(1/2)
>>430590
Since (as Aquinus says), such an explanatory chain cannot go on forever, since then nothing would be explained (an infinite chain of inert objects cannot explain the cause of anything), the chain must terminate at some final object.
This object cannot have any potentiality, since then we would have to appeal to some further object, and we alreadt stipulated this object to be the necessary end of the chain. So the object cannot have any propertues potentially, and so has no potentially but is simply *pure actuality*.
Aquinus then calls this object 'God', because he thinks that we can deduce that this object is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. I'm not so sure about this last step in his reasoning, but it definately is not arbitrary.
>>430548
Well yes, but to borrow an example from Aristotle, we can call a statue a 'man', even though we know that the statue is no real sense a man. In the same way, though St. Thomas thinks that there is a sense in which God is 'angry', 'vengeful', 'loving', etc. it is only in an analogical sense (i.e. the sense in which the statue is 'a man', though I don't mean to suggest that God is like a statue).
In other words, the anthropormorphisation is not actually a part of Aquinius' view of God, but rather a result of the literary flourishes of the Bible, meaning that one cannot seriously charge Aquinus of all people of anthropormorphising God.
>>430590
>The exception of God is not arbitrary.
I didn't say the exception or concept of God was arbitrary, just that its operation in this model is.
It requires no previous potential to do its thing, it just does so whenever / however / *arbitrarily*, as it's not acted upon by anything else.
This is a new class of entity, rather than an exception to or amalgam of existing classes.
That this new entity has all the same capabilities on the highest order of the other objects, rather than the lowest order or none at all, is Aquinas' optimistic assumption.
He can call it a self-realizing, all-knowing God. I call it a passive, know-nothing law.
>>430301
how does Aquinas establish divine simplicity, and what is to stop me from saying the universes acts are identical with its substance, something which is arguably congruent with observed phenomena?
>>430642
>It requires no previous potential to do its thing, it just does so whenever / however / *arbitrarily*, as it's not acted upon by anything else.
>This is a new class of entity, rather than an exception to or amalgam of existing classes.
To be honest, I think Aquinus would happily agree to these charges, since God must be, in a certain sense, 'free' and is fundimentally unlike any other existing object (not least because, unlike everything else, God has no potentiality bot only actuality).
>That this new entity has all the same capabilities on the highest order of the other objects, rather than the lowest order or none at all, is Aquinas' optimistic assumption.
Well no, it follows from the premises of the argument that God is an object with causal efficacy, and causes the changes in all other objects, since He is the highest link in the metaphorical chain.
>He can call it a self-realizing, all-knowing God. I call it a passive, know-nothing law.
This is contradicted by Aquinus' argument. Aquinus' God is the exact opposite of passive: He, in fact, causes all change in the universe. Perhaps you might question the claim of omniscience, but remeber that Aquainus (>>430638) takes such ascriptions of 'knowledge' to be analogical rather than literal.
And again, a law is not an object, and as we supposed in the premises, the chain of causal explanation is a chain of *objects*. Therefore, to siply states that God is a law contradicts Aquinus' argument without offering any rationale.
>>430692
>God is an object with causal efficacy, and causes the changes in all other objects
How does this make it all-knowing and all-seeing?
>>430692
>a law is not an object
You keep saying this, but what's your rationale for it?
A law is a concept, and concepts are, arguably, objects at least in the mental or abstract sense.
If you want to draw a line between physical and abstract objects, then why can God be an object and yet also be non-actual or whatever?
>>430684
Well, divine simplicity is a tricky subject, since not every theist takes it to be true. Theistic Personalists for example do not. Aquinus is a Classical Theist, not a Personalist. His doctrine of simplicity is derived partially from the Bible (though I can't remember any of the relvant verse numbers, sorry), and partially from argument.
That argument might go something like this:
>if God exists then He must be able to exist independantly from any other object (this is supported by the Bible, particulary Genesis where God is said to be the only existing thing prior to creation of the world).
>If God had parts, then He would not be capable of existing independantly of these parts.
>But since God can exist independantly of anything, He therefore cannot have parts.
>>430735
That seems to contridict the trinity, at least depending on how you define "parts"
that said, it doesn't address my second question, which I am more interested in
>>430702
You have to keep in mind that Aquinus ascibes properties like 'seeing' and 'knowing' to God in an analogical sense, and not in the same sense in which you or I see and know. The way Aquinus sees it, if God did not 'know' something, then it would lead to contradiction. If God did not know p, then he would have an un-actualised potentiality (namely: the potentaility of nowing that p), but that contradicts our conclusion and so must be false. The same goes for seeing, loving, etc. But you have to keep the analogical aspect of Aquinus' ascriptions in mind.
God potentially know that p (and sees that p) since he the cause of p coming to pass via His being the cause of all change in the world.
>>430758
>the analogical aspect of Aquinus' ascriptions
If everything is going to be dismissed as an analogy of some kind, there's no way to argue his points.
It's a fucking motte and bailey up in here.
>>430727
>A law is a concept
You say this, but that's actually very controversial position.
If a law is a mental object, then it is not a substance, since it cannot be concieved of as existing independanly from everything else (i.e. existence of a concept implies the existence of a mind in which the concept subsists). But only substances in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense can properly be said to have potentially or actuality, and since God has actuality He is not a mental object.
If a law is an abstract object, like a number perhaps, then it cannot be said to actually cause anything in the world (if it were an actual *cause*, then it would not be abstract but concrete). But it follows from the argument that God is a link in a chain of objects with causal efficacy, in which case God cannot be a abstract object.
>Why can God be an object and yet also be non-actual or whatever?
What!? The entire argument is to show that God is entirely actual. In fact, according to Aquinus at least, God has absolutely no non-actual (i.e. potential) features.
>>430756
The trinity is not parts. Partialism is a serious heresy.
>>430756
Yes, and that's why Theistic Personalists in particular don't really like the doctrine of simplicity as much as the Classical Theists. Since they think God is really a person (or 3) in a literal sense. That gets a little out of my comfort zone, but I'm sure there's stuff you can find online about that.
As for the second quesiton (which I'm sorry I didn't answer). The arguments for divine simplicity simply do not carry over to anything other than God, since they are always partilly justified by scripture, which strictly distinguishes God from the created world. The reason why you cannot identify the universe with its 'acts' is because these acts are distinguished from each other (e.g. the big bang is distinct from the heat death/big rip). So either you identify the universes' substance with just one of these acts, which seems arbitrary, or else with multiple of them, but then:
If
>universe=big bang (or any 'act' of the universe)
and
>universe=heat death (or any other 'act' of the universe)
but also since
>big bang≠big rip
it would follow that
>universe≠universe
Which is a contradiction.
>>430767
Well yeah, but that's just the way he is unfortunately. There are a bunch of theists that agree with you that it's bullshit, and they become Theistic Personalists.
>>430796
>law as a concept
>controversial
>Concept, n. - an idea of something formed by mentally combining all its characteristics or particulars; a construct.
That's probably the most general term anyone could ever use to describe "an idea of a thing".
You want to hold fast that a law is not a concept, but is abstract, but can't be an abstract object, which is unlike God, which is somehow both non-physical / non-substantive and an object at the same time.
That makes zero sense.
>>430840
What doesn't make sense? If a law is abstract then it cant be a cause, and if it's mental then it cant be a substance in the sense Aquinus and Aristotle understand it.
Since God is both a substance and a cause, then if being a concept implie being either mental or abstract, then God cannot be a concept.
And then if a law is a concept, then God cannot be a law.
>>430826
>If
>universe=big bang (or any 'act' of the universe)
>and
>universe=heat death (or any other 'act' of the universe)
>but also since
>big bang≠big rip
>it would follow that
>universe≠universe
>Which is a contradiction.
This is why we model objects with behaviors, instead of behaviors as objects.
>universe("big bang", "heat death")
>"big bang" != "heat death"
>universe == universe
This implies the universe is mutable. Who knows if it really is?
>>430871
Well if the universe *is* mutable, then simplicity is false with respect to the universe. Since then it would have some properties potentially and others actually, implying a multiplicity of properties and so non-simplicity.
>>430865
What if anon falsely described a "force" as a "law"?
A force is a cause and as ambiguously a substance as God is according to Aquinas. They are essentially equivalent.
>>430892
>simplicity and non-simplicity
These relative terms mean what to who now?
>>430897
Well no. You are right that a force is causal, but a force is not a substance, since a force is always associated with some massive body (i.e. the force vector is just the product of the body's mass with it's accelaration vector, if I can remember high-school physics correctly). Meaning that a force cannot exist separatly on its own (i.e. apart from a body), and so is not a substance in the relavant sense.
>>430912
Something is simple if and only if it has no parts. The kind of simplicity ascribed to God by Aquinus is even stronger than this: it says that there is no aspect of God's being (e.g. his actions or attributes) separate from any other. So you can't distinguish any of God's actions from each other, not from God Himself, at least according to Aquinas.
>>430920
If you can hike back down high school physics even further, you'll also recall that substances can't exist without those forces. It's rather mutual.
Where does God fit in there?
>>430930
>no parts
>hence, no substance
>God has no substance
>forces have no substance
Hmm, and the generally accepted excuse for this is...?
>>430932
>You'll also recall that substances can't exist without those forces
Well then perhaps you could say that *systems* of bodies and forces are substances, rather then either forces of bodies individually. The point is, forces aren't substances since they cannot exist separately from bodies, which answers >>430897.
>Where does God fit in there?
Well God is neither a force nor a body nor a body-force system. Substance doesn't necesserily mean physical, it just means something that can be concieved of as existing independantly. God is a substance, but that doesn't imply that He is either a body or a force or anything like that.
Physics as Aquinas understood it are incorrect. Objects are not static things that have a 'force' act on them. Rather objects are the force itself and nothing is static.
>>430952
God's substance isn't a part of Him, it IS Him. What the doctrine of divine simplicity states is that all of God's actions are identical with His substance.
Now, I don't know about God, but we KNOW that the universe is not simple in this way, since it has parts that are non-identical with each other.
God does have substance though, at least for Aquinas, since He is a link in a chain of substances.
>>430961
>God exists outside of the laws of physics and the observable universe
That begs the questions: what proof is there of a God?
Even if "something" created the universe, why should it be called "God" instead of, say, "The Thing That Made The Big Bang"?
To the extent of Aquinas' hyper-analogical model's application to reality, this is an argument of semantics.
To any other extent, there's no reason to invent a God to fill a gap in our ignorance.
>>430974
Well honestly, the details of physics aren't relavant to Aquinas' argument. The only premise he needs is:
>There are substances that which undergo change (i.e. which have propoerties potentially which are then actualised).
Whether these substances be bodies or forces (or electrons or whatever) doesn't matter to Aquinus' argument.
>>431001
Because if you read the rest of Summa Theologica, Thomas then goes into the necessary traits of an entity "outside the universe", and then brings that all back down to earth in the realm of ethics, everyday life, the universe and everything.
>>431007
Well then it's too bad he's not around, or else he'd have to update his model and argument with new evidence.
A dead man's dogma can't help anyone.
>>431017
Which means nothing because it's all speculation at best?
>>431001
Well sure, you don't have to call the thing 'God' if you don't like.
But if you accept Aquinas' argument, you have grant the existence of an uncaused, eternal and immutable, all-powerful and transcendanly existing substance. If you don't want to call it 'God' then I'm sure Aquinas wouldn't mind that much.
>>431007
It matters. It mattes so much that it removes his argument on the most fundamental level. Aquina's entire arguement collapses once the distinction between object and force is gone.
It means the source of all movement is self-caused. The concept of 'first mover' no longer exists since all motion is now self-generated. All movement is energy, all matter is energy. All matter is the universe. Thus all the universe is movement.
>>430871
I could make the argument that all events in the universe, indeed the universe itself is the same phenomena and they only seem as individual events from a relativistic perspective.
>>431018
>else he'd have to update his model and argument with new evidence.
No, he wouldn't, that's the point I was making. Did you even read my post? As long as the physicist admits that
>There exist physical objects
>These physical objects undergo changes
Then Aquinas' argument carries through.
>dogma
It's not a dogma if you argue for it.
>>431018
It's not even his arguement. It's a modified version of Avicenna's model which is itself a modified version of Aristotle.
Scholasticism is literally just taking Aristotle and Plato and trying to reconcile any differences between their theories and Christian dogma.
>>431024
That's a motte I'll buy for free, but I'm divorcing it from the word and preconceived notion of "God" to avoid the bailey.
I'm take that weak man and drop the weak bits by the curb, by golly.
>>431038
>it's not dogma if you argue for it
Dogma is only a belief and dogmatic is synonymous with stubborn.
You can argue for an inflexible platform, but that doesn't make it correct.
>>429118
Did nobody read this and think it was gibberish?
>>431061
All of it, really? Read it again.
It's logical, but makes some assumptions at the end.
>>431038
As long as the physicist admits that
>There exist physical objects
>These physical objects undergo changes
Then Aquinas' argument carries through.
Not necessarily, for instance I could describe a method by which objects change by their own. Or I could propose an alternative metaphysical framework which explains the cause of change equally well.
>>431034
But that seems very implausible. For one thing, if you want to admit that there are at least two such 'reletivistic perspectives', you would have to distinguish two aspects of the universe (unless you say that these perspectives are 'outside' the universe in some way) and so the universe wouldn't be simple.
So there could only be one such perspective at most, which is either outside the universe or identical with the universe (since the only other alternative would be to be inside the universe, which would imply the existence of a part of the universe, the perspecitve, distinct from the whole universe, which implies non-simplicity). If it's identical with the universe, then the universe is a relativistic perspective of itself.
So its a relativistic perspective of a relativistic perspective of itself
So its a relativistic perspective of a relativistic perspective of a relativistic perspective of itself.
Etc.
So what is the relativistic perspective percieving other than itself? Nothing, for if it were, then there would be a part of the universe distinct from the universe (i.e. the perspective), which implies that the universe is not simple.
And if the perspective were separate from the universe, then how could it percieve it? For it is a perspective outside the universe, and so not of the universe, which contradicts out supposition that it is a prersprecitve of the universe.
So in other words, the claim is a non-starter.
>>431043
Are you okay, man?
>>431106
Why is it necessary for the universe to be simple e.g. 'have no parts'?
>>431077
Well Aquainus is presupposeing certain Aristotelien premises, so it's not really a detriment to him if the argument fails within some utterly differant metaphysical system. Of course, you would have to argue against Aquinas' Aristotelianism before you dismissed the argument on this ground, since Aquinus and Aristotle do argue for these background premises.
>>431139
Seems to me he was hinting at a single part, not utter simplicity.
>>431106
in this case the aspects of the universe could only be distinguished from a forced perspective if such a thing exists. that parts could appear to be distinct when viewed in isolation, but to an "outside" observer, if such a thing existed, would see one phenomena which is timeless and unchanging.
>>431151
Well if he was hinting at one part, then the argument still applies. As long as he doesn't think the universe has any 'proper' parts.
>>431136
Having read at least some of Aristotle's metaphysics, he backs up his system through natural observation, which is why I have argued in the past that once those natural observations have been contradicted, those metaphysics must be altered to the extent they served as a basis for his system.
>if you accept all my made up physics and definitions, then this thing is totally true!
That's nice. Actual physics don't seem to follow that system though. Those mechanics were discarded a long time ago.
>>431165
Well, if it has one part, can't it have a perspective of itself?
Unless by 'part' you mean 'singular object' and a perspective counts as one (buh?), then anon would likely posit a relatively uncountable number of parts and perspectives.
Logically speaking, we still don't entirely understand how reality works.
If it's anything like the maths we use to justify it, then it involves a lot of irrational bullshit that can never be observed or quantified except through abstraction.
>>431028
I'm sorry, do you really want to say that ALL moverment is self-caused? Because then you're effectively removing cause and effect from the universe. Anything could move in any direction at any time for literally any reason any all movement is self-caused.
>>431202
Radioactive decay causes a change from "potential" to "actual" without an intervening "agent." "Potential" and "actual" are arbitrary changes in state over time. There is nothing inherently "potentual" about state 1 and nothing inherently "actual" about state 2. Even seemingly natural reactions like a loss of energy to achieve a greater stability can easily have their "actual" and "potential" reversed under the correct circumstance. The concept of anything being "pure actual" is nonsense, because the word "actual" does not have any real meaning in this context.
>>431197
Well if the universe has only one part, then that part must be identical with the whole universe (i.e. it isn't a proper part that is distinct from the whole). If a perspective is that part, then it follows that perspective, being a perspective of the universe, percieves only itself.
Now maybe I'm wrong to call a perspective a 'part' of the universe, but it seems to me that this follows from the supposition that the perspective is 'in' the universe.
>>431227
> There is nothing inherently "potentual" about state 1 and nothing inherently "actual" about state 2.
Aquinas would agree. You see, some things have properties potentially (e.g. Trump has the property of being president potentially) and some things have properties actually (e.g. Obama has the property of being president actually). The properties are neither potential or actual in themselves, but with respect to an object and a time.
>The concept of anything being "pure actual" is nonsense, because the word "actual" does not have any real meaning in this context.
Well it does, Aquinas says that God is pure actuality in the sense that He doesn't have any preperties merely potentially. That's all pure actuality means, and its ascribed to objects, not properties.
>>431243
If a perspective is abstract and is a result of the part, then it's not a substantive part of the universe.
Then, depending on what the 'universe part' is capable of doing, it could potentially have infinite internal perspectives.
>>431272
Ah, I think you're probably right. The universe could be one in respect of substance without being one with respect to attribute. And if a perspective is an attribute, then yeah, you could concievably have as many perspectives as you like. Unless of course you also wanted to call the universe one with respect to attribute as well. I mean, it still works as an argument against calling the universe one in the same sense of God's simplicity (which is simplicity with respect to attribute as well), which is what matters in the end.
Worth a try, anyway.
Do any other philosophers today use Aristotelian metaphysics besides the Scholastics/Thomists?
>>431271
If there is nothing particularly special about them except their relationship to time, let's use less loaded language. State1 occurs before the interaction, State2 occurs after the interaction. So State1 (liquid water) becomes State2 (ice water) when its heat transfers to another package of matter.
>God lacks State1s, therefore he is all State2s.
What does that even mean? Remember, we took out the loaded language of potential and actual because they were not descriptions of inherent properties and just dependant on time. But when you remove that loaded language (and therefore the distracting poetry of the statement of "God is pure actual") you're left with his actual statement that basically just says "x has all possible states without causes" which goes against the entire "everything has a cause" starting point. It's self refuting.
Pic realted might help.
Does anyone have that updated version of this picture?
>>429118
>I don't understand.
no one in this thread does
read a book instead
>>431320
Not the anon you are responding too, but I just wanted to point some things out.
>If there is nothing particularly special about them except their relationship to time
There is still the fact that a potency marks a capacity to become the thing it is in potency to. You can't just reduce it down to time, you have to remember the property/object involved as well. The only reason time even matters in this case is because at one time you can have the capacity for something that you actually have at the other time, time is the per accidens elements here, where the property/object is the per se object.
>everything has a cause" starting point.
Nowhere is that stated in the argument. The argument's premise is that if something changes then something else must change it, not that everything must necessarily have a cause/changer. Having a cause/changer is only relevant if you actually change, but if you never change from one state to another then you don't need a cause/changer, that is what a being of pure actuality is like. Talk of potency comes from being able to be changed from a potential state to an actual one, if you are the first changer/cause then this can't apply to you.
For God to be purely actual is to say that he is unchanging and has everything he could possibly have on his own, underivatively. Where everything else has everything they are derivative from it.
One of the corollaries of this argument is that God has/is one single act that extends across all of time. So he is a first enduring cause that is equally active at each moment and everything else arises from.
>>431297
Straight up Neo-Aristotelians who don't care about Scholasticism do.
>>431652
how would Neo-Aristotelians criticize the Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle?
