Clausewitz.

Dupuy

Mahan.

tolstoy

>>1112259
Boyd.

Machiavelli

>>1112259
Caesar

The problem with War philosophy and literature is that books can only help so much when it's time to actually command the battlefield.

Being the most well versed in battle tactics doesn't mean shit if you can't follow through and adjust your thinking to the changing situation and tide of the battlefield.

Best example of a well versed general who fucked up would be George McCellan. He knew how to drill his men, organize them, and field them in the positions they are supposed to be in by the book.

but once the battle started and he had to think on his feet on when to engage, when to defend, and when to hold a defensible point, he choked up because the books didn't teach him what specifically to do for the battle he was commanding.

This is why the better war books are left so generalized and vague like the Art of War, because war can't exist in a vacuum where every battle is going to look like the one a book described. Only battle experience and veterans who understand their current enemy's tactics and patterns are more of a godsend than a rulebook.

To those who did tho, they made a good effort. Machiavelli will always be a controversial pick, but general consensus will tell you that his methods are indeed effective, just the results very wildly in practice.

for a more modern example, Vo Nguyen Giap of the North Vietnamese made some wonderful works on asymmetric warfare, telling his methodology for engaging the French and Americans in guerrilla war. While not a specific rulebook or piece of philosophy, they're still worthwhile pieces to read. Especially his "Military Art of the People's War"

https://books.google.com/books/about/Military_Art_of_People_s_War.html?id=qtRWCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false