What was the most decisive battle of WWII?
kursk
Midway
>>30630549
Battle of France 1940
Battle of Moscow 1941
All the others were either foregone conclusions or inconsequential. That includes everything that happened in the pacific.
>>30630594
>All the others were either foregone conclusions or inconsequential. That includes everything that happened in the pacific.
>>30630549
Pearl Harbor
Moscow showed that USSR would not be beaten in a blitzkrieg
Stalingrad stopped the possible collapse of the state if it would have lost the rich South
Kursk established the material domination of the Red Army as decisive
There are a few possible options
The Battle of Britain: the failure to force Britain to capitulate, or at least fight on home soil, meant that Germany would always have a great European power to deal with, necessitating the placement of guard units along the French coast.
The Battle of Moscow: Failure here meant a total loss of strategic momentum and a prolonged two front war against two of the greatest economic and military powers in the world, just like WW1.
The Battle of Stalingrad: loss of the German 6th Army, collapse of the entire southern front, irreparable loss of public confidence and a permanent fallout between the political and military leadership of Germany.
Honestly the Battle of Moscow would be my pick, because it was a failure of Germany to accomplish a quick and decisive surrender of the Soviet Union.
ITT: Plebs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
>>30630640
>>30630665
Nobody every considers that germany could have failed spectacularly in 1940, probably because
>lol frogs surrender anyway
>>30630772
This. By all accounts France should have rekt the krauts in 1940, or at least put up a much stronger fight and drained the Germans far more.
>>30630549
Midway
Battle of the Bulge
If the US hadn't shown up and finally, and resolutely, turned the tide, the Germans could have just walked into Moscow next Spring on their Eastern front. Instead, they had to shift into "fighting retreat mode" and the Eastern front lost all its reinforcements.
>>30630665
>The Battle of Moscow
All important people left Moscow before the battle took place. STAVKA was well outside of harms way in particular. Moscow was irrelevant to Soviet warfighting capability.
>>30630597
I mean, he's right.
The Pacific was a foregone conclusion.
>>30631005
>the Germans could have just walked into Moscow next Spring on their Eastern front
>1944
>Germans doing anything besides dying
>>30631077
Soviet morale was hanging by a thread at that point, losing Moscow could have caused the country to collapse.
>>30631461
They were prepared to lose Moscow, their national unity wouldn't tank from losing a city they had literally prepared their entire nation to lose. They planned on a fighting retreat all the way to the Urals, hence why they moved their manufacturing base.
>>30630665
That completely ignores the pacific war. Throw in midway and your complete.
>>30631412
No, it wasn't.
>>30631593
Midway was incinsequential.
Even if the US had lost every ship in the battle, the only outcome is that the end of the would be a few months later and Japan would have had more than two irradiated craters.
>>30631629
>Midway was inconsequential
Not really. The more boats and materials used in the Pacific, the less the US sends to Europe.
the US pretty much took on Japan by themselves, (I know, CORAL SEA! REEEEEE!) and the Americans hated the Japanese quite a bit more, so if Midway was lost, I think a lot of our focus would have to be shifted to the Pacific.
>>30631614
It was, but how much effort and men we dumped into the Pacific directly affected the war in Europe.
There is no sequence of events where Japan won a shooting war with the US.
Plus, American merchant marine output for 1944 was more than Japan's for the entire war, it was lopsided and only increasingly so.
The single most defining factor was when Germany declared war on the US. If they had just let Japan get BTFO alone, there would have been no lend-lease, no strategic bombing campaign, no D-Day. Germany would've been free to 1v1 the Soviets.
>inb4 England
The UK could not possibly have done D-Day alone; most of the resources blown on the Atlantic wall could've gone East instead.
>>30631679
>There is no sequence of events where Japan won a shooting war with the US.
The entire point of them attacking was to knock out the Pacific Fleet so they wouldn't be an effective fighting force, allowing them to do as they pleased. How are you this ignorant of history to think that Japan then being allowed to take the primary source of Rubber of all things from the west wouldn't result in any difference to the war?
>>30630549
Are we not going to talk about the 6 squirrels?
>>30631679
Plus, all those neat little projects that were canceled, delayed or otherwise limited by the approaching end of the war?
Nah, fuck that. Full speed ahead! Next stop: A nip free zone.
>>30630549
hmm... Dunkirk, probably? As it's the only battle that I can see flipping the end result.
Telling germans not to attack russia at kursk won't defeat russia (at this point we have access to german communications, there are huge distances so no real surprises, germans don't have the ability to use russian rail infrastructure, etc. and germany is burning, kursk was not needed for germany to lose. And had they eventually ground down russia at the late stage, america would've just dropped their toys on Germany to end things.)
With dunkirk, the germans chose to consolidate and simply allow 330,000 defeated fighting men to escape across the English channel.
Had those defeated men not been allowed to escape, it's much more possible that Britain surrenders, Russia puts their dick back in their pants and sticks to peace-treaty for a few more years and America's isolationism pre-pearl harbor means it doesn't become a World War at all.
Britain would most likely surrender with the entirety of their army captured along with its gear. Germany would have had extra resources – including the 40 divisions which Britain’s continued hostility required in Africa and on the Atlantic Wall, as well as the 1,882 aircraft, and their experienced pilots and bomber crews, which were lost over Britain in the coming months. Faced by a Germany buoyed with these additional forces, Russia almost certainly would have fallen.
America couldn't have used the narrative "oh no the british are in trouble let's all risk our lives invading a heavily fortified foreign continent!" if Britain and France already surrendered and signed documents.
And Germany, having the best pilots in WW2, would've been too hazardous to try to start an air war with if they hadn't expended those pilots on low-fuel long-distance missions across the channel escorting ineffective ground attack aircraft (stukas and he111 that were not up to task against modern planes and took away bf109 advantage to defend down low)
>>30631733
Japan knew when they hit Pearl Harbor they were at best buying themselves 6 months. Their entire plan was to hand America a decisive battle in that 6 months like they had done the Russians and then sue for peace with the terms of reopening trade. Japan was already desperate when they attacked Pearl Harbor and they knew it would only get worse.
>>30631710
>no lend-lease
Lend lease started way, way, waaaaaay before we entered the war. Eventually the Americans would send "volunteers" to North Africa, and "British" forces would take Sicily. The war would stalemate with the Germans pouring more and more troops into meatgrinders, and would go full WWI unrestricted sub warfare, dragging the US into a war with another Lusitania-type event.
FDR was *not* going to not smack the Germans.
>>30631733
Because America had a magnitudes larger manpower pool and manufacturing base.
Also, there was absolutely no way to wipe out PacFleet, even post of the battleships sunk were raised to fight, later.
Japan was doomed, America was gearing up for an intervention (see: shitstomping) in East Asia, and Japan acted by attempting to do so much damage to America that we would just sue for peace and let them have East Asia. Unfortunately for them, they didn't listen to their top military advisers and continued to believe that Americans lacked willpower and drive to complete a conflict.
How incredibly silly.
>Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.
>In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.
Smart man.
>>30631569
>They were prepared to lose Moscow
Lol.
>They planned on a fighting retreat all the way to the Urals, hence why they moved their manufacturing base.
No, retard, they moved it there so that Nazi couldn't bomb them.
>>30631816
You think the public would be OK with lend-leasing away our weapons and supplies while we're busy fighting Japan?
>>30631811
>>30631816
These.
Japan never intended to win a war against America. Their attack on Pearl Harbor was out of pure desperation to bring the Americans back to the bargaining table and reopen their supply of American oil.
>>30631834
>You think the public would be OK with lend-leasing away our weapons and supplies while we're busy fighting Japan?
Yeah. Especially considering that Lend-lease went on until VE day.
>>30631869
Right, it did in the real war, because Germany declared war on us.
>>30631832
Why would they surrender? The only real opportunity the Germans had to seize Moscow was Operation Typhoon, and even if that succeeded, immediately after Typhoon failed, 18 divisions of well-equipped (by Soviet standards) well-trained (by Soviet Standards) winterized troops were fresh in from Siberia.
The entire war Stalin kept ~3 million troops on the Japanese border, if they really needed to, they could cut that to 1 million and still be fine.
Stalin wasn't going to give up from a loss of *any* city.
>>30631461
>>30631077
If one thing has become clear in modern warfare, it's that capitals don't mean anything anymore.
They are not a war material or manufacturing base and military and political command are completely separate in many modern nations, or at least have standing orders and a clear line of succession if command is severed.
taking a capital, usually a 3rd or 5th rate city in many countries, is nothing more than a symbolic victory. Thinking that moscow was the lynch pin of the eastern front is as ignorant as thinking we should have nuked tokyo to end the pacific war.
>>30631884
>because Germany declared war on us.
no, because we were already lend-leasing equipment before then. Why would we stop when we went to war with a German ally? If anything, we would only ramp it up even more. FDR was a political genius, and extremely popular at the beginning of the war. He could've told them we are now going to invade Mexico to make sure another Zimmerman Note wouldn't get through, and the Americans would've done it.
it would be something like this
>We are now at war with Japan, a crucial ally of the German Reich, in of itself an affront to Democracy and our very way of life. Even though we are not at war directly with the Germans, we must do anything and everything possible to aid the Democratic forces fighting the Nazi regime!
Plus, once we finished the war, do you not think we would find a reason to engage Germany if they didn't Lusitania us? (they would've anyway)
>Now that one great threat to Democracy is vanquished in the Far East, we must turn towards the heartlands of Western civilization itself. We must free the oppressed peoples of Europe from the very embodiment of evil.
Yeah, we were gonna kill Germans one way or another.
Once the giant awoke, it was not going to slumber again.
>>30631974
I'm saying we would stop lend-leasing against Germany if we were only at war with Japan. If Germany never declares war on us, we would cease sending aid to the UK and to the Soviets so we could focus on crushing Japan.
>>30632071
Right, and I showed you why that's wrong.
>>30631752
the germans not wanting to make peace with england so bad (IE dunkirk) would have changed a lot of things. If they'd encircled and captured the frogs and tommies instead of hoping their magnanimity would be properly interpreted instead of being spun as "the miracle at dunkirk" there is a much better chance of the british capitulating for their men at the loss of north africa.
>>30631974
the bigger reason is that britain paid for every scrap of lend lease post war. it wasn't free like history pretends it was to shore up the "muh anglosphere" whitewashing.
Still, if the germans didn't declare war and left alone US merchant marine all they would have to deal with was britian refusing to "surrender" and let the nazis control continental europe and north africa because of churchill being a mad cunt.
>>30632153
The Anglo-American Loan financed most of it. It was a 60 year, 2% interest loan of ~$5.5 billion.
America would've intervened eventually, probably after we pushed the Japs back to the Home Islands. Even if we didn't directly declare war, we would've inevitably sent "volunteers"
Eventually these "volunteers" would die, and that itself could be spun into yet another casus belli.
There were no shortage of reasons to fuck up Germany post-Pearl Harbor.
>>30630669
By June 1944 Germany was already collapsing so Operation Bagration was hardly "decisive".
>>30631005
(You)
>>30630549
>>30632205
>There were no shortage of reasons to fuck up Germany post-Pearl Harbor.
except for britain not being at war with them by the time we got finished ruining japan's boipussy.
before the zimmerman note and pre pearl harbor propaganda to tease public sentiment towards helping britain "why should we give a fuck, the nazis seem like pretty cool guys" was the common sentiment of the day.
No western power took any issue with the Nazis destroying the BBEG of communism.
>>30632284
I don't see it that way.
FDR was going to get us into that war. The American people would've voted out the remaining Isolationists in November 1942 and the first thing FDR would've asked for in January of 1943 would be to send troops to Europe.
It was a done deal. Once the pendulum swung into force against fascists in Japan, America would crave European fascist blood.
Not to mention that once the Germans stalemated against Stalin's troops, the Germans would try and stop the flow of American equipment to the Soviets. (see: Lusitania)
>>30632284
>>30632412
Also
>no Western power
They were all either under Nazi control, allied to the Nazis, or fighting the Nazis.
Charles Lindbergh was a member of a fringe minority.
>>30630549
the ones where the communists infiltrated the US government, media, education and financial institutions.
>>30632412
>attacked by japan
>responds by sending troops to europe as the pacific fleet still rusts underwater and reports of the bataan death march reach american radios
I don't think so tim/10
>>30632452
>implying the finns were wrong about gommunism
churchill was the only real thing standing in the way of peace in western europe. if the nazis had captured effectively the entire british army at dunkirk instead of letting them escape as a sign of good will the brits wouldn't have had a real option other than negotiating peace.
>>30631959
>They are not a war material or manufacturing base
Except Moscow was a manufacturing center in WWII, along with Leningrad and Stalingrad. Not to mention, Moscow was THE major transportation hub that could transship men, equipment, and supplies from one front to another the quickest. Political statement didn't matter to the Russians, and yes taking Moscow would not have meant capturing the Stavka. But it would have broken the biggest rail link in Soviet logistics.
>>30632521
>churchill was the only real thing standing in the way of peace in western europe. if the nazis had captured effectively the entire british army at dunkirk instead of letting them escape as a sign of good will the brits wouldn't have had a real option other than negotiating peace.
I hope you're not serious. First off, it was not a good will gesture. There is no historical evidence to support that claim, not to mention it being completely illogical for Hitler to do such a thing. They stopped because Germany's tanks had outrun the infantry and their supply lines, and the Heer had been in heavy fighting for two straight weeks and needed time to reorganize and rest. Goering assured Hitler his bombers could wipe the British out on the beaches while the Heer rested, and Hitler agreed because marshlands surrounding Dunkirk would have bogged down any offensive as it did in WWI.
Second off, Germany had no way to invade Britain, and the Brits knew it. Army or no army, first they have to get past the Home Fleet and the RAF. The first was impossible, and second was unlikely. Sealion was a lost cause without taking into account the loss of the British at Dunkirk, IF Hitler had managed to get them before the evacuation.
>>30630772
What could have happened and what did happen are two different things. The Czechs could have told Germany to go fuck themselves. The Poles could have turned over Danzig. Hitler could have had a brain aneurysm.
>>30631593
Honestly the war in the Pacific was a forgone conclusion. There was no way the Japanese were going to beat America. It was just a matter of when/how they were going to be defeated.
>>30631077
It wasn't so much the threat of Moscow falling so much as a loss of strategic initiative. The Germans were forced back and never truly recovered from the loss of momentum.
>>30630549
Cant find shit on this
>>30632521
>I don't think so tim/10
nice argument. I provided adequate reasons why the US would intervene in Europe, and you respond with this.
>churchill was the only real thing standing in the way of peace in western europe
Oh, so you're a Nazi apologist and Wheraboo, this makes sense.
>instead of letting them escape as a sign of good will
As has been stated above, the Germans would've been smashed if the unsupported armor continued to push into the bogs surrounding Dunkirk.
Germany was extremely worried about a possible breakout and wanted to keep the BEF and French pinned down, they had only two options:
1) push the initiative and strain your already thin supply routes in an attempt to destroy the hundreds of thousands at Dunkirk, possibly losing massive amounts of armor and allowing an Allied breakout operation.
2) regroup, reorganize, and attempt to leverage your air power to stop an evacuation until you are ready for a new offensive
The Germans were in a no-win situation, it was either let the 300,000 escape or lose your Panzer divisions attempting to stop them.
>>30632709
>there is no historical evidence to support this
not that guy but holy shit you're right
I've seen the fucking Dunkirk Mercy thing repeated so fucking much I just assumed it had some element of truth
fucking wehraboo historiography
>>30630772
>>30630975
One of the things people tend to forget about the Battle of France is that Gamelin actually ordered the correct flanking counterattack on Guderian's Meuse bridgehead, which would probably have cut off the panzer groups and contained the German breakout. The only reason the attack didn't go forward was that Gamelin was replaced by Weygand, who temporarily delayed all of Gamelin's offensive orders by a matter of days while he assumed command.
This doesn't absolve the French military or Gamelin of responsibility for losing the battle, because their corps commanders should have been able to execute the offensive without being delayed by reshuffling at the highest level, but it does show how close the ebin blitzkrieg came to disaster.
There's a reason OKH spent most of the Battle of France screaming at Guderian and Rommel to fucking stop advancing. They were outrunning all of their lines of supply and communication, which presented the very real risk of annihilation.
>All of these posts saying the Pacific is foregone.
If the US loses Midway and their whole fleet, they lose Hawaii, they lose any presence in the Pacific, and their allies like Australia get caught off.
I don't think people understand how important it was to have a close island base. You think that a Navy can fight and sail for some foregone time without any need for resupplying and refueling? Even if they build up the fleet, how are they going to make any meaningful impact if they have to deploy all the way from the West Coast and most likely have to come back often because of the vast amount of ocean they have to cross?
>>30632938
>unable to google
>>30633620
>lose Hawaii
Ha, that's adorable.
Maybe if the entire USN ceased to exist and we forgot how to build new boats.
>>30633718
That's under the consideration that the fleet at Midway gets wiped out. That literally leaves only Saratoga and Wasp as the only carriers in the Pacific. 2 carriers wouldn't be able to hold Hawaii against the Kido Butai and remember that the Essexes started coming in in 1943.
>>30633893
>the *entire* fleet
No, no way, even if we lose, the IJN would be too hurt to stage the massive, massive amphibious assault that would be the taking oof Hawaii.
>>30633648
>That jap with glasses
Jesus Christ the propoganda was real
>>30633620
Japan never had the industrial ability to seriously challenge American domination of the Pacific, nor the resource base. At worst they could have delayed their defeat a couple more years if we had lost Midway, but even that is an optimistic view.
>>30633893
They barely had the fuel to attack Pearl Harbor, how are they going to take Hawaii?
>>30633893
If the USN loses Midway in the worst possible scenario (all Japanese CVs alive and undamaged and all USN CVs sunk), Japan is still unlikely to actually take Midway. Why? They do not have amtracks or any other amphibious vehicle capable of getting over the reef and into the lagoon, the heaviest naval gunfire they actually have doctrine for using in support of a naval landing is the 8.1" guns of the cruiser fleet, and they don't have near enough men to overwhelm the defenders. It would be a literal bloodbath in the lagoon, and even assuming they manage to take it, they can't keep it supplied in the face of US submarines. This ends with any garrison getting starved out and removed at a later date. The invasion of Hawaii is laughable, as Japan simply did not have the sealift or the logistics to accomplish it. This story ends with the USA coming back with even more carriers and stomping the IJN even harder.
>>30634112
t. Wake Island Commander Winfield S. Cunningham
>>30633643
Did you try to google it or are you just being smug?
>>30634112
Midway isn't like Iwo Jima or another slightly larger island. The whole island actually can be leveled by artillery quite handily. Japs don't have to try to land before everyone is dead, and, considering the firepower they brought to the party, Midway won't last long.
>>30634112
>The invasion of Hawaii is laughable, as Japan simply did not have the sealift or the logistics to accomplish it.
Yet Japan was capable of taking the Philippines or Borneo. The idea that it is simply impossible for Japan to take Hawaii is at best American exceptionalism and more likely just plain retardation.
>>30634112
Except that the US had a low amount of submarines compared to the IJN in 1942. Even less so if they lose the subs they had at Midway. I don't think they'd be starved out any time soon. And since they just took the island called Midway, they have a staging ground and place to keep hold of their logistics.
>>30634508
>cratering the entire island
This is getting stupid, seriously, there is a reason they want the base.
>>30634545
shut up, I'm done. We've explained this many times.
>>30634545
Japan wasn't trying to take Hawaii.
They just wanted to shock American into surrendering the West Pacific -- mostly Philippines, so they could have all the delicious resources they needed to start land wars in Asia.
What they didn't expect was for America to wipe the blood off its lip, stand up, and unload a secret weapons program straight up their ass.
>>30634583
You were done the day you were born with brain damage.
>>30634583
>At first I will claim that Japan simply can't take the island
>then I will change my argument to say Japan won't try very hard since they want the island to be nicely preserved
Wew
>>30634628
two different people, dude.
>>30634590
>They just wanted to shock American into surrendering the West Pacific -- mostly Philippines, so they could have all the delicious resources they needed to start land wars in Asia.
Which is why they didn't devote most of their precious resources to taking Hawaii as Genda advocated. However that does not mean that Japan, in a surprise attack, could simply not have taken Hawaii because they are utterly incapable of moving a couple of divisions 2000 miles by sea as some people in this thread have claimed.
>>30634158
>>30634508
Wake Island
>550 defenders against 2500 japanese, on a larger and less defensible island
>12 F4F fighters
compared to Midway
>3,600 Navy and Marine Corps, with several Army air crews
>31 PBYs
>6 TBF-1s
>4 B-26s
>17 B-17s
>27 SBD-2s
>17 SB2U-3s
>21 F2As
>7 F4Fs
>japanese invasion force is 5,000 men, 13 destroyers, and 4 heavy cruisers
Are you people this dense? It took Spruance over a week of bombarding Kwajalein with carrier aircraft, B-24s, artillery from neighboring islands, and his battleship support and still there was Japanese counterattacks for 3 days until the Americans secured the island.
>>30634545
You are fucking retarded. At the Philippines and Borneo, they did not face a prepared foe contesting their landing, nor did they have significant natural barriers blocking their landings.
>>30634569
Midway is a barren rock. Everything needed for war has to be shipped in save for water, and that's only if the desalinization plant is functional. Japanese submarines were utilized incredibly poorly, even despite having better torpedoes early on. They targeted warships, not merchant marine. The US would strangle the garrison and sweep in when Japan abandoned it.
>>30634590
>What they didn't expect was for America to wipe the blood off its lip, stand up, and unload a secret weapons program straight up their ass.
kek
>>30631614
Obviously you've never met any Marines.
>>30634664
That amount of airplanes probably wouldn't have been able to do anything against the Kido Butai's. The Marines' pilots were also woefully trained as they did horrible during the Battle of Midway compared to the Navy pilots.
That also still doesn't address the point that the US has no subs to counterattack with. And US subs were only destroying merchant fleets in droves in 1944 when the USN achieved Naval Parity/Superiority. What the fuck are they going to be able to do if the fleet just got wiped out at Midway? Thay's also not addressing the fact that the USN's Mark 13 torpedos weren't fixed.
>>30634757
>If an extremely specific series of events occurred in the fashion I describe, Japan can not lose
No.
>>30631734
>>30631662
Not to diminish the very true fact that most of the actual work of beating Japan was done by the US, China and other Allied nations did tie up a large number of Japanese soldiers that could have otherwise been used to dig in on the islands.
Whether they could have kept them well (enough) supplied is another question.
>>30634775
This whole thing is a hypothetical already. Claiming that even if the whole USN fleet at Midway was wiped out, the IJN not being able to take Midway is ridiculous.
>>30634835
How do you take an island that shoots at your gunfire support ships with 7" guns, shoots your landing infantry with smaller artillery and machineguns, and forces said infantry to literally swim across 200 yards of lagoon from the reef before they can even begin fighting? You do not have a 3:1 advantage, the heaviest guns you have are 8" guns on the cruisers, and your air support has failed repeatedly to inflict significant damage to anything but the runway and the avgas fuel tanks.
>>30634812
Yeah, that's the argument I tend to make when people go "m-muh China"
Yeah, China killed a lot of Japanese, but the issue is that even if China lost out, what would change? Japan would still spend a lot of its troops garrisoning China, and even if Japan went full BEF and evacuated, where would they go?
They couldn't go to the Pacific Islands, because every body means more bullets, beans, and bandages, which means more transports, which stretches the already dangerously thin supply routes the IJN was running, and would probably lead to more merchant marine vessels sunk, and they would starve anyway.
If they recalled them to the Home Islands, they would still capitulate after the nukes.
If they went to hold Manchuria, the Soviets would still steamroll them.
Japan's divisions tied up in China were equally worthless everywhere else, save maybe the Philippines.
>>30634835
Different guy, I think they could've taken Midway, but I would hardly consider it decisive.
As stated earlier, Yamamoto himself said
>Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.
America was not going so surrender or sue for peace, which means they would continue to fight, which means Japan would lose.
It's that simple, if they didn't force American surrender, they lose, and that was never going to happen.
Not a single goddamn battle in the Pacific mattered, because America could've won by pure attrition, all the way to the Home Islands.
>>30634901
They brought the Yamato-class, Nagato-class, and Kongou-class battleships with them to Midway. Could those ships not get into range of Midway?
And they'd probably assault the islands the same way we did. Blast it with your ships and take out installations with air power. If the USN fleet is down, there's nothing really to stop Japanese pilots from continuing to bomb the island. The Army and Marines pilots on the island aren't going to be able to do jack shit to the more trained Japanese ones.
>>30634913
I made a point earlier in the thread that was basically, if they can take Midway, they can take Hawaii. All they have to do is stop there and hold on to that defensive line in the Pacific. That is what Yamamoto planned to do which is why he wanted Midway in the first place.
If they can just hold on to Hawaii, how is the USN going to be able to make their way back into the Pacific if they have to deploy all the way from the West Coast? They won't have any island bases to support their logistics and keep the fleet fueled and armed.
>>30634901
>How do you take an island that shoots at your gunfire support ships with 7" guns, shoots your landing infantry with smaller artillery and machineguns, and forces said infantry to literally swim across 200 yards of lagoon from the reef before they can even begin fighting? You do not have a 3:1 advantage, the heaviest guns you have are 8" guns on the cruisers, and your air support has failed repeatedly to inflict significant damage to anything but the runway and the avgas fuel tanks.
You kill everyone on it and then land some dudes on it.
>>30635021
>If they can just hold on to Hawaii, how is the USN going to be able to make their way back into the Pacific if they have to deploy all the way from the West Coast? They won't have any island bases to support their logistics and keep the fleet fueled and armed
This is exactly why Genda was right and everyone else in Japan who were all muh resources were wrong. Having resources mean jack when your enemy can always get more than you. Taking Hawaii would have forced the US to attack from the Indian Ocean, something it may not have had the stomach for.
>>30634975
>They brought the Yamato-class, Nagato-class, and Kongou-class battleships with them to Midway. Could those ships not get into range of Midway?
Japanese doctrine specified for cruisers to do all infantry landing support until Guadalcanal, as they needed guns the size of the Kongou-class's to actually have a chance at damaging Henderson Field. At Midway, doctrine was that all battleships be held in reserve for a Jutland-like battle, which is why Yamamoto and the battleship fleet was 600 miles from Midway during the battle. The actual landing support fleet, consisting of Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, and Kumano, were far closer because they were assigned to support the landings.
>And they'd probably assault the islands the same way we did. Blast it with your ships and take out installations with air power. If the USN fleet is down, there's nothing really to stop Japanese pilots from continuing to bomb the island.
If Wake Island is anything to go by, they would get closer and closer with the Marine guns staying silent until they couldn't possibly miss. Then they'd open up, which would royally fuck the cruisers and landing craft. The landing craft themselves have to stop at the reef, as very few of them can even get over the reef. Men either have to transfer from landing craft to rubber boats, or swim to the beach 200 yards away, all while under machinegun fire. 2500 SLNF troops were supposed to make this landing. The remaining 2500 men were construction battalion engineers. Remember, Kwajalein was bombarded for 10 days by land and naval artillery, naval aircraft, and B-24 heavy bombers. It was still a contested landing, and the only reason it went so well was because the troops had amtracks to get over the reefs and to the beach.
>>30635029
See battle of Kawajalein. You are not going to magically kill everyone on the island without starving them out. Bombs and guns are not going to remove an entrenched defender. See every US landing on a contested island.
>>30635021
>>30635046
They can't take Hawaii because they do not have the logistics to sustain a supply line across the Pacific Ocean, nor do they have the sealift to move enough men to take an island with a 25,000 man garrison, which also happens to be the single most defended island chain in United States possession when it comes to shore batteries. Genda was a fool with no knowledge of logistics if he thought it was possible.
>>30635099
>See battle of Kawajalein.
>See the battle where the attackers literally killed everyone on the island while suffering barely 100+ deaths.
You are really bad at this logic thing, you know that?
>>30635119
Shock and awe. Take over stores of supplies. Yes, it's a crap shoot, but a crap shoot is better than a plan that is 100% sure to end with your country losing with a good chance of nukes mixed in.
>>30635129
>Took 4 days to secure the island
>Japanese made an organized counterattack each day on the first 3 days
>they did this after being hit by far more firepower and troops that were brought to bear on Midway
Git lernd son
>>30635149
>Shock and awe
>lets completely ignore logistics
>lets throw away tens of thousands of SLNF and IJA troops, along with ships, planes, weapons, and precious fuel, on a fools errand that can only end in failure
>>30631752
The Battle of Britain could've gone ahead exactly the same if the Germans hadn't allowed the Dunkirk evacuation.
There's no reason to think that they'd have been forced to surrender, they just wouldn't have been as capable of going on the attack.
>>30635190
>>Took 4 days to secure the island
>>Japanese made an organized counterattack each day on the first 3 days
>>they did this after being hit by far more firepower and troops that were brought to bear on Midway
>and in the end, literally every Jap died
Git ((((((learnd))))))
>>30635283
>>30632709
>>30633047
>fucking wehraboo historiography
>There is no historical evidence to support that claim
And people say the /pol/smokers aren't trying to take this place over.
>>30634590
>What they didn't expect was for America to wipe the blood off its lip, stand up, and unload a secret weapons program straight up their ass.
To be fair, there was a very real, albeit small chance that if the Japanese wiped out the pacific fleet, they could possibly affect a bombardment of the West coast, to bring the US back to the bargaining table like they intended.
Contrary to what people may think, your hate-boner isn't going to always grow harder when people are dropping bombs and shells on you, sometimes you just want it to stop especially the people in the immediate area where they're landing.
Would it have just caused another war later on even if Japan did get what it wanted? Oh certainly. But WW2 wasn't this forgone conclusion on either front, like people portray it.
It's like you folks only ask about the 'fun' parts of what your grandparents remember about WW2, and not the whole reality that our side actually could have lost.
>>30635597
>To be fair, there was a very real, albeit small chance that if the Japanese wiped out the pacific fleet, they could possibly affect a bombardment of the West coast, to bring the US back to the bargaining table like they intended.
No.
The endurance of the Kaga, for example, is 10k nautical miles at 15 knts cruising speed. Straight line distance from Tokyo to Sand Diego is 4848 nautical miles. She can barely make this voyage on her own fuel stores, at cruising speed. Kongou-class battleships have the same range, but the accompanying destroyer escorts have between 4,000 and 5,700 nautical mile endurance depending on the class. The fleet does not have enough fuel to make the round trip when you account for going to full steam to launch aircraft, taking a longer route to the north to avoid detection by the 250-350 aircraft garrisoned on Oahu, and still make it back to Japan. The Kido Butai took 8 fast fleet oilers with them to reach Pearl Harbor. The IJN had a total of 18 fleet oilers throughout the entire war, and 8 of those were completed in 1943-44.
>>30630975
this
everyone blames the british for bugging out, but the prewar arrangement was always that the french would do the bulk of the mainland fighting while the british helped out and handled the naval/overseas side and built up a army, neither side expected france to get so completely hammered but by the time the british retreat to dunkirk and evacuation began the situation was already irretrievable, so the british were meant to do what instead of retreating? fight a futile battle to the death while their allies collapsed around them?
at the point at which the evacuation was launched the overwhelming strategic priority for britain had to be the preservation of as much of a viable fighting force as possible to allow for the defense of britain and the continuation of the war.
both the french and the british failed in the battle of france, but the french failed harder
Moscow was meaningless. The failure to take Leningrad (major production hub), and more importantly Stalingrad (cutting off the Volga) was a devastating loss for the Germans in ending the war against the Soviets. Only a few months after the defeat at Stalingrad, the Afrikakorps surrendered. At this point there was little to no chance the Germans could have won, so I would say the defeat of Stalingrad and the loss of the Afrikakorps were the most decisive battles of WWII.
>>30639214
Germans failed to achieve any of their goals for Barbarossa, so it's kind of hard to pinpoint which of their massive failures was truly instrumental to their loss. Maybe they all contributed?
>the loss of the Afrikakorps were the most decisive battles of WWII.
This, however, was absolutely meaningless. Also Afrikakorps ceased to exist as an entity long before Germany's Africa army was destroyed.
>>30640435
>Germans failed to achieve any of their goals for Barbarossa, so it's kind of hard to pinpoint
I agree with this.
> Afrikakorps ceased to exist as an entity long before Germany's Africa army was destroyed.
They could have gotten those 300,000 men back though instead of leaving them in Africa to surrender. That is no small number, and I would still consider it a valuable "entity"
>>30632284
The zimmerman note, that is the zimmerman telegraph, was WWI.
F u u c kk
>>30631593
How does hopping on few pisshole islands in the middle of nowhere could have any impact on the outcome of the war? The Imperial Japan has been defeated by Red Army in Manchuria. All Americans did was shitting diarrhea at Guadalcanal and dropping atomic bombs on civilian population.
>>30640528
I freely admit I do not know the *numbers* but I very much doubt that the AK, a unit of some four divisions at its height, had 300 thousand men...
>>30634751
>oh look, it's the "marines did everything in the pacific" meme
>>30633570
This like the worst post in this thread.
>>30640528
What Germany could have also done was bother to bring back the divisions they had up in Norway basically playing with themselves until Hitler popped some pills and danced his last shindig.
There wasn't even the problem of the Mediterranean being controlled by the allies in that case.
>>30631077
Moscow was *the* rail hub for the entire country.
Take that, and those factories in the Urals have a hard time getting any components or supplies to each other, or finished goods to a coherent front.
>>30631752
There's one extra component to consider...
If the Brits, their morale shattered by the loss of their entire force and all its men, demand negotiations over Churchill's desire to fight it out, then not only does Hitler get to lighten his western garrisons (and avoid the strategic bombing), but he also gets to continue to buy things, not just from England, but also the US.
Does Hitler have enough stolen gold to pay for enough oil tankers (or better yet, gas from Houston's refineries) to last the war?
>>30631974
Don't forget that the communist-infiltrated State Department had flipped from isolationist to warmongering the instant the USSR was invaded.
The joke was that the Soviets were broken with a non existing industry left.
The Lend-Lease Act saved their asses, without it the Soviets wouldn't have an intact air force, no logistics and no equiptment for the Winter.
>>30641777
Lend-Lease had barely any effect in 1941
>>30641503
Hitler ran out of stolen gold in 1940.
>>30641527
>implying america isn't still secretly communist
>>30640855
Except that the USN utterly decimated the IJN all by themselves.
Without that, even if the Soviets take China, what are they going to be able to do to make an impact against Japanese-held islands or Japan itself with its non-existent navy?
>>30630640
>Kursk established the material domination of the Red Army as decisive
>Red Army
Don't make me start busting out Zhukov quotes here. Without lend-lease it is entirely possible Stalingrad and Moscow either drag on much longer or are lost and the war drags on much longer. Without Lend-Lease the westward relocation of factories and production becomes far, far more problematic and immediate food and materiel supplies to troops during this process is also much more difficult. Also, without Stalingrad, Lend-Lease supply becomes much more difficult as the Persian supply corridor is cut off (representing almost 30% of total LL supply to the USSR). This is why Stalingrad is probably the most pivotal. Note that this is not to say the Soviets would have lost without Lend-Lease entirely, but the entire war would have taken on a very different character and may have lasted as much as a decade longer depending on whether Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad fall.
By Stalingrad, 3,180 tanks, 2,650 aircraft, and 87,300 motor vehicles (about 45% of the tanks, but only 18% of the aircraft and 20% of the vehicles) had already been shipped. But it was the food, boots and most importantly the locomotives to ship all the industry west during this crucial period that really made the contribution. While the Soviets may have blunted the German advance at Stalingrad without Lend-Lease (although their chemical production at that point makes it doubtful they would have had enough ammunition, much less other essentials), they certainly wouldn't have been able to begin counter-offensive actions as quickly as they did without it. There would have been about a 2 year eastern front stalemate while relocated Soviet industry spooled completely back up and developed to replace crucial LL contributions like the near-front logistics solution of the Studebaker trucks or the locomotives supplied.
cont
>>30630640
>>30642717
Kursk or Taifun only really become the points around which the entire war pivots if the Germans win either in decisive fashion and cripple Soviet forces along the way. In that manner they reverse the damage already done, rather than these battles merely being additional momentum to the prevailing trend at that point.
Let us not also forget what a clusterfuck Leningrad was for the Germans and what a rallying cry it was for the Soviets. That's another piece of the puzzle.
>>30640855
>How does hopping on few pisshole islands in the middle of nowhere could have any impact on the outcome of the war?
They were crucial for contesting the Pacific.
IJA was defeated AFTER Japan surrendered.
You should read a book.
>>30630549
>>30630594
>>30630640
>>30630665
>>30630669
Isn't the basic strategic lesson of WWII that "decisive battles" are not the fulcrum upon which wars are balanced? All the early German victories, the crippling of Soviet production capacity, Dunkirk, Leningrad, the taking of France, the (admittedly ineffectual) disruption of Allied supplies from North America, Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, the Solomons, etc., none of it matters when the Soviets are able to double their troops in the field from late 1941 to late 1942 and completely rebuild and increase production from the precipitous 44%+ drop starting in June 1941 by mid-late 1942, when Great Britain's production is relatively unhindered and its usefulness as a strategic staging point is undiminished, when the US is allowed to supply crucial materiel more or less unmolested to all allies and outproduce the Axis by itself in many areas.
Production and logistics represent the "turning points" of WWII. The Axis' inability to deal a crippling blow to Allied production or even severely hinder it after the early successes in mid 1941 to mid 1942 in the USSR are what spelled its doom. Some basic thoughts in this vein:
>The US alone produced almost half again as many aircraft during WWII (303,713) as the entire Axis (214,191). Total allied aircraft production (575,480) more than doubled Axis production, and included types (four engined bombers capable of crippling Axis production for instance) which were force multipliers unavailable to the Axis. This is in addition to the generally better quality and quantity AvGas, materials and technology (in strategically important numbers) by mid-late war.
>The Allies produced 6.5 times as many tanks, self-propelled artillery, vehicles, 5 times as many artillery pieces, mortars, guns, and 32.9 times as many ships. 32.9 TIMES AS MANY SHIPS.
>The Allies produced twice as much coal, almost 14 times as much crude oil and five times as much Aluminum.
>>30643059
Germany would not have produced as many airframes if they continuously upgraded them as the Allies did. They got their production numbers by sticking to their 1936 plane for the most parts.
>>30643069
>They got their production numbers by sticking to their 1936 plane for the most parts.
The obvious counter to that argument is that 1936 German designs were advanced compared to Allied designs, and were not overcome on a one for one basis until the Allies started getting fully sussed out 1941-42 designs into full production and service in 1943. A lesser form of the argument holds true for Japanese aircraft designs and tactics up to late 1942. Of course, neither Japan nor Germany were hitting the allies decisively where it counted - in their production centers and shipping routes, and neither of them developed the one aircraft class which might have at least assisted them to attempt to do so - the four engined bomber.
>>30632071
History doesn't change based off what you think should have happened you fuck
>>30643104
*not overcome on a one for one basis when Allied aircraft had to be optimized for range
>>30642724
>Let us not also forget what a clusterfuck Leningrad was for the Germans and what a rallying cry it was for the Soviets. That's another piece of the puzzle.
There is an excellent argument for Leningrad being strategically more important than even Moscow to success on the eastern front.
Remember that, including civilians and soldiers, the USSR lost 1.6-2 million citizens in that siege (many to starvation and cold over the 41-42 winter). This is more casualties than ALL United States combat casualties from 1776 to present. And the Germans STILL failed to take the city, in fact being bled of resources to center and southern groups to that front by mid 1942 instead of linking up with Finnish forces and cutting Soviet supply lines there.
>>30642717
And Barbarossa itself wouldn't have been possible without the US corporations selling Hitler steel and oil up to the outbreak of war. Your point? Most of the lend lease hardware didn't start arriving in quantity until late 1942, and in reality, the tanks Soviets did receive were not as effective as their own T-34 and KV-1. The lend lease did make a difference once the Soviets gained the initiative in 1943, because the large number of trucks enabled more of the Red Army to be mobile, which in turn gave the Red Army the ability to exploit breaches in the German lines, sustain rapid advances, and keep troops & equipment on the advancing front lines well supplied as they moved forward. So the lend lease was most impactful after Kursk which already marked Germany's fundamental reconfiguration from offense to defense.
The outcome of the war has been largely predetermined in Kursk and the Soviets would have eventually reached Berlin regardless, with or without material aid from the west. The fact that promplty forced the US to intervene and gain strategic foothold in Europe in heroic battles against kids and cripples from Wehrmacht's second rate reserves.
>>30631077
>Moscow was irrelevant to Soviet warfighting capability.
Lol, you're so full of shit. Moscow was the transportation and industry hub of USSR, 80% of all roads and railroads went through Moscow. Without it there would not be USSR anymore. There was a huge panic in Moscow and only after first days of successeful counteroffensive it stopped and order was restored on the streets. Westernfags who only saw red square parade propaganda movie on youtube know nothing about it ofc.
>>30643195
>*not overcome on a one for one basis when Allied aircraft had to be optimized for range
This is fair. It should also be noted that features like self-sealing fuel tanks and sturdier frames further handicapped US designs against Japanese designs early in the war when considering the pure kinematic performance effects of the additional weight and disregarding the later huge effective advantages of those design redundancies.
>>30643245
You need to look at the amount of goods that went through Moscow. "80% of all roads and railroads" is doesn't really say anything.
>>30643259
You're retarded, man. There was not a single North-South transport connection to the east of Moscow, not a single one. By taking Moscow Germans would win the war immediately.
>>30643316
Forgot.
>>30643237
>Most of the lend lease hardware didn't start arriving in quantity until late 1942, and in reality, the tanks Soviets did receive were not as effective as their own T-34 and KV-1. The lend lease did make a difference once the Soviets gained the initiative in 1943, because the large number of trucks enabled more of the Red Army to be mobile, which in turn gave the Red Army the ability to exploit breaches in the German lines, sustain rapid advances, and keep troops & equipment on the advancing front lines well supplied as they moved forward. So the lend lease was most impactful after Kursk which already marked Germany's fundamental reconfiguration from offense to defense.
This is only correct if you consider the tanks and materiel on the front line while ignoring strategic resources like ammunition, propellant, explosives, AvGas, food and boots/clothes. For instance, Lend Lease accounted for 47.4% of all truck production within the USSR from June 41 to Dec 42. How this is not significant RE: Stalingrad, you will have to explain to me. Even then, by the end of 1942, 10% of total Soviet tanks were lend-lease acquisitions, which even while employed in less crucial areas freed up Soviet designs and production for the front line. Some facts:
>From 1942 onward, the US AvGas supply to the USSR accounted for roughly half of their entire supply.
>Lend-Lease supplied a total of 214,607 tons of finished explosives (mostly TNT), compared to domestic Soviet production of about 600,000 tons. In terms of raw materials, the US supplied 103,293 tons of toluene, compared to Soviet production of about 116,000 tons. In addition, the US shipped nearly 300,000 tons of propellants, equal to about three years worth of the production capacity lost when the Donbas chemical industry was overrun in 1941.
cont
>>30643237
>>30643436
>the entire Soviet pre-war ammunition production (in terms of artillery ammunition) stockpiled from 1936 through June 1941, some 88-million rounds, was expended by the end of 1941. The loss of the Donbas chemical industry and of many ammunition plants meant that production delivered June-December 1941 was just 50 to 60 percent of the mobilization plan. As a stopgap production of aerial bombs, at 16-million in 1941, was reduced in 1942 to 6-million to allow diversion of the explosive filler and its constituent chemicals to other uses. As late as 1945 the production of bombs remained at under 6-million annually. But propellant production in the first quarter of 1943 was still at 91 percent of prewar capacity, while projectile production was at 113 percent, and gun production was at 281.6 percent. It is difficult to see how even this restricted production level could have been maintained without the Lend-Lease receipts. In fact ammunition production in terms of finished rounds peaked at just a 58% increase over the second quarter of 1941 – in the first quarter of 1945!
>1941: 180 tanks, 150 planes, 8,300 vehicles, total value about $435,000.
>1942: 3,000 tanks, 2,500 planes, 79,000 vehciles, total value $35,479,000. In addition, the UK shipped 2,600 tanks and 2,000 aircraft.
>Lend-Lease arrivals in the USSR in 1942 (an extra 5,780 tanks all types from US and UK) represent more production than all German tank production of the same year.
>In 1942 the Soviets produced 24,495 tanks and SU, while the US shipped in 3,000. So just over 12 percent were supplied externally, a small but significant percentage. Especially when considering that Soviet tank losses during 1942 were about 15,000. Which meant that Lend-Lease increased the net change of production minus losses at the end of the year significantly. Instead of +9,495 it was +12,495, about a 30 percent increase. This does not include the UK LL contributions to that date.
cont
>>30643237
>>30643436
>>30643446
>The grand total of 23,106 tanks on hand on 6 June 1941 included 4,415 requiring either major repair or a complete rebuild, understandable given that the total on hand probably included over 9,100 T-26 completed between 1931 and 1938, as well as many other elderly types. Now given that the tank park was 7,700 on 1 January 1942 and production in 1942 was 24,495 while losses were 15,000, shouldn’t the tank park on 1 January 1943 be 17,195? But no, it is 20,000, so where did the extra 2,805 come from? Lend-Lease perhaps? And is it unreasonable to suppose that the 7,700 on hand on 1 January 1942 might have still included a large number of the elderly and near useless 4,415? Either way, you can say that Soviet production in 1942 was 24,495 and that Lend-Lease shipped in that period was about 5,600 about 18.7 percent of the total.
>Total Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941was 62,000, and then dropped precipitously to 35,000 in 1942, 49,200 in 1943, 60,600 in 1944, and 74,700 in 1945, for a wartime grand total of 281,500. So Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941 was 62,000, while Lend-Lease shipments from the US alone were 8,300 (11.8% of the total). Granted that only 1,506 arrived prior to 1 January 1942, but Soviet production in 1942 was only 35,000, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 79,000 (69.3% of the total). Soviet production in 1943 was 49,200, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 144,400 (74.6% of the total). Soviet production for 1944 and 1945 combined was 135,300, while Lend-Lease from the US alone through August 1945 was 188,700 (58.2% of the total). By 1 May 1945 32.8% of the Soviet Army truck park consisted of Lend-Lease vehicles. Thus, from June 1941 through December 1942, Soviet domestic production was 97,000, while US Lend-Lease was 87,300 (47.4% OF THE TOTAL).
>>30643237
>>30643436
>>30643446
>>30643459
>As for "Soviet equipment being superior", which is irrelevant in this discussion, at Kursk Lend Lease tank types accounted for 10.46 percent of the total on hand/committed, and 10.35 percent of the total lost. They were used and lost in roughly the same proportion, meaning they were destroyed at about the same rate. You seem to forget that not all Soviet tank types in 1941-43 were T-34s, plus the fact that at Kursk, T-34s were lost at almost the same rate as Grant/Stuart types (and a greater rate than Churchills or Matildas/Valentines).
>>30643237
>And Barbarossa itself wouldn't have been possible without the US corporations selling Hitler steel and oil up to the outbreak of war.
Do you have a source for this? It was my understanding that US sales in those materiel categories up to 1940 accounted for less than 3% of total German production across the board.
>>30643466
>meaning they were destroyed at about the same rate [as soviet designs].
Sorry, had to fix that.
>>30643446
>USSR building 1.13 times as many projectiles and 2.816 times as many guns in early 1943 as pre-war
>but only .91 times as much propellant
>building only 1/3 as many bombs
>Lend-Lease still somehow completely irrelevant for Stalingrad
I mean, I get that a lot of Burgers and Bongs overstate the importance of Lend-Lease, but come the fuck on anon. It says it right there: the Soviets only had to increase ammunition production by 58% by 1945 because of Lend-Lease, meanwhile the US increased ammunition production by 3,140% between 1941 and 1945 (2,538% between 1941 and 1942 alone) in ground ammunition rounds larger than 20mm (I can't find immediate year-on-year data for total US ammo production, but that should give a good overall picture).
>>30643581
Overall, US ammunition deliveries to the USSR accounted for 53% of total domestic production; over 1942, the US delivered nearly as much completed ammunition to the USSR as they produced domestically. In terms of pure propellant, Toluene, etc, US deliveries account for an even higher percentage of Soviet usage during jan 1942 - aug 1942.
After all, the biggest blows to Soviet production in the Summer of 1941 were in industrial chemical production capacity and food production capacity.
>>30643581
>It says it right there: the Soviets only had to increase ammunition production by 58% by 1945 because of Lend-Lease, meanwhile the US increased ammunition production by 3,140% between 1941 and 1945 (2,538% between 1941 and 1942 alone) in ground ammunition rounds larger than 20mm (I can't find immediate year-on-year data for total US ammo production, but that should give a good overall picture).
Here's some better data on US ammo production year on year, pic related. We note the following:
>Between 1941 and 1942, US total ammunition production increased by tonnage 1,209.9% while Soviet production was roughly flat or falling during their industrial relocation (producing only about half of what their mobilization plans were calling for).
>from 1941 to 1945, US total production by ammunition ton had increased 2,459% compared to the modest 58% Soviet increase from prewar to 1945 levels, in spite of having the much larger army to equip. So the question remains: where were they getting their ammunition if not Lend-Lease, especially in 1942. Remember that pre-war stockpiles in many applications (such as artillery) were depleted by the end of 1941.
>>30643436
>>30643446
>>30643459
Source(s)? Most I've ever seen as far as a yearly breakdown goes was the British pre-lend-lease, which provided about 1/3 of the tanks used in the defense of Moscow and 140~ hurricanes at murmansk. Everything else I've seen is either total material delivered broken down by type by the end of the war, or total tonnage delivered per year with no regards as to what was delivered. I'd like to read more on this.
>>30630549
Winter war:
1) it caused Finland to join in Operation Barbarossa
2) it alerted russkies to the fact that their Army was huge but retarded, allowing them to get their shit together before Niemcy attacked
>>30643760
US congressional reports, US presidential messages to congress, the actual Soviet LL program requirements outlines in conjunction with adjustment/shortfall addendums, plus a shitload of secondary scholarly work based on US, UK and post-Glasnost Soviet primary documents (some of which is more reliable some of which not so much on all three sides). I remember the works by Harrison, Van Tuyll and Krivosheev being especially useful for running down primary documents and providing counter-points to be addressed (Van Tuyll especially makes several dubious assertions about the ineffectiveness of lend-lease overall). Maybe the easiest year-on-year overview of contributions IIRC comes from “The US Army in World War II, Statistics, Lend-Lease” prepared by Theodore E. Whiting, Carrel I. Tod, and Anne P. Craft for the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: 15 December 1952.
A lot of that is cribbed from this thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=61570
Which I used as a jumping off point looking for lesser-known sources to write a 30-page college essay on the effects of lend-lease up to mid-1943 almost a decade ago. I remember that the numbers supplied above were confirmed. Most of where I dug that stuff out over several weeks were the normal sources on WWII production, including many of the newer secondary sources released covering the primary Glasnost documents on WWII production/Lend-Lease.
At the end of the day, though, several of the figures fluctuate depending on which sources you're looking at, and a lot of it has to be converted from US dollars in the congressional reports to actual tons/rounds/completed vehicles/gallons/etc, which has its own hazards. I think the thread above represents a good jumping off point for running down the sources and illustrates good points on both sides of the issue.
cont
>>30643760
>>30643928
When I started that paper, I really had no idea how deep I'd have to get into it to start getting really clear answers on what was produced, what was shipped, what actually got to the USSR and where it was actually used (for instance, food: feeding the army, feeding the production workers, feeding the populace, even feeding Gulag prisoners and guards...).
The only reason I got an A- instead of an A on that was because I went to broad. It's probably too complex to completely explore outside of a 200+ page book, which I might someday write. Losing both hard drive and paper copies of that paper in the great house fire of 2009 still royally pisses me off.
>>30642717
Lend-Lease only arrived in relevant quantities by the later years. Your 3k tanks and 2.6k aircraft by late '42 is a fucking drop in the bucket by the standards of the eastern front at that time. And the food, boots and locomotives made up a vanishingly small fraction of the overall soviet stockpiles and production at the time. Hell, for locomotives and rolling stock, the existing stockpile the Soviets had at the start of the war was literally more than ten times as much as what they both produced and received from Lend-Lease for the entirety.
Late-war motorisation is the one thing where Lend-Lease made any real impact at all.
>westward relocation
You mean eastward.
>>30644003
>Lend-Lease only arrived in relevant quantities by the later years. Your 3k tanks and 2.6k aircraft by late '42 is a fucking drop in the bucket by the standards of the eastern front at that time. And the food, boots and locomotives made up a vanishingly small fraction of the overall soviet stockpiles and production at the time. Hell, for locomotives and rolling stock, the existing stockpile the Soviets had at the start of the war was literally more than ten times as much as what they both produced and received from Lend-Lease for the entirety.
You should read his entire set of posts, anon. Then provide actual numbers instead of just reasserting an unsupported opinion.
>>30644003
>Your 3k tanks and 2.6k aircraft by late '42
It clearly states here >>30643446 and >>30643459
That by the end of 1942 the total shipped between the US and UK was about 5,600 tanks, or 18.7 percent of the total Soviet tanks on hand at that point (note that this is not taking combat losses into account). In dec 1942, Lend-Lease tanks made up just over 10% of available Soviet tanks. See the Kursk numbers here >>30643466 for a good idea.
Furthermore, tanks weren't even the most important contributive products; that would be things like food, boots, clothing, ammunition, AvGas (over half of the Soviet supply in 1942), and yes trucks.
While pre-war Soviet stockpile figures on things like trucks, locomotives and ammunition are interesting, what really matters are the Soviet available/stockpile numbers west of the Urals for these post Barbarossa, and that's where it gets very tricky even with the Glasnost documents. As I have lost my paper and access to the university library and my professors compared to a decade ago, if you have good accessible sources on these numbers, I'd be overjoyed to see them.
>>30644003
>Late-war motorisation is the one thing where Lend-Lease made any real impact at all.
What about ammunition? Pure explosives or propellants? Highly refined petrolium products? Food? Aluminum? Copper?
During Lend-Lease up to the end of 1943, the US provided 8.2% of total USSR steel production. While not an amazing amount, that's certainly more than a drop in the bucket, especially considering how crucial steel was to the USSR in those years. That's not even mentioning crucial finished products like rail (40.58% of Soviet production 1942-1943).
>>30643466
>You seem to forget that not all Soviet tank types in 1941-43 were T-34s, plus the fact that at Kursk, T-34s were lost at almost the same rate as Grant/Stuart types (and a greater rate than Churchills or Matildas/Valentines).
Now that's pretty damn interesting. Any idea for some context on that number? Were Grant/Stuarts, Churchills and Matildas committed to front line combat in the same proportion as T-34s?
>>30644003
>Lend-Lease only arrived in relevant quantities by the later years. Your 3k tanks and 2.6k aircraft by late '42 is a fucking drop in the bucket by the standards of the eastern front at that time
List of units in 1942 equipped all or in part with LL tanks, either fighting with them or freeing up Soviet new production to go to front line units:
10th Tank Corps: Formed 19.april-42, traded its T-34 for MatildaII tanks, in action with Matildas for first time 7.jule-42, in august received KV,s.
Corps had 178 Tank Brigade with no matildas, 183TkBr with matildas an T-60, 186TkBr( matildas, T-60). By spring of 43 last matilda was gone.
11th Tank Corps:Formed 19 may -42. Corps was formed with MatildaII in place of T-34.
Coprs had, 53rd TkBr(Kv, matilda, t-60),59TkBr(Matildas, t-60),
190TkBr(Matilda,t-60). By august-42 the Corps was rebuilt due enormous losses, with t-34 and t-70.
5th Mechanized Corps: Formed with all units having Matildas as mediums and Valentines as lights.
Corps had, 127th, 128th, 156th, 168th and 188th Tank Regiments.
The Corps went into action during the Stalingrad counteroffensive in Dec.1942. After being largely destroyed by Manstein,s counteroffensive the unit was rebuilt and returned to the front in Feb.1943 with almost all tanks LL Valentines.
10thGuards TankBrigade:Formed Nov-42 from 35thTkBr. Had a mixture of T-34 and Mtildas as mediums.
11thTankBrigade:This was the second brigade with this number, formed in Feb-March -42. Had a mixture of Matildas and T-34 as mediums. Used as an infantry support unit until April-43.
15th Tank Brigade:Formed sept.-41. April-Sept 1942 equipped with American tanks(M3Stuarts and M3Grant).
cont
>>30644003
>>30644213
36th Tank Brigade: Formed Sept.1941-April 1942. Equipped with mixture of Matildas, Valentines and t-60. Went into action in April-42 with 22nd Tank Corps, transfered to Moscow military district, transfered to 2nd Mech.Corps Oct.-42.
37th Tank Brigade:Formed Sept1941-April1942. Equipped with mixture od Matildas, Valentines and T-60. First combat action was Kharkov offensive May 1942, then in 38th Army and then in 6th Army.
Rebuild with matildas June1942, destroyed and disbanded in late June-42 by german summer offensive in southwestern front.
38th Tank Brigade:Formed May1942, equipped with mixture uf Matildas, Valentines and T-60. Went to the front with 6th Army in may with just two battalions. Trapped in Kharkov encirlement and destroyed late may-42.
57th Tank Brigade:Equipped with, T-34, Valentines and T-60.First action with 23rd Tank Corps in Southwest front in may-42.
Destroyed in Kharkov encirclement.
64th Tank Brigade: Formed Feb-April-42, equipped with a mixture of matildas, valentines and t-60. Took part in the Kharkov operation with 21 and 23 Tank Corps, rebuilt with 16 T-34 and 30 Matildas, destroyed in the Izyum pocket.
92nd Tank Brigade:Formed Feb-June1942, equipped with M3 Grant and Lee. Went into fron with 31st Army in july1942.
101st Tank Brigade:Formed Feb.-June 1942, wquipped with M3 mediums. Fought as an infanrty support brigade in western and kalinin front throughout 1942. Equipped with t-34 in may 1943.
102nd Tank Brigade:Formed at stalingrad in march 1942, equipped with 7 KV,s, 30 Matildas and 15 T-60. Went into action near Voronezh in june-july, with 1st Guards Army north of Stalingrad in Sept.1942.
In Oct.1942 brigade was equipped with t-34 and t-70.
108th Tank Brigade:formed Feb.1942, equipped with "english tanks", probably with Matildas and Valentines. It spent virtually all of 1942 and -43 as an infantry support unit in 50th Army of the Western Front.
cont
>>30644003
>>30644213
>>30644223
114thTank Brigade:Formed march 1942, equipped with t-34 and M3 light.Destroyed in Kharkov offensive, rebuilt and smashed again in 4th Tank Army in sept.1942, rebuilt as a tank regiment in Oct.
120th Tank Brigade:Formed feb-june1942, equipped with M3 mediums and Valentines.With 20th Army from end of june-42, spent most of its career as an infantry support brigade in Western Front.
130th Tank Brigade:From 8th Tank Division 1941.Kharkov operation with 23rd tank Corps, destroyed at Izyum pocket with its 20 T-34,s, 16 T-60, 10 Valentinesand a few M3 lights.
131st Tank Brigade:Formed by May 1942.Under 23rd Tank Corps in the Kharkov operation, dfestroyed in Izyum pocket with its 20 T-34, 16-t-60, 10 Valentines.
136th Tank Brigade:Formed by june 1942, equipped with M3 mediums. Assigned to 14th Tank Corps, destroyed in august 1942.
145th Tank Brigade:Formed feb.1942, equipped with M3 mediums.
In 31st Army in late 1942, lost all Lend Lease tanks during battles around Rzhev in Nov.-Dec. 1942.
153rd Tank Brigade:Formed Feb 1942, equipped with mixture of KV, T-34, Valentine and T-60. Went to front in july1942 as an infantry support unit in the Western Front.
154th Tank Brigade: Formed Feb-June 1942, equipped with US M3 medium and lights.
To the front as a rifle support unit in Western and Kalinin Fronts in late 1942, reformed as the 69th Tank Regiment as the and of 1942.
164th TankBrigade:Formed Feb-May 1942, equipped with Matildes and T-60. Assigned to 16th Tank Corps in june, after taking heavy casualties before and after Stalingrad offensive went into reserve and rebuilt with russian tanks.
167th Tank Brigade:Formed Apr.-June 1942, equipped with Matildas and Valentines. Assigned to 13th Tank Corps, destroyed west of Stalingrad in july, rebuilt and assigned to 24th Army in september.
>>30644003
>>30644213
>>30644223
>>30644233
168 th Tank Brigade:Formed by and assigned to front in may 1942, equipped with Matildas and Valentines. with 22nd Tank Corps in Kharkov offensive, almost destroyed, rebuilt with british tanks and reformed as 168th Tank Regiment.
188th Tank Brigade:Formed Apr-June 1942, equipped with Matildas and Valentines.Suffered heavy losses with 31st Army near Rzhev in september, received T-70 as reinforments. Reformed as 188 tank Regt. in Oct.1942.
192nd Tank Brigade:Formed march 1942, equipped with M3 medium and lights. Supporting 61st Army july-42.
202nd Tank Brigade:Formed Feb-Apr.1942, equipped with Matildas and Valentines. Went in to action with 48th Army and later 19thTank Corps.
236th Tank Brigade:Formed jule-42, equipped with mixture of KV, T-34, valentine. Served as an infantry support unit north and west of Moscow throughout 1942 and 43.
10th Guards Tank Regiment:Formed Oct.1942, equipped with Churchill IV tanks. It fought at Stalingrad and then in Southwest Front as a general support unit during 1943 summer campaign.
15th Guards Tank regiment:Went to Don Front at Stalingrad in Dec.1942 equipped with 21 Churchill tanks.
134th Tank Regiment:Formed from 134th Tank Brigade in Oct. 1942, equipped with M3 mediums.In late 1942 fought under 4th Guards Cavalry Corps.
156th Tank Regiment: Formed Aug1942, equipped with Matildas and Valentines. Remained as a STAVKA reserve until early 1943.
Source: Red Hammers, Soviet self-propelled artillery and Lend Lease armour 1941-1945 by Charles C. Sharp
It seems that lot of Lend Lease material was lost in Summer 1942 battles around Kharkov, but it was present at the battle of Stalingrad also.
>>30630554
This, all other answers are irrelevant.
>>30644274
>Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad irrelevant and not primary reasons why the Germans failed at Kursk
ok
>>30644003
>Lend-Lease only arrived in relevant quantities by the later years.
I would hardly call 2 of 19 tank corps and 1 of 9 mechanized corps plus 10%+ of all regiments and battalions formed in March-April 1942 with lend lease armor alone "irrelevant".
STFU about fucking Lend-Lease already, will you
>>30644274
starting a war in the first place is when the germans failed
>>30644372
>STFU about fucking Lend-Lease already, will you
Fuck off, I want to learn more about it. This shit is interesting as it offers direct evidence to LL being actually relevant before 1943 or at all, contrary to Soviet statements about it. It also directly applies to the relevance of both Stalingrad and Leningrad as far as turning points in the war - losing either affects lend lease deliveries in a big way.
>>30643928
>>30643936
Thanks. Shame your paper's gone though. I'm enjoying reading all of this.
>>30644687
>I'm enjoying reading all of this.
I did too back then and again today. It's rare to find a well-researched, civil and academic discussion on this topic online that doesn't devolve into ridiculous low-info dickwaving 20 posts in, much less one with about a dozen good but obscure reference titles buried in it.
>>30630549
>ctrl f
>no Operation Uranus
>>30644736
I think most people roll Uranus into the general mention of Stalingrad, as it represents the strategic end of that particular battle, along with the Manstein miracle to blunt further Soviet capitalization of that victory.
>>30644771
Christ, makes me want to play some HoI4, but the AI is a turd right now. Marching into Moscow in less than a month isn't fun.
Maybe in 6 months time.
