Help me understand this part of the Tractatus: 4.1212
Don't know what it is in english, loose translation: What can be pointed, cannot be said
It's translated as "shown"
Every sub-numbering is a further comment or clarification on the preceding propositions so you should post those too
>>8270295
I'm no good at translating, but here we go:
4 Thoughts are meaningful sentences
4.1 Sentences portray ruling or non-ruling in private situations
4.12 Sentences can portray the whole truth, but not what they must have in common with reality in order to show - their logical form.
To show a logical form, we should be able to seat ourselves outside logic, a.k.a. outside the world.
4.121 Sentences cannot show a logica form - it is projected from sentences.
What is projected from language, cannot be portrayed by language.
What portrays itself in language, that we cannot portray with language.
Sentences show the truths logical form.
The sentences show it.
4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said.
>>8270329
Yep. It's the old saying/showing distinction. Very important idea in the book, and also the most controversial ...
>>8270274
>4 The thought is the significant proposition.
>4.1 A proposition presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.
>4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said.
In other words - according to the picture theory of language, a correspondence theory of truth - there is a gap between the content of propositions and what they relate to 'in the world.' The propositions express a thought, or a picture of a 'state of affiars,' which is the atomic fact of the proposition. If something can be shown simply by pointing or whatever, there is no need to say anything, for the 'picture' is simply out there 'in the world:' a picture in the mind is what forms a thought, then subsequently a proposition, which are representations of the images of reality, which are 'in themselves' sort of.
Hope that makes sense.
Say someone's never seen the colour blue before. No matter how much you talk about it, they won't understand, but as soon as you show them something blue they will understand.
So, there are things that you can show but you can't say.
>>8270381
That's not at all what he means
>>8270477
You're wrong.
>>8270477
Care to explain how my interpretation is wrong? If possible, I'd like to understand it better.
>>8270361
This is wrong.
1.1 Did Wittgenstein have Aspergers?
1.1.1 Serious question.
>>8270329
>>8270274
I think you did a pretty okay job, actually.
>4.12 Sentences can portray the whole truth, but not what they must have in common with reality in order to show - their logical form.
>To show a logical form, we should be able to seat ourselves outside logic, a.k.a. outside the world.
This is the critical passage, OP. The logical form of our meaningful sentences--it's 'structure' and how it 'hooks onto the world'--cannot itself be the content of a meaningful sentence. This leads to Wittgenstein's observation that seemingly meaning propositions like a=~~a are not, strictly speaking, true, but rather limn the domain of what can be truthfully said, are actually necessary 'preconditions' for anything true to be said.
>>8270592
But again, this can't be 'said' directly, or demonstrated through propositions leading to a logical conclusion, but has to be inferred indirectly through 'seeing' that it is so.
>>8270507
He's only talking about propositions. What's "shown" is the relationship between the logical form of the proposition and the state of affairs. It's nothing at to do with sensations like colours (colour comes into it later).
>>8270730
This is correct
>>8270584
this is early witty
