Where leaves determinism punishment?
Given that we are all the products of our genetics and our upbringing - that even our faculties for self improvement, our capacity to dedicate ourselves to live a moral life, our dedication to ethical standards are given to us, not genuinely achieved - how should we approach the question of punishment? How could anybody truly, morally deserve anything in a world where none of us are the prime mover unmoved, the uncaused cause of ourselves?
Do the answers to these questions have consequences for our justice systems and criminal law? For our personal daily lives and interactions with others?
Key concepts for those who're just getting into this:
>retributive vs. utilitarian vs. restorative justice
>(moral) desert
>compatibilism vs. hard determinism
Smilansky has a final chapter on this in Free Will and Illusion. He basically says the de facto position of philosophy at this point is incompatibilist determinism, and then goes "so uh, what now?" His answer is basically that the reigning justice model, or the best one we have or something, isn't about fairness*. If it were, it's clearly not "fair" to give sentences to people who didn't "earn" them (in the sense of desert), because no one can ever earn anything because free agency is impossible.
* or about brute utilitarian efficacy in deterrence for that matter, because then we'd be a lot more lax about the "innocent until proven guilty" thing, and just accept the occasional missentencing as a "better safe than sorry" measure, catch probably 5000% more criminals, and deter crime much more efficiently
In my opinion, free will discussions can be split into three levels. On the top level, you have the grand cosmic questions, everything from "why do I feel free if I'm not?" to "is an unfree life meaningless? should I just kill myself?" to "how can I even 'deliberate' if deliberation implies agency somehow?!". On the bottom level, you have the naturalized/pragmatic aspects of living daily life; whether or not the philosophers resolve these issues definitively, you still have to go and prosecute some guy for stealing tomorrow, because that's your job. Even more obviously, your balls itch and you can either scratch them or not. So you'd better either slap down some William James-tier "FUCK YOU, I'M FREE IF I WANNA BE"/"Desert is meaningful because it feels like it is" axioms, or just stop moving until your protons decay.
The middle level is theoretically important because it's where the two meet. This is where Smilansky tries to come in, literally talking about what would happen if everyone on earth suddenly grokked the current philosophical consensus of incompatibilism seeming like the most parsimonious and least anthropocentric or religious solution. But in practice, he just vibrates between the top and bottom levels over and over again, and pretends the blur over the middle section is actually inhabiting it. That's what pretty much every treatment of the middle level is. There's just no real praxis. I guess some of the pomo guys try to force us to radically "destabilise" and live forever in the "discourse" of the milieu, but then they also go and fuck underage French girls so.
>>8115831
>He basically says the de facto position of philosophy at this point is incompatibilist determinism
Well that's empirically wrong - about 70% of philosophers are deterministic compatibilists, and about 10% libertarians. Why would he say such a thing?
>>8115559
>Where leaves determinism punishment?
noice grmr
>>8115874
He just rejects simplistic compatibilism IIRC. But he hedges very close to an ultimate metaphysical determinism, and says that it's the reigning champion (in the sense of veracity, not necessarily a poll of philosophy PhDs).
But I read it like ten years ago, so YMMV.
I'm massively against his conclusions for deep reasons but I agree with dismissing 99% of compatibilists as unserious thinkers desu.
>>8115888
>grmr
Actually I'm just German.
>>8115898
I couldn't even think of 100 compatibilists, but the only one I think is not "serious" would be Daniel Dennet.
Shouldn't you rather have said that Smilansky somehow decides to put determinism and incompatibilism as his null hypotheses?
Cause I don't see by what measure it would be the de facto position "of philosophy".
I know I'm not actually engaging with your argument here, but I think it's important to establish facts.
>>8115831
>Even more obviously, your balls itch and you can either scratch them or not. So you'd better either slap down some William James-tier "FUCK YOU, I'M FREE IF I WANNA BE"/"Desert is meaningful because it feels like it is" axioms, or just stop moving until your protons decay.
I don't understand this. A monkey or a baby or a sleeping person will scratch themselves without having settled on a libertarian philosophy. They just do.
Similarly, I observe myself forming the decision to scratch myself (as was determined at the beginning of the universe). I experience this action as "my own", even though I know it's just brain chemistry. My arm still ends up scratching myself; my philosophy still remains hard determinist.
I don't have to do a metaphysical grand stand to scratch my balls is all I'm saying.
>>8115913
To be honest I barely remember and I'm trying to remember the real source of the FEELING I have now, that Smilansky just wants to get down to brass tacks and assume a pretty bleak model of determinism is the default.
On closer scrutiny I just can't really remember how exactly he establishes it. I do remember being relieved by it, because he it means he doesn't spend 500 years engaging with every facile compatibilist and compatibilist fallacy.
>>8115954
That's what I mean by the "low level." It's just gonna happen. You don't stop to think about the metaphysics. We probably CAN'T even apply the metaphysics to real life praxis (or phronesis, or whatever you want to call it).
>>8115559
The purpose of punishment is to deter people from taking bad actions and to deter people who take bad actions from repeating them. A person deserves punishment simply by the fact that they committed a bad act. The freedom of their will is not relevant.
>>8115559
Let me rephrase the question, in slightly different terms:
>Given that we are all the products of our genetics and our upbringing - that even our faculties for 'rational' decision-making, our capacity to dedicate ourselves to rational inquiry, our dedication to logical norms are given to us, not genuinely achieved - how should we approach the question of rationality? How could anybody truly, rationally participate in deliberation in a world where none of us are the prime mover unmoved, the uncaused cause of ourselves?
How do you answer?
>>8115913
I fail to see what 'free will' has to do with 'determinism". Seems more of a mind-body issue. The whole compatibilism/incompatibilism thing is a non-sequitur.
>>8116156
I fail to see a problem with deliberation in such a world.
>>8116198
Deliberation about *anything* is pointless, given that the future is already written.
>>8116217
How so? Does that diminish the reward or purpose of deliberation?
>>8116231
The words "reward" and "purpose" have no physical meaning. The world is a 4+ dimensional geometric object encompassing everything here, there, past, present, and future.
>>8116248
Are you arguing for nihilism?
>>8116257
No.
>>8116274
Then, it sounds like you will not permit me to use any terms that do not have "physical meaning".
But we can get quite physical with these terms. The points of deliberation, can include deliberation for deliberation's sake, that is, the joy produced by deliberation, that is, the release of dopamine in the brain. The other point could be the utility of deliberation as it contributes to the intellectual process thus giving us a greater grasp on the world thus allowing us to manipulate the world according to our desires (which are in the brain).
We cannot be too quick to dismiss abstractions, as they do in fact correspond to something in the world, they only take a bit more effort to collect all of their parts and to understand in the brain than say, a rock or an apple.
these are all circular logic reasoning to keep you looking away from your own reality as god.
>>8116188
>I fail to see what 'free will' has to do with 'determinism".
>>8116315
The point is, all discussion of "utility" and "rational deliberation" is for naught. For the future is already written.
>>8116127
This. The point is behavior modification, not "hurt the wilfully bad people"
I'd even go further and say that the question of whether someone "deserves" punishment is itself presumptive - how would a society of people without free will have the moral agency to collectively decide who "deserves" retaliation?
>>8116353
How so?
Understanding the future as already written is not palatable to our emotional centers, but it is not wholly destructive, and it doesn't have to be at all much of the time because we can and often are not thinking of this fact (assuming it as true). And there is certainly no logical connection between determinism and, what, shall we say, deliberational nihilism?
>>8116033
>That's what I mean by the "low level." It's just gonna happen. You don't stop to think about the metaphysics. We probably CAN'T even apply the metaphysics to real life praxis (or phronesis, or whatever you want to call it).
But are you implying that an unreflected illusion of freedom is necessary to scratch yourself?
>>8116188
>I fail to see what 'free will' has to do with 'determinism". Seems more of a mind-body issue.
If the world is determined, and if freedom hinges on indeterminism (which incompatibilists believe), then we are not free.
If you do not believe freedom depends on indeterminism, then you are a compatibilist.
If you want to make a compatibilist argument, you will have to make it, not just claim "it's a non sequitur" just because you self admittedly fail to understand it.
Theory of knowledge entails values. Values imply linear political correctness.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/
>>8118430
>Values imply linear political correctness
Okay, but what if 4 harmonic corner days rotate simultaneously around squared equator and cubed?
>>8117712
I am at least a consequentialist. I would not go so far as to say that I am a utilitarian, but I am similar.
Free will is nothing but a linguistic deficiency of the brain. Free from what? It is a necessary casuistry of the human psyche, the idea of such an idea.
Determinism and awareness of determinism changes absolutely nothing.
>>8118586
>What justifies punishment then, and what punishment is justified?
That punishment is sought and occurs justifies it.
>>8117696
The whole argument is confused. Free will requires determinism. The real issue is whether mental states can have physical consequences without themselves being physically constituted. Belief in free will is just a specific form of dualism.
>>8118586
Nothing justifies anything. The very idea of "justification" implies rational deliberation, which implies choice, which we don't have. Humans will continue to violate societal expectations and continue to be punished for it just as the sun will continue to rise.
>people still believe in Laplace's demon
>200 years alter
Quantum Physics says hi.
>>8119378
Again, determinism is utterly irrelevant to the case for or against free will.
>>8115559
Fear of punishment might be a deterrent. Death and mutilation surely are deterrents.
The question is whether there are better alternatives. In what cases could we reform criminals and how? That is a question we should ask.
>>8119396
the two are literally antonyms you retard
>>8119410
Nope, free will requires determinism.
>>8119418
Your sentence is a non sequitur.
>>8119488
Determinism is the non-sequitur. It's required by free will, so cannot be used against free will.
>>8119358
>Free will requires determinism
Congrats, you are a compatibilist. Easy as that.
If you don't understand these terms, which are the standard terms employed by people who are a lot smarter than you AND have thought about this for ages, look it up.
There are also people who disagree with you, btw.
>>8119321
>That punishment is sought and occurs justifies it.
That's not even an argument.
>>8119410
That's false. The antonym of determinism is indeterminism. Determinism has a very specific technical meaning that is very clearly and obviously not the antonym of freedom of will.
Some scholars believe freedom of will is compatible (or even dependent on) determinism. Others disagree. Both of them have better arguments than you, or this guy
>>8119418
Effective punishment of defection leads to game theoretic evolutionary equilibria of social systems.
Nature doesn't care about justice, it cares about evolutionary fitness of systems.
>>8120185
No, it's the literal causal chain. People want to punish, therefore it is justified. Something is only determined once it has happened.
>free will requires determinism
Explain?
>>8120643
That's what free will is free from, determinism. It makes no sense otherwise.
>>8120598
>People want to punish, therefore it is justified
That is the definition of a preference, not of a justification.
>Something is only determined once it has happened.
That is not what "determined" means.
>>8120643
A typical perspective works roughly as follows:
1. I am responsible for what I cause (-> if my moral character and convictions and my deliberation cause a decision in me)
2. Conversely, if things happen without being caused, I am not responsible.
3. Then, if things do not happen deterministically, I am not responsible.
There are multiple ways of making basically this argument.
Note also this is far from the only compatibilist account of free will.
>>8120792
Uneducated gibberish.
>>8119791
>Determinism is the non-sequitur. It's required by free will, so cannot be used against free will.
This is not a meaningful argument. The following is a possible scenario:
1. free will is incompatible with indeterminism (what you believe)
2. free will is incompatible with determinism (a well-known, intuitive argument with a long history)
3. it follows that free will is impossible, regardless of what world we live in
>>8120181
Actually, not true. Determinism has nothing to do with the argument against free will. It's a non-sequitur.
>>8120192
>Some scholars believe freedom of will is compatible (or even dependent on) determinism. Others disagree.
That's like arguing over whether free will is compatible with bananas. Utterly irrelevant.
>>8123123
Every single incompatibilist disagrees. Consider Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, Baruch Spinoza ...
Now I don't ask you to accept their views. (This would be impossible, as they are incompatible; Kane believes in free will, Pereboom and Spinoza don't.)
Just understand that there are other views from yours, and that they are much, MUCH better informed and articulated than yours, and that to make a claim here, you at least need to know and understand their positions.
>>8123127
Your inability or unwillingness to engage with other's theories reflects poorly on you, and does nothing to advance the matter.
>>8122517
Free will and determinism have nothing to do with each other, actually.
Free will is the thesis that mental states are non-physically constituted despite having physical effects. So, it's a subspecies of dualism.
Once you grant that everything is physical, then there can be no free will, since everything with physical effects would then be physically constituted. Under physicalism, a state can be either caused or uncaused ('random') but if it is caused then the cause must be another physical state. In other words, there are no irreducibly mental states in the ontology.
For example, in some interpretations of quantum mechanics, states can seen as fundamentally random - that is, not fully determined by the dynamic laws together with initial conditions. This has zero impact on the debate about free will, since determinism is a non-sequitur there.
>>8123163
>Every single incompatibilist disagrees. Consider Robert Kane, Derek Pereboom, Baruch Spinoza ...
I'm very familiar with the literature. It is conceptually confused. In fact, almost everyone admits that quantum indeterminacy does not leave any space for free will, and that determinism is not really the issue at all.
>>8123182
>Free will is the thesis that mental states are non-physically constituted despite having physical effects. So, it's a subspecies of dualism.
That is your personal definition that nobody else uses.
You've somehow decided on a rather random, non-etymological and weird definition of the word, and use this terminological confusion to contradict others instead of actually making an argument. This is not a productive mode of engagement.
>>8123189
>almost everyone admits that quantum indeterminacy does not leave any space for free will
Quantum indeterminacy has marginal impact on cognition, and presumably freedom of will.
>>8123220
>That is your personal definition that nobody else uses.
Utter nonsense. You really have no clue what you are talking about.
>Quantum indeterminacy has marginal impact on cognition, and presumably freedom of will.
It's a fallacy to suppose it would matter even if the impact was decisive. Even if it turned out that human decisions were the outcomes of fundamentally indeterministic quantum events, that would not provide any basis for freedom of the will. For by definition, we cannot control those outcomes.
>>8116248
Past and future do not exist
all of life is a series of presents, or one single present, if you will
who doesn't like presents?
>>8116371
>How so?
>not understanding that we are all pawns for The Universe's amusement
>>8123264
>Past and future do not exist
Except that thesis (presentism) is incompatible with Special and General Relativity.
There is no absolute 'now' and no absolute simultaneity.
>>8123247
>Utter nonsense. You really have no clue what you are talking about.
Whose definition of free will are you using? Give me a book, or a text, or a name.
>It's a fallacy to suppose it would matter even if the impact was decisive. Even if it turned out that human decisions were the outcomes of fundamentally indeterministic quantum events, that would not provide any basis for freedom of the will. For by definition, we cannot control those outcomes.
No idea what you're saying here. Let me restate: quantum-scale indeterministic effects most likely do not play any substantial role in cognition.
>>8123286
>No idea what you're saying here. Let me restate: quantum-scale indeterministic effects most likely do not play any substantial role in cognition.
To repeat: EVEN IF fundamentally indeterministic quantum events played a role in cognition, that would not provide any basis for freedom of the will. For by definition, we cannot control the outcomes of fundamentally indeterministic quantum events.
>>8123302
>we cannot control the outcomes of fundamentally indeterministic quantum events.
We cannot fully control them, but we can possibly exert some (even significant) degree of control over them.
Alas, it seems we are in agreement here that quantum randomness can certainly at least not save freedom of will.
We also probably agree that it doesn't damage it either - you because of your unwillingness to consider compatibilism one out of multiple theoretical positions (rather than something whose truth is clear a priori), and me because I'm convinced by incompatbilist arguments.
>>8123286
>Whose definition of free will are you using? Give me a book, or a text, or a name.
It's the traditional understanding of free will that goes back to the beginning of philosophy, and the one held by the man on the street.
For example, here is Thomas Reid:
I grant, then, that an effect uncaused is a contradiction, and that an event uncaused is an absurdity. The question that remains is whether a volition, undetermined by motives, is an event uncaused. This I deny. The cause of the volition is the man that willed it. (Letter to James Gregory, in 1967, 88)
More recently, Roderick Chisholm defended this view (agent causation) in depth.
Most current philosophers of action reject this notion of free will as incoherent. I don't know if it's incoherent, but it is certainly incompatible with a materialist worldview in which the only cause-and-effect is physical cause-and-effect.
>>8123317
Seeing as you grant that determinism is probably false, why do you care whether free will is "compatible" with it? That's what I'm not getting. Being compatible or incompatible with a falsehood is at best a mere curiosity. Free will is incompatible with the far more fundamental assumption of physicalism - so that's where the argument should be located.
>>8123280
>Special and General Relativity.
>muh Science
irregardless of what an oh-so-objective scientist has to say, from the human perspective (you are human) dividing the present (your perceived existence) into the imaginary Past and the speculation Future is a convenient lie, a fiction to help us understand. And we cant even do that right most of the time since our memory keeps changing and distorting our Past like an unreliable history book that keeps rearranging its own letters
>>8123317
>We cannot fully control them, but we can possibly exert some (even significant) degree of control over them.
But we have zero control over them - that's been established. There's nothing we can do to control whether we get Spin-Up or Spin-Down in a Bell test experiment (i.e., which branch of the wave function we end up in).
>>8123337
what im saying is most of what you think of as "your life" is a fiction you wrote and you literally have no future
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5PC9pq8wMU
>>8123337
>irregardless
Dropped.
>>8123333
>Roderick Chisholm
Basically a libertarian. His agent causation, fleshed out, is actually indeterministic.
In my opinion, agent causation is about the dumbest thing ever, but at least it's a view.
>>8123343
>But we have zero control over them - that's been established. There's nothing we can do to control whether we get Spin-Up or Spin-Down in a Bell test experiment (i.e., which branch of the wave function we end up in).
We can cause a photon to be on either this or the other side, in contrast to any other place.
>>8123344
If it's my own fiction, can I write myself a crazy manic pixie girlfriend, and also a super penis?
>>8123378
>Basically a libertarian.
So-called libertarian free will is what almost every philosopher in history -- not to mention the common man -- understands by free will. To accept it, you have to reject the view that all causes are physical causes.
>His agent causation, fleshed out, is actually indeterministic.
Again, not relevant. Determinism is actually false, so compatibility with it should not even be a desideratum.
