What strategic lessons or military axioms have you learned from your various readings?
From Alexander and Cyrus to Westmoreland and Schwarzkopf, discuss and post tactical tidbits and lessons you've learned
If you mix the hot chocolate powder from your ration pack into your rice pudding it makes a great tasty treat
>>30190935
This isn't from a reading but from modern events.
When a conflict is 2 sided but there's 3 sides involved, you have to be selective about your commitment to destroying enemy forces.
For example: Syria. The US wants to defeat the Islamic State while simultaneously keeping as much of the country out of Assad's hands as possible but without actually fighting his or his backers' forces. That means you have to make sure not to gut your enemy's entire army such that the whole front collapses and the 3rd party can exploit your common enemy's collapse.
The US is already trying to do this. For example:
1. they have not cut the Islamic State forces in Iraq off from Syria, because that would involve going through Deir-ez-Zor and relieving the siege of Assad's forces there. Thus, the US-backed SDF has stopped north of Deir ez-Zor and has advanced no further.
2. They have chosen to target Manbij rather than al-Taqba, as advancing to al-Taqba would directly draw off forces opposing the Syrian army (which is also advancing to al-Taqba), allowing them to more quickly advance into Raqqa province.
3. Though al-Qaeda is the enemy of the United States, they have virtually ignored the al-Qaeda branch in Syria because it is large and ties down a large number of Assad's forces.
4. They usually (unless the target is very strategically important) do not strike IS targets operating in areas nearer to the Syrian Army than the SDF.
>>30190935
When in doubt, "do something" and more than likely it's "go forward"
Panic and inaction has never helped in any sort of contextual situation. Even a horrifically failed charge with heavy losses is still better than sitting and letting them assfuck you.
>In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing
>In the absence of orders go find something and kill it
>in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy
>>30191035
The Syria conflict seems too intricate for me to even half grasp, It'll prob take me another few months before I read into it, though at least I can count /k/ for that info
>>30191084
Where'd you learn these?
>>30191144
Mostly quotes.
>In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing ~ T. Roosevelt
>In the absence of orders go find something and kill it ~ attributed to Rommel
>in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy ~ Horatio Nelson
>When in doubt, fight ~ Ulysses S. Grant
>>30191175
Also
>The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack.
>But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest. . . .
>If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, if follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object.
Clausewitz
Any sort of unusually long or otherwise arduous patrol should be constantly managed well from within. It isn't enough to go with what the boss says and work from there.
There was the tendency to assume "he's very good, he'll be fine" and sort of leave someone to it. You should be constantly aware not only of your own condition, but the condition of those around you. It simply isn't enough to go along with the idea that someone has done something before and that they are capable of fully carrying it out again. Jungle and desert warfare exaggerates this. Arctic and urban warfare does, too, but it's very rare that this is carried out for a long period of time.
>>30190935
Generally, flow like water. Find the path of least resistance. Time is more valuable than space.
>>30190935
Do your part and kill em all.
>>30191144
In what terms do you mean?
Militarily? Yeah, kinda. When you have 4 sides (which, as far as I know, is unprecedented in military history) it can be kind of a clusterfuck. But figuring it out is fascinating IMO.
>>30191187
>Any sort of unusually long or otherwise arduous patrol should be constantly managed well from within.
So are you saying leaders should be more hands on? I totally agree, a majority of people are retarded and should not be given autonomy at all, especially in military-like settings
>>30191285
like the monthly operations and strikes by various groups, just looking at Russian strikes in the middle of sides advancing or retreating was more than I could initially process
>>30191317
This can help you stay on top of things.
http://syria.liveuamap.com/
>>30191317
>So are you saying leaders should be more hands on?
In a sense. I'm more drawing from personal experience here, but even when working with very experienced and level headed types they can become complacent. Not only should consistency be a key, but keeping skills fresh and making good use of experience.
For instance, the LRDG perfected desert patrolling in the Second World War. By the time Aden came around for the British Army, they had to learn it again. The US SF sent to Vietnam throughout the early and mid 60s had a simple, robust, solid technique that they used to make large gains. They didn't, however, have the sense to make sure that other combat units stuck to it or they themselves maintained and improved it.
The French had what was widely considered to be the best quick reaction air portable force in the world from about 1948 to the early 1990s. It's still very good, but once you've lost that edge it's hard to get it back. You can apply that to a four man brick or a whole army, it's the same principle. People get complacent because they're in the knowledge they're the best.
>>30190935
That high speed maneuver based warfare is not doable for most armies and that defensive fortifications still work. The Syrian civil war, Ukraine civil war, and the Armenian–Azerbaijani border conflict all ended up with heavy tench use. Most armies nowadays just do not have the needed volume of artillery, tanks, and air to ground in order to fight in the manner most people talk about modern war being.
