Let's discuss The Republic of Plato, since it is considered one of the finest works of philosophical /lit/erature.
Is Polemarchus the worst debater in world history? He enters the conversation in Book I with a strong and plausible definition of justice, and allows himself to be converted within minutes by Socrates' utter nonsense.
How easy would it have been for him to put up an argument?
>No Socrates, being good at guarding something has nothing to do with your ability to steal. We have already distinguished doctors, lyre players, bricklayers, and others. I see no reason not to distinguish between thiefs and guards - and a quote from Homer about a single mythical figure won't convince me by the way.
>The grouping of friend and enemy is based on existential commitments, not any objective valuation of goodness or badness.
>No Socrates, I believe the harsh treatment of moral agents who are capable of reflection may have beneficial consequences, unlike the harsh treatment of horses, because these two objects of harsh treatment are qualitiatively different.
Similarly, how do we feel about Thrasymachus? I believe his attitude to Socrates' childish stratagems and intellectual cowardice is justified, and I think he makes a good if inarticulate sociological case for ethical nihilism with normative legalism which Socrates fails to refute with petty references to rare cases of fallibility in matters of self-interest, meaningless distinctions between practical arts and the art of earning a living, and simply incorrect statements about the lack of ambition showed by doctors and musciains to excel against fellow practitioners.
Thrasymachus' arguments about justice being "the rule of the stronger" are powerfully refuted by Socrates. You can call them 'rare,' but instances of fallibility which Socrates raises do indicate that it exists, that there are flaws in Thrasymachus' arguments. It's not enough for Socrates that the argument in favor of justice be MOSTLY true. If there are any exceptions, circumstance and cleverness can enlarge them. Socrates wants an airtight definition of what justice is, something that can stand against any test.
Incidentally, it's pretty easy to draw a line between Thrasymachus and Nietzsche. I think half the reason Nietzsche got so annoyed at Plato is that Plato anticipated his argument and blew it the fuck out more than two thousand years before he was born.
socrates' definition of justice is more less mathematical/logical and irrefutable
if you want to talk about how real life works, that's a different story
>Let's
>Let
> 's
>Let us
>Lettuce
>>7444692
>Socrates' childish stratagems and intellectual cowardice is justified
What childish stratagems do you have in mind?
And how is Thrasymachus's stance on Socrates' "intellectual cowardice" justified? Thrasymachus goes on, after all, to attempt to narrow the kinds of answers that he would permit Socrates to give, answers that he himself is willing to give. Do you not think that there's a sophistical element to the kinds of arguments Thrasymachus is giving, especially given that he's a sophist by profession?
With respect to Polemarchus, do you take it as unimportant that Plato chose to show us someone who respects the teachings of the poets? Do you take it as unrelated to the later arguments in bks. 2-3 and 10 about the poets and poetry?
>>7444692
>being good at guarding something has nothing to do with your ability to steal
false, if you are good at guarding you know how guarding works and can more easily then someone who dont, get around it
Criticism of Plato's treatment of Thrasymachus abound in the literature. Maguire and Harrison both defend his initial statements as a coherent political, but not moral, understanding of justice and Hourani and Kerferd both defend the coherence of his thought in general (albeit from competiting legalistic/natural right directions).
But I think Polemarchus is the more interesting character in Book I, both as an unworthy inheritor of both the poetic tradition he cites in his argument and also a literal inheritor of Cephalus. But his argument strikes me as being a root of Schmitt's eventual existential re-orientation of politics in the early twentieth century in The Concept of the Political and it seems to be an inarticulate but sound statement of metaethical prudence where a definition of "justice" is sought in terms of what it is good for men to do.
>>7445035
>Criticism of Plato's treatment of Thrasymachus abound in the literature. Maguire and Harrison both defend his initial statements as a coherent political, but not moral, understanding of justice and Hourani and Kerferd both defend the coherence of his thought in general (albeit from competiting legalistic/natural right directions).
Okay, but so what are their criticisms at bottom about Plato's depiction of Thrasymachus?
>But I think Polemarchus is the more interesting character in Book I, both as an unworthy inheritor of both the poetic tradition he cites in his argument and also a literal inheritor of Cephalus
What do you think makes him an "unworthy" inheritor of the poetic tradition (if "inheritor of the poetic tradition" is the right way to frame his use/respect for poetry)? What about his inheritance of the argument from Cephalus is interesting to you?
>>7445035
what a hilariously empty post
>>7444997
>What childish stratagems do you have in mind?
To give one example, in his alleged refutation of Polemarchus, he conflates the insturction of a tekhne with its ordinary performance ie a musician cannot make somebody a worse musician through instruction, a horseman cannot make somebody a worse horseman through instruction.
Of course Polemarchus' argument has nothing to do with instructing one's enemies, it has to do with performing the tekhne of justice against them. The simple performance of expert musicianship or horsemanship has nothing to do with its consequence on the unskilled, and in reality great displays of ability may cause anxiety and discouragement.
Socrates' argument is disreputable, but the cowardice of Plato himself in having Polemarchus surrender to this argument is even more stunning.
>Thrasymachus goes on, after all, to attempt to narrow the kinds of answers that he would permit Socrates to give, answers that he himself is willing to give.
If Thrasymachus is shown to be intellectually cowardly by this demand (which he quickly surrenders), can we not say the same about Socrates trapping Thrasymachus in a dialectical mode of argument by decision with Glaucon?
>Do you not think that there's a sophistical element to the kinds of arguments Thrasymachus is giving, especially given that he's a sophist by profession?
I do not see anything in Thrasymachus' argument that we would today attack with the meaningly perjorative 'sophistry', and what his profession as an ancient sophist has to do with that is beyond me.
>>7445025
This is at odds with the narrow definition of tekhne that Socrates will later force on Thrasymachus, which omits the faulty or corrupt use of human exellences.
>>7445090
I'll answer more of your questions when you offer some substantive views on this topic of your own. You are currently engaged in the same weasel-like stratagems of Socrates.
>>7445096
Your post is a paradigm of wisdom and human excellence.
>>7445123
>This is at odds with the narrow definition of tekhne that Socrates will later force on Thrasymachus, which omits the faulty or corrupt use of human exellences.
this is at odds with my ass nigger, a contemporary example; a hacker goes on to become a security expert
>>7444692
It's funny how clearly the protagonist makes his point in fiction.
>>7445123
this post is complete garbage. you're a fraud. have fun saying nothing and pretending it's something.
>>7445211
>m-m-muh plato
>i was t-told that if i read his book i'd know everything
>no he can't possibly be wrong about anything!
>>7445123
>To give one example, in his alleged refutation of Polemarchus, he conflates the insturction of a tekhne with its ordinary performance ie a musician cannot make somebody a worse musician through instruction, a horseman cannot make somebody a worse horseman through instruction.Of course Polemarchus' argument has nothing to do with instructing one's enemies, it has to do with performing the tekhne of justice against them. The simple performance of expert musicianship or horsemanship has nothing to do with its consequence on the unskilled, and in reality great displays of ability may cause anxiety and discouragement.
That's not a childish stratagem; Polemarchus *agrees* to all of the dialogical moves that Socrates makes, and its the accumulation of those agreements that undoes Polemarchus (and Thrasymachus after him). A simple way to deal with Polemarchus's argument is that he's just stupid--but surely that's not satisfying. But why not then notice the other thing that comes to light from their conversation? Namely, that while what Justice is is still unclear, Polemarchus's opinions about it *are* clear, and those opinions are in tension, and part of that tension is of what he understands technai to be. If they are means, and so neutral with respect to the ends they're used for, then the earlier argument about technai stands. If, on the other hand, a techne does rule over the ends to be pursued, then on the basis of *things he's agreed to* he's wrong.
>If Thrasymachus is shown to be intellectually cowardly by this demand (which he quickly surrenders), can we not say the same about Socrates trapping Thrasymachus in a dialectical mode of argument by decision with Glaucon?
No, because at what point did Socrates demand that the crowd demand a display from Thrasymachus? And at what point did Socrates *force* Thrasymachus to allow him to ask questions? He doesn't, and Thrasymachus, as the text says, "evidently desired to speak so that he could win a good reputation, since he believed he had a very fine answer" (338a)--that is, Thrasymachus is willing to dialogue with Socrates because he's convinced that he'll show him up in speech; after all, his very profession is to teach others to speak well, and especially to win arguments.
(cont.)
>>7445275
>I do not see anything in Thrasymachus' argument that we would today attack with the meaningly perjorative 'sophistry', and what his profession as an ancient sophist has to do with that is beyond me.
I wasn't using "sophistical" in some peculiarly modern way different from how the Greeks of Plato's time used it, i.e., he uses the rhetorical techniques of the sophists to win any conversation whether what he says is true or not, and whether the arguments and speeches he gives are slippery or not. (He thinks that by taking up a tyrannical posture, that he can dictate the terms of debate: 336d, 337c and e; more substantially, because he's after praise, he won't concede defeat if he can *somehow* or other maneuver his way out of defeat: 340c-e, 343a, 344d, 350d-e, 352b)
The relevance to his profession as a sophist is this: his very job is to teach others how to speak, and how to win arguments. When wisdom and knowledge are brought in, and it becomes clear that Thrasymachus respects wisdom and considers himself superior in wisdom to others, he closes off the very possibilities by which he could win: either what Socrates says is valid, and *his own wisdom won't get him what he wants or teach the same to others*, or what Socrates says is invalid, and yet he agreed to all of the moves that led to the conclusion, which again puts into question his wisdom.
>I'll answer more of your questions when you offer some substantive views on this topic of your own. You are currently engaged in the same weasel-like stratagems of Socrates.
You know, I was trying to politely ask you if you could make that post actually relevant, instead of handwaving by lazy reference to "the literature" and neat but irrelevant reference to a modern figure who otherwise does not resemble Polemarchus.
>>7445203
elaborate please
>>7445275
>>7445278
You don't seem to have a very clear understanding of sophism or a firm grasp on what is happening dramatically in the text.
You assert that in an earlier post that Thrasymachus '[attempts] to narrow the kinds of answers that he would permit Socrates to give', but this is a very thin reading of the text. The point of his utterances here is not to deny that Socrates can give any particular answer to the question 'what is justice', but that he cannot give an empty platitude for an answer which must then be further elaborated by Socratic dialogue. You seem to be under the impression that Thrasymachus is interested in engaging in a dialectical argument when that could not be further from the truth. Sophists did not engage in 'arguments' of the kind that take place in The Republic, they engaged in long-form argumentative rhetoric of the kind that Thrasymachus eventually breaks into when he elaborates his central statement that justice is the good of another - he is subsequently mocked for doing so by Socrates, who then colludes with Glaucon to veer the discussion back onto dialectical grounds. We must remember that Socrates at this time was the only practitioner of this method, and people were not keen to engage in it since his experience granted him practical advantages - his very method of enquiry is a childish stratagem in this context.
Thrasymachus reluctantly submits to one at the beginning once payment is promised, and begins with a provocative and partial statement of his view that justice is the good of another (namely one application of it, 'justice is the good of the stronger'), but he gives an elaborated speech soon after. Once Glaucon and Socrates decree that the conversation must subsequently proceed by question and answer, Thrasymachus no longer gives a shit. He doesn't '*agree* to all of the dialogial moves', he passively allows Socrates to make them while casting aspersions on his intellectual credibility.
>>7445702
>The point of his utterances here is not to deny that Socrates can give any particular answer to the question 'what is justice', but that he cannot give an empty platitude for an answer which must then be further elaborated by Socratic dialogue
That's not what happens by any measure: 1) He demands that Socrates "answer [himself] and say what [he] assert[s] the just to be." (336c) It would otherwise be reasonable to ask Socrates really thinks justice is except that then Thrasymachus demands that 2) "you don't tell me that it is the needful, or the helpful, or the profitable, or the gainful, or the advantageous." (336c-d) So Socrates is told to tell Thrasymachus what he personally thinks justice is--but just as long as it's not one of *these* answers. His very next lines are precisely what are sophistical in light of that: "But tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won't accept it if you say such inanities." (336d) So, if Thrasymachus is serious, then Socrates is to tell him what justice is, clearly and precisely, but somehow it surely can't be one of those, which intentionally narrows what Socrates can say. Now, your claim is that he's preventing Socrates from answering in platitudes, perhaps because they might also (in addition to being platitudes) be ambiguous and require further dialectical reasoning. Thrasymachus's own assertion of what justice is goes: "The just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger." This is itself a platitude common in the day (unless you'd like to Socratically refine what you mean by platitude), and is further very obviously not without ambiguity; but that shouldn't be a surprise, because Thrasymachus's request is disingenuous.
And all of this depends on Socrates actually having an answer to such a question.
(cont.)
>>7445994
>Sophists did not engage in 'arguments' of the kind that take place in The Republic, they engaged in long-form argumentative rhetoric of the kind that Thrasymachus eventually breaks into when he elaborates his central statement that justice is the good of another - he is subsequently mocked for doing so by Socrates, who then colludes with Glaucon to veer the discussion back onto dialectical grounds.
I didn't realize that rhetoric was only concerned with the length of speeches, and not also ways of speaking. For whatever reason, you seem to forget that Gorgias, another sophist specializing in rhetoric, asserts that "no one could say the same things in briefer speeches than I" (Gorg. 449c)
But ultimately, this is beside the point, because your taking issue with the fact that Socratic dialogue means making sure that Thrasymachus actually (god forbid!) know what he's talking about and take responsibility for his answers.
>We must remember that Socrates at this time was the only practitioner of this method, and people were not keen to engage in it since his experience granted him practical advantages - his very method of enquiry is a childish stratagem in this context.
So Socratic dialogue is a "childish stratagem" because he has practice in asking questions? Okay, that seems fine. So, using your standard, Thrasymachus and the sophists, being practiced in the art of "long-form argumentative rhetoric" are also using "childish stratagems".
>begins with a provocative and partial statement of his view that justice is the good of another (namely one application of it, 'justice is the good of the stronger'), but he gives an elaborated speech soon after
That's not quite how I'm seeing it happen: He gives his "partial" definition at 338c, and gives his elaborated answer at 343b-344c. Glaucon comes in at 347a. What amounts to seven pages in the Bloom edition go by before the elaborate answer is given; seven pages of question and answer have already been going on, and about four pages go by until the point when Thrasymachus blushes (350d), which is four pages after he's supposed to have stopped giving a shit. Why do you think he blushes if he has no stake in the conversation?
>>7445999
he doesn't blush socrates is flattering himself cunt that he is
>>7445371
probably just saying that Socrates would of course look good and reasonable when his author wrote him that way
best lecture course on republic
https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/Republic1957.pdf
>>7444692
I have to admit that it's unclear to me why you're so focused on how the characters debate with each other, as if their (un)successful assertion of a position was what Plato thought was at stake. Polemarchus is praised by Socrates in the Phaedrus as being philosophical, and that seems pretty significant if we take keep that passage in mind with what we have the Republic. I mean, I guess you could always argue that Socrates was being ironic, but that as an explanation doesn't make heads or tails of why he says what he does about Polemarchus in the Phaedrus.
I don't think I'm contesting your suggestions for how he and Thrasymachus could have made their arguments stronger, but it seems like Plato isn't interested in that, and the more immediate problem of at least making sense of the Republic is that if we approach their arguments that way, we otherwise miss how neither of them in fact belongs to the sorts of positions that we're otherwise associating them with. >>7445999 points out that Thrasymachus blushes, and that's good as an indication that he's bothered both for reasons of pride and because some of his beliefs are shown to be incompatible, but I'd also like to add that it seems important that we get hints that Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus are each exaggerated faculties of the tripartite soul later discussed (Reason, Spiritedness, Appetite/Eros), which seems to suggest that our analysis of these figures probably would need to be taken up again in light of later suggestions.
>>7448949
Just read the first session. Very insightful reading. I hope subsequent sessions feature as little of the students as the first.
>>7448949
who's that supposed to be?
>>7450941
Leo Strauss
>>7450957
thanks
>>7450957
Needs a Jewier nose.
>>7448949
Gadamer is way better. Fuck Strauss.
>>7453449
not really way better, but pretty good and way better than most commentators.
correspondence between strauss and gadamer at archive.org
https://archive.org/details/LeoStrauss-GadamerCorrespondencetruthAndMethod1961
interview with gadamer on strauss. seems to respect him highly.
http://www.interpretationjournal.com/backissues/Vol_12-1.pdf
>>7453615
nice links
You especially like Strauss? I remember seeing you around.
>>7453629
i find him pretty helpful. even when i disagree with him on something, it's rarely the case that he's obviously wrong. the real test is figuring out how to explain the same passages he discusses better than he does. sometimes he alludes to things that i can't make heads or tails of tho, which makes pinpointing his own positions pretty hard.
his students can be hit or miss, though when they're on to something, they can be pretty amazing and helpful for making sense of whatever authors.
