Why exactly does Kant take human reason as this entirely homogeneous thing that we have in common and that we can more or less be "solved" in its entirety(for the latter claim see the appendix to the Prolegomena, "Proposal for an investigation of the Critique, after which the judgment can follow" in which he says, regarding metaphysics, "...especially since the science concerned is of such a peculiar kind that it can be brought all at once to its full completion, and into a permanent state such that it cannot be advanced the least bit further and can be neither augmented nor altered by later discovery (herein I do not include embellishment through enhanced clarity here and there, or through added utility in all sorts of respects): an advantage that no other science has or can have, since none is concerned with a cognitive faculty that is so fully isolated from, independent of, and unmingled with other faculties”
What I most strange is his claim that the transcendental (or rather, transcendental concepts) is (are) required because this thing that he calls “reason” calls for it (them) itself and can only be satisfied by it (them).
See the paragraph that starts with (book linked in reply)
>It is true: we cannot provide, beyond all possible experience, any determinate concept of what things in themselves may be. But we are nevertheless not free to hold back entirely in the face of inquiries about those things; for experience never fully satisfies reason...
This justification of why we need concepts beyond experience hinges on the reader, well, giving a fuck. He even, defends the existence of metaphysics by placing emphasis on the fact that people can’t help but think about those questions due to their psychological make up:
>We have thus fully exhibited metaphysics in accordance with its subjective possibility, as metaphysics is actually given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and with respect to that which forms the essential goal of its cultivation
>Metaphysics, as a natural predisposition of reason, is actual, but it is also of itself (as the analytical solution to the third main question proved) dialectical and deceitful.
He, perhaps inadvertently, even himself makes a case for scepticism when he says:
>the demand that the attempt at such a critique which is now before the public be subjected to an exact and careful examination does not seem unreasonable – unless it is considered more advisable still to give up all claims to metaphysics entirely, in which case, if one only remains true to one’s intention, there is [4:372] nothing to be said against it
Clearly, he does not have people in mind who, well, do not give a fuck and would be totally fine not making any claims about metaphysical things about which they agree with him that, we cannot know anything about them.
My question being, is Kant’s way of thinking not thoroughly unconvincing for someone who well, doesn’t really have this craving of reason? Does he really think everyone has this spirit of inquiry?
Pic very very related
>>7990199
>Why exactly does Kant take human reason as this entirely homogeneous thing that we have in common and that we can more or less be "solved" in its entirety
He either didn't properly understand Plato or he was a low empathy autist.
Possibly both.
He does defend the possibility of metaphysics at all saying:
> Fortunately, it happens that, even though we cannot assume that metaphysics as science is actual,we can confidently say that some pure synthetic cognition a priori is actual and given, namely, pure mathematics and pure natural science; for both contain propositions that are fully acknowledged, some as apodictically certain through bare reason, some from universal agreement with experience (though these are still recognized as independent of experience). We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetic cognition a priori, and we do not need to ask whether it is possible (for it is actual), but only: how it is possible, in order to be able to derive, from the principle of the possibility of the given cognition, the possibility of all other synthetic cognition a priori.
But then, this entire argument once again rests on people actually granting apodictic certainty to certain claims, not so convincing for the sceptic.
Also, this is the book this all taken from: strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-prolegomena-cambridge.pdf
>>7990205
>He either didn't properly understand Plato or he was a low empathy autist.
What do you think Plato had to say about this?
My question phrased in a better way is:
Isn't trying to "critique" reason, hinging on the assumption that reason is this similar thing we all have and that it can in fact be critiqued in a manner that can be agreeable to everyone, a task doomed to fail?
More importantly:
>Does Kant assume that reason is this similar thing we all have and that it can in fact be critiqued in a manner that can be agreeable to everyone
Bump for interest.
>>7990199
My best answer is that he was steeped in the enlightenment tradition which basically held that all differences in ability for individual humans to reason were superficial, and that underlyingly there was a common intellectual capacity that transcends race, gender, maybe even age to some extent. This is laid out pretty explicitly in Descartes' Discourse on Method. The source of this in turn seems to be ancient rationalist thought that considered the intellgibility of the world itself to be something well-defined and determinate, and reason, being the power to grasp this determinacy, must itself be determinate. There is only one way to reason, since there is only one way things are, and so reason is inherently law-governed and internally consistent, justified by its own unified principles.
With Kant the unity of the 'way things are' seems to drop out a bit and the consistency of the mind seems to ground itself in its own operations. Kant promised a kind of fundamental underlying principle that would tie all this together, but it's not clear he ever gave it. The closest he comes is in the transcendental unity of apperception, the idea that nothing could actually be thinkable if it weren't thought as a unity, in particular the unity of the subject or 'I.'
>>7990222
>in a manner that can be agreeable to everyone
Certainly not, nor is this an expectation. You make a case and defend it against attacks, or modify your position after encountering sound criticism.
The soul, or the mind, or the self--the experiencing 'thing', whatever you want to call it--is also, for Kant, a transcendental object, meaning it is a condition of the possibility of experience. Any element of the mind then, of which Reason is a constituent faculty, is also a transcendental object. Thus, insofar as you are an experiencing being, you are a being possessed of the power of reason.
So no excuses, homo.
>>7990786
This is a good answer.
>>7990786
I never knew there was any such thought in any such tradition, interesting, can you back up that claim with more evidence please, it would really satisfy my query completely.
Here is my doubt expressed again, it very much pertains to the actual validity of Kant's system of including the transcendental as a whole which he, as shown in the OP, clearly believes must be introduced becauae it must, it is inherent to our minds and the things it naturally strives for that they crave for this satisfaction that can only come from beyond experience, as he says it is what makes metaphysics very much "actual" and seems to be the proof of its existence.
Taking the oft quoted line from CoPR
>HUMAN reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as pre- scribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.
What if some ignorant and disinterested persons very much ignore these "burdens".
And here is an additional doubt on top of my previous doubt, what if some eccentrics or crazies believe these burdens are solved within its power (human reason's power) and in the realm of experience (consider an acid tripping buddhist monk who during his meditations holds to the belief that appearences are subject to no laws, as the way he perceives them, given that he is out of whack, they actually do not, how would Kant respond to this person?)
>>7990951
>Here is my doubt expressed again
I do not wish to patronize btw I am sure you understood my doubt and your answer is helpful, just adding more explanations anyway.
>>7990816
> The soul, or the mind, or the self--the experiencing 'thing', whatever you want to call it--is also, for Kant, a transcendental object, meaning it is a condition of the possibility of experience. Any element of the mind then, of which Reason is a constituent faculty, is also a transcendental object. Thus, insofar as you are an experiencing being, you are a being possessed of the power of reason.
Valuable insight, thank you but...
My question pertains more to "why should we use the concept of transcendetal with respect to mind or anything else, at all? Kant says we "should" (rather he says we need to) because reason craves for it, but what if I am apathetic and barely care? What motivation do I have for using these transcendetal objects?"
Elaborating on a doubt based on your response, let us assume as you say that reason is trans for kant and the mind is trans, let us also assume that he believes it is an inherent feature of reason to crave for certainty that it can only get from using the trans (which I do not believe he ever derived so formally, he seemed to mainly use as evidence the contradicting ideas on things talked about by metaphysicians and philosophers, such as about the boundry of the universe which he seemed to "point to" as evidence of human reason's tendency to use the transcendental, this still however was not a formal derivation, did we ever tackle that?), how would he respond to people who said that they do not crave for this satisfaction of reason? Would he say they are liars?
Kant definitely had an interest in psychology evidenced by the fact that he taught as an anthropologist in his later years, which is why I am curious about this.
>>7990951
Kant pretty much said that his deductions (categories and pure forms or sensibility) are subjective. That is to say, aliens could have different constitutions in how they perceive, think and understand (connect language to sensibility). Drugged out humans could very well do the same, the point still stands that regardless of their state and drives, they are still limited when it comes to knowledge as such. Assertions are not the same as knowledge even though they can be correct (for instance giving a correct answer despite faulty reasoning).
As for the "reason we have in common", it is a presumption, but a necessary one for his project. Like Descartes' thinking substance, it was criticized by many later philosophers.
Here's Zizek's example.
> Suffice it to recall Kant's own famous example from his Critique of Practical Reason: "Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passions if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer may be." Lacan's counterargument here is: what if we encounter a subject (as we do regularly in psychoanalysis), who can only fully enjoy a night of passion if some form of "gallows" is threatening him, i.e. if, by doing it, he is violating some prohibition?
>>7991204
first of all stop using "trans" as short for transcendental. it is awful. also transcendental what? sounds like you should just be saying the categories.
>Would he say they are liars?
something like that
you're not seeing the import of kant if you're jumping to questions like boundary of the universe. the real issue was already seen by hume. you cannot get anywhere at all without presupposing objectivity. every time you change your perspective regarding an object, your subjective experience is totally different, but you don't lose your understanding of a stable object. and so already in that experience you are saying that there are multiple, shifting points of view on something that is singular and stable and so you're not just speaking for one point of view now but all points of view. and so already you have a little bit of universal knowledge, which we very much do when we observe an object that is really there.
>>7991204
Transcendental objects are those 'things' that we MUST presuppose to make sense of the actual things we have acquaintance with. Even if you aren't aware of these presuppositions, they are still present. That's what the 'critical' part of the 'critical philosophy' means--it's an examination of the grounds of our knowledge, not of any particular aspect of it. If you don't care, fine. Nothing is lost in that. Kant wasn't writing for a 'common' audience in his technical work, but for academics conversant and interested in very abstract questions of metaphysics.
Reason, according to Kant, as a part of its own 'spontaneous operation'--that is, according to the laws by which it is bound--seeks the unconditioned to bring unity to its object, namely knowledge. Reason seeks the ultimate explanation, but Kant tries to demonstrate in the CPR that this is basically impossible, and to proceed as if otherwise is to fall into dialectical illusion and dogmatic metaphysics, to spin castles out of clouds.
But again, if you, particularly, don't feel this impulse, so much the better for you. You're free from philosophy. Go enjoy your life.
>Reason, according to Kant, as a part of its own 'spontaneous operation'--that is, according to the laws by which it is bound--seeks the unconditioned to bring unity to its object, namely knowledge.
I will add another angle to this
I see why the metaphysicians of his day might take him seriously but Kant's idea behind using the concepts of reason for things beyond experiences I.e. his trans idealism as a whole seems to be not exactly "so is so because of so and so" but seems to be more "we need so because without so we could not have an answer to so and so" my point being his arguments seem weak for someone who might not NEEDd an answer in the first place and might be fine suspending judgement, I.e.a skeptic.
I suppose Kant does not exactly atttack skepticism so much directly though and I do not believe he was writing so much with the skeptic in mind, his writings seemed more geared towards metaphysicians who need a solution.
I know he has said this much about skeptics
>skepticism does not give one the comfort of ignotance
His argument against skepticism seems to be "why the hell would anyone want to do that?"
>>7992869
Neat. And?
>>7992869
I don't think this is right. Kant takes himself to be refuting various types of skepticism directly (see, e.g., the intro and the refutation of idealism in the B-edition of the first critique). The basic idea is that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible (see math). And this is so whether you care to ask such questions or not. The only way for it to be possible is this, that, and the other thing. And lo-and-behold, this, that, and the other imply the existence and possibility of knowledge of external objects, the self, causation, etc. And again, this implication is there whether the skeptic cares about it or not.
I'm not sure if he has anything useful to say, though, to the skeptic who doubts the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, though. Besides, perhaps: "Come on, be serious." Anybody know if he addresses this anywhere?
>>7993121
> Anybody know if he addresses this anywhere?
He would just say, I think, that the synthetic a priori truths of mathematics (and physical science) are factually self-evident, and anyone who denies such immediate truth would not be worth trying to argue against.
>>7993174
Yeah, that's more or less what I guessed. Kinda disappointing though, since I think that reply works just as well against someone who doubts the existence of external objects or whatever (see Moore). Not that I think there's a better reply.
>>7993121
>The basic idea is that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible (see math)
I agree, quoting from the Proleg again
>Fortunately, it happens that, even though we cannot assume that metaphysics as science is actual,we can confidently say that some pure synthetic cognition a priori is actual and given, namely, pure mathematics and pure natural science; for both contain propositions that are fully acknowledged, some as apodictically certain through bare reason, some from universal agreement with experience (though these are still recognized as independent of experience). We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetic cognition a priori, and we do not need to ask whether it is possible (for it is actual), but only: how it is possible, in order to be able to derive, from the principle of the possibility of the given cognition, the possibility of all other synthetic cognition a priori.
But
>I don't think this is right. Kant takes himself to be refuting various types of skepticism directly (see, e.g., the intro and the refutation of idealism in the B-edition of the first critique)
Well, Idealism is different from skepticism.
Also, yes, Kant takes as given some a priori synth claims precisely because his response to skepticism is "why would anyone want to do that?"
As he says:
>Skepticism is thus a resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and make survey of the region in which it finds itself, so that for the future it may be able to choose its path with more certainty. But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement. Such can be obtained only through perfect certainty in our knowledge, alike of the objects themselves and of the limits within which all our knowledge of objects is enclosed.
>Simply to acquiesce in skepticism can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason.
Pic related
>>7993935
> Well, Idealism is different from skepticism.
Not always, given Kant's terminology. The Refutation of Idealism is partially aimed at "problematic idealism," which is associated with Descartes' type of external-world skepticism.
>>7993935
Idealism is grounded on 'skepticism' of the external or 'material' world. There are many ways of being a skeptic.
Your phrasing for Kant's attitude is goofy and basically wrong. For one, he's not asking a question; he's making an assertion: skepticism is a consequence of thinking of these problems in the first place, and it actually even offers a vista from which to survey the surrounding terrain and get a better sense of where you should be heading. But if you were to stay there you'd die of exposure come nightfall. You have to HAVE to move on. No one can remain a skeptic, but even Hume. After his reflections he goes back to the parlor with his friends and his billiards and he behaves exactly as if causality was a real certainty. But the question remains in the back of his mind as an impetus for thought.
You seem to believe that because not every single person may be 'compelled by reason' to seek the ultimate that this defeats Kant's project, which is just nonsense. You also label 'skeptics' just these types of people, which is wrong. The skeptic is the person that went seeking for just such a thing, and found nothing but dogmatic assertion and slight of hand where he sought a ground.
>>7994560
>You seem to believe that because not every single person may be 'compelled by reason' to seek the ultimate that this defeats Kant's project, which is just nonsense
I don't know about defeating his project because I dare not presume I know what his project or intention was. However, I believe his introduction of the transcendental does not rely on a synthetic a priori proof as in "x is because y" but relies on a characteristic emotional feature of the subject namely it being compelled to satisfy its reason. You seem to agree that not every person might be compelled to satisfy reason would you then also agree that even a perfectly rational person, if he did not have this compulsion, would have perfectly rational grounds to not accept Kant's metaphysics?
Why would you use the word nonsense here by the way?
>>7994560
>You also label 'skeptics' just these types of people, which is wrong. The skeptic is the person that went seeking for just such a thing, and found nothing but dogmatic assertion and slight of hand where he sought a ground.
Perhaps the skeptic due to his very negative nature is not the best example for my point, let us agree that I was wrong in assuming he was a consenting person.
My point is that there can be rational individuals who can reject Kant's works if only they were to not give consent to the use of the transcendental which Kant says is needed and relies on the reader agreeing rather than somehow showing beyond doubt that it can be used.
Kant's systems although internally consistent (which is basically their most important feature which Kant worked to build up) seem to still rest on the axiom of the transcendental (which Kant agrees we cannot say anything about) being used or having something said about, the motivation for this being reason satisfying itself yada yada.
This axiom then is not given a definitive truth value by Kant but he seems to call upon his readers to realize that it MUST be consented to if any answers are to be given.
I will quote papers on that particular point tomorrow.
>>7994999
A stronger claim I might make could be that denying the use of the transcendental to experience and thereby the entirety of Kant's transcendental idealism would not be internally inconsistent with Kant's ideology, since he does not say definitively that the transcendental has to apply to experience in so and so way (in fact he says that nothing can be said about it) but he does call for it to be applied to experience in so and so way to the end of satisfying reason.
So denying the application of the transcendental would not be inconsistent with his ideology as a whole.
However if the application is agreed to the way it is applied it would be impossible to find faults in since the purpose of his idealism was to find the perfect way to apply transcendental concepts.
>>7994919
>However, I believe his introduction of the transcendental does not rely on a synthetic a priori proof as in "x is because y" but relies on a characteristic emotional feature of the subject namely it being compelled to satisfy its reason.
I know this is your point. It's wrong for a number of reasons which I keep trying to point. For one, it misconceives Kant's argument, for reasons which have already been outlined for you above, and for another it construes an introductory comment which is basically just meant to get us into the actual argument for the argument itself. A person lacking the compulsion to follow reason to its ultimate conclusion would not have 'rational grounds' for rejecting Kant's argument because they aren't even exercising reason, but rather neglecting it. They aren't rejecting anything; they are merely ignorant of an alleged problem.
>>7994999
>My point is that there can be rational individuals who can reject Kant's works if only they were to not give consent to the use of the transcendental which Kant says is needed and relies on the reader agreeing rather than somehow showing beyond doubt that it can be used.
As far as I can tell, you've only read the Prolegomena, which is--surprise!--just an introduction. You haven't even gotten to Kant's actual argument. Transcendental objects are not axiomatic for Kant, and though they cannot be known in themselves, their logical necessity still requires demonstration, which Kant attempts to do quite meticulously in the CPR. Kant isn't asking you to 'consent' to some definition from which he can proceed--that would throw him right back into dogmatism, which he's very carefully trying to avoid. Rather, he's indicating a given: synthetic a priori knowledge. This is something we, allegedly at least, very obviously have (see: mathematics, geometry, and theoretical physics). He then poses the question: how is such knowledge possible? He then tries to provide an answer, which you haven't actually even gotten to yet.
>>7995390
I think my point still holds I will get back to you after reading the critique.
>>7996950
Don't worry, it doesn't.
>>7995390
Here are some quotes from this paper: http://www.derk-pereboom.net/attachments/File/KTFprfin4.pdf
For this we take one example of a transcendental concept, namely transcendental freedom
>I think that the general outline of Kant’s treatment of this problem is defensible. Arguably, moral responsibility requires the sort of freedom he believes it does, while our being free in this sense cannot be established on the evidence. Nevertheless, there is a consistent conception according to which we have freedom of this kind.
>Thus, in accord with this account, although we can form a superficial conception of transcendental freedom by means of our reason, we lack the ability to investigate the nature of fundamental causal powers of the self to establish whether transcendental freedom is a capacity we actually have. Transcendental freedom could in fact turn out to be metaphysically impossible, or the nature of fundamental noumenal causality might actually not allow for transcendental freedom, but this we could never discover. But what does Kant then mean when he says he has shown that nature does not conflict with transcendental freedom (A558/B586)? What if transcendental freedom is really impossible, or the fundamental nature of noumenal causality precludes transcendental freedom? The best interpretation of Kant’s claim here is that there is no internal inconsistency in the superficial description of this power that we can formulate by our reason, and that there is no inconsistency between the claim that this description is true of us as noumenal agents and our best empirical theories about the natural world.
>In Kant’s view, transcendental freedom is negatively conceivable given our cognitive situation – we cannot rule it out. This is consistent with its not being ideally negatively conceivable.
My point being then that Kant does not prove that transcendental freedom exists as much as he proves that assuming it is consistent or that it is not disprovable.
Negatively conceivable means that it cannot be rules out by the way.
>>7997321
I would love if it does not.
In any case though,
>it misconceives Kant's argument, for reasons which have already been outlined for you above
I do not see what you mean, could you re-outline your reasons?
>construes an introductory comment which is basically just meant to get us into the actual argument for the argument itself
Okay and what is the "Actual" argument for the argument? I believe the argument you are taking about is that transcendental concepts must be applied to our experience? Because that is what I am talking about.
>A person lacking the compulsion to follow reason to its ultimate conclusion would not have 'rational grounds' for rejecting Kant's argument because they aren't even exercising reason, but rather neglecting it.
So Kant would deem it impossible to have "reason" if one is not compelled to make assumptions regarding the existence and applicability of transcendental concepts to experience? Two questions then:
(1) Is it impossible, according to Kant, to find a person he would deem "reasonable" if they do not go beyond skepticism?
(2) Is it impossible, according to Kant, for humans to find "ultimate conclusions" for their reason that are not sought via his transcendental concepts?
>They aren't rejecting anything; they are merely ignorant of an alleged problem.
I assume to reject something means to say it is not true, I assume these people would also be saying that it is not true that transcendental concepts are applied to experience in the way Kant describes (it might be possible but it is not the way things are), they assent to the fact that we cannot say anything about transcendental objects though.
>their logical necessity still requires demonstration
What is an example of one such demonstration?
>>7997327
>My point being then that Kant does not prove that transcendental freedom exists
He never contends that he does.
>>7997335
>that transcendental concepts must be applied to our experience
They cannot, and to do so would lead to dialectical error. Again, Kant doesn't contend that they do.
>So Kant would deem it impossible to have "reason" if one is not compelled to make assumptions regarding the existence and applicability of transcendental concepts to experience?
This is a loaded question because it rests on a mistaken assumption. Again, Kant doesn't contend that 'transcendental concepts' like freedom of the will need to be applied to experience--they can't be. But the presupposition of transcendental freedom is a necessary precondition for practical reason. This is a very different than what you're claiming Kant is claiming.
>Is it impossible, according to Kant, to find a person he would deem "reasonable" if they do not go beyond skepticism?
You are once again equating skepticism with general ignorance of or indifference to philosophy. This is wrong. But anyway, there are plenty of 'unreasonable' people in the world. Just because you possess a certain power doesn't mean you exert it to its potential or even at all. A very strong man can also be a very lazy man. Again, you're getting hung up on a passing remark that is meant to be evocative rather than substantive, and what substance there is in it is misunderstood by you.
>Is it impossible, according to Kant, for humans to find "ultimate conclusions" for their reason that are not sought via his transcendental concepts?
Your phrasing is still fraught and clumsy so I hesitate to answer for fear of sending you off again, but yes, Kant believes that when appearances are taken as things-in-themselves it is possible for reason to carry its object to several pairs of mutually excluded and undecidable 'antinomies' that are only resolvable by transcendental idealism.
>I assume to reject something means to say it is not true, I assume these people would also be saying that it is not true that transcendental concepts are applied to experience in the way Kant describes (it might be possible but it is not the way things are), they assent to the fact that we cannot say anything about transcendental objects though.
Transcendental objects are not applied to existence. 'Existence' probably doesn't even mean for Kant what you have in mind.
>What is an example of one such demonstration?
I am not going to summarize a six-hundred page philosophical treatise for you in a 4chan post. Just read the CPR.
>>7997422
>But the presupposition of transcendental freedom is a necessary precondition for practical reason. This is a very different than what you're claiming Kant is claiming.
Oh okay and is there a similar justification for all his assuned transcendental concepts?
>>7997493
>assumed
Again, Kant at least tries to demonstrate them. You are way to loose with your language.
And yes. 'Transcendental' should be read as 'condition for the possibility of'.
