Was Kursk the biggest blunder for the germans?
>huge manpower and equipment wasted assaulting a impenetrable fortification
>every gain was futile because soviets just gained them back counterattacking with their huge reserves
>offensive was called off anyway because Allies invaded Sicily
All of it lost because Hitler thought that assaulting the most defended position on the EF would gain them victory
>>929362
You're ignoring the fact that assaults on salients had worked fine before for the Germans. They had literally just crushed a Soviet push into Kharkov (which is what created the Kursk Salient in the first place), and there was no better place to launch an offensive than at Kursk. There, they could call on the forces of two Army Groups and two Luftflotten to hit a dangerously exposed salient in the lines.
That's not to say that there weren't mistakes made at Kursk, but it was hardly a stupid decision to attack it in the first place.
>>929362
The Germans had to attack it because that was the biggest concentration of Soviet soldiers.
At this point, German high command new that conquering the USSR just wasn't going to happen, but hoped for one last major blow to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table and talk from a position of strength.
the goal was to encircle the Kursk salient and leave some 1.5 million Soviet troops surrounded and stranded by the encircle, which would've taken a good 25% of the Red Army off the playing field. So attacking it had to happen in order to achieve this goal.
The Soviets knew this was the Germans goal too, so they fortified to the point where the Wehrmacht was wading through their own dead men to advance.
It made sense to the Germans who wanted to remove the bulk of the Red Army from the battlefield, but the Soviet defenses were just that strong, even if the Germans pushed for one more assault, ignoring the allied invasion of Sicily, it would've been almost impossible to completely close the circle, considering how negligible their gains were so far in the operation.
>>929419
Couldn't the germans just dig in themselves to favorable defensive positions and stay on defensive?
>>929453
Nope. They lacked the resources to really hold off any significant offensive on the scale the Soviets could launch.
Remember that even in late 1941 the Soviets managed to launch an offensive across the entire front. By 1943, with the Luftwaffe reduced to the point where they were operating as "fire brigades," and with the Soviets significantly better off than they were in '41, waiting for the Soviets to launch an offensive at Kursk would have been disastrous.
>>929474
oh I see
Then they basically were fucked the moment they lost in Stalingrad?
>>929485
They were fucked long, long before that. Even if we assume they had a chance when Barbarossa began (they didn't), the point where they were really fucked was when Kiev held out longer than expected, forcing Army Group Center to divert its efforts to aid them and stalling the onset of Operation Typhoon.
Stalingrad was just an excellent example of how bad the Germans were at predicting what the Soviets could do. Despite the Soviets showing time and again that they were rapidly learning from their mistakes, the Germans assumed that they could continue doing the same things to the same degree of success.
>>929485
Stalingrad was the moment when the Germans accepted that completely defeating the Soviets was now impossible.
Kursk was the Germans attempt to bring the Soviets to terms and maybe end up with some Ukranian/Belorussian land and the Baltic states, then refocus their attention on fighting the UK/US.
After the defeat at Kursk, Germany lost any chance of negotiating peace terms that would be favorable to them, and after Kursk, Stalin was going to settle for nothing less than the complete conquest of Germany, so negotiating after the battle was pointless.
tl:dr: they lost the chance for total victory at Moscow/Stalingrade
they lost any hope for a favorable peace at Kursk
>>929503
Wasn't there a German general who outright said, when the Germans were defeated at Moscow, that "the Invasion of Russia has failed."?
>>929531
Careful believing the words of any German general. They tended to embellish stories and try to blame everything that went wrong on Hitler to satisfy their postwar egoes. Manstein's a particularly bad example of this.
>>929362
my understanding was that the plan made sense for a limited time period, before the soviets had a chance to entrench themselves.
however, as the plan continued, the strategic and tactical sense for it evaporated but everyone was too invested in making it happen - particularly GROFAZ - that no one ever questioned why it was still being implemented. additionally, it kept being delayed so that new weapons platforms could be deployed (like the panther and the elefant) which, together with the mole in OKW feeding the soviets intel, allowed the russians to prepare basically a gigantic fortified position upon which the german army could be broken.
>>929546
Did the German High command spend most of their time straight after world war 2 blaming everything on Hitler and claiming they knew nothing about the holocaust and that the Werhmact dindu nuffing?
>>929573
Not too familiar with that myself, but from what I understand it was mixed - some did, while others didn't.
With Manstein, it's pretty funny/infuriating because his memoirs blame anything and everything on Hitler no matter how retarded. And if there's an incident he can't blame on Hitler (like the failed first assault on Sevastopol) he pretends it never happened.
Once you start to realize just how concerned with personal egoes the average German general was, Hitler's paranoia and convoluted command structures start to make more sense - he likely (rightfully) believed these men were more concerned with their reputation than they were winning the war.
>>929573
yep, and were successful. the soviets kept a lot of their experiences on the down-low and the western powers had a vested interest in believing them, since many of these guys ended up in the bundeswehr when it was reformed.
>>929362
>the most defended position on the EF
It was actually the most heavily fortified position in the history of mankind.
>>929402
German detected. Yeah, it's not smart to attack exactly where the enemy is expecting you to attack and give him months to prepare defenses even if it's "tactically correct". Literally anywhere else on the line would've been a better place to attack, because the Soviets would've been caught off guard.
>>929627
Agreed, the ruskies knew several weeks in advance where the two thrusts would come and had ample time to amass troops and build fortifications. I think their engineers put down a few million landmines, and there were like 6 defensive lines, it was completely nuts to attack into that.
>>929362
>what is maskirovka?
>>929627
Where else could they attack?
Army Group North was embroiled in Leningrad which was too much of a clusterfuck to assault with the resources they had.
Just south of Kursk was Kharkov, where the Germans had just launched an offensive that brought the frontline up to the Don. Attacking there again would be suicide - not only would the Soviets have plenty of men ready to be poured in, but you're attacking across a river.
And at the southern extreme of the front, you had the Kuban theater, where the Axis forces were already having enough trouble holding what ground they had.
>>929669
>muh argument from ignorance
They didn't have to attack at Kursk. There are a million other places to launch an assault in Russia. Or, they could have just not attacked and regrouped somewhere completely different. But Hitler wanted to do it, probably because he was on some heavy drugs and thought he was the immortal übermensch or something.
>>929501
The Soviets were master at maskirovka, mate. Don't forget to take that into account.
>>929698
>They didn't have to attack at Kursk
Not attacking at Kursk leaves the Soviets with literally a million men parked in a salient at the junction between two Army Groups.
And again - where else could an assault have been launched? There was no other place where they could concentrate enough men and airpower.
>>929546
>Careful believing the words of any German general. They tended to embellish stories and try to blame everything that went wrong on Hitler to satisfy their postwar egoes. Manstein's a particularly bad example of this.
Just as Soviet memoirs are all heavily edited by the state and all histories printed up to the 1990's are, at best, slanted and, at worst, factually inaccurate as all scholarly work had to be approved before publishing. Modern historians estimate upwards of 40 percent of records of the Red Army’s wartime operations are missing, censored, and forgotten.
Slavboos will tell you the Eastern Front is forgotten and diminished because of the western allies' propaganda but in reality it was their own policies that cratered the credibility of already limited Soviet records and forced a dependence on German ones.
>>929728
and the germans by that point will have amassed an immense armoured reserve with which to threaten that army in the likely event that it tries to break out, half of which can be save and used for a counter thrust somewhere else.
a million men and thousands of tanks and trucks is a lot of dudes to feed and supply if they're attacking to break out of that salient, especially if you can narrow down their avenues of advance and keep their supply lines constantly under threat, which a large mobile reserve and defence in depth can do.
>>929767
Was that really necessary to say?
>>929774
>create a clusterfuck by having two opposing armies deep in each other's territories
this is viable how exactly?
>>929831
because one clusterfuck will be contained and threatened with isolation and pocketing, and the other will be threatening bridges, railway lines and roads which are vital for supply, further worsening the enemy's position.
but it didn't happen, and kursk did, so it's moot at this point.
>>929786
Yes. With Kursk particularly.
>The battle of Kursk, fought in the summer of 1943, involved six thousand German and Soviet armored vehicles, making it the biggest tank battle of all time and possibly the largest battle of any kind. Students of military history have long recognized the importance of Kursk, also known as "Operation Citadel," and there have been several serious studies of the battle. Yet, the German view of the battle has been largely ignored.After the war, U.S. Army Intelligence officers gathered German commanders' post-war reports of the battle. Due, in part, to poor translations done after the war, these important documents have been overlooked by World War II historians. Steven H. Newton has collected, translated, and edited these accounts, including reports made by the Chiefs of Staff of Army Group South and the Fourth Panzer Army, and by the Army Group Center Operations Officer. As a result, a new and unprecedented picture of German strategy and operations is made available. The translated staff reports are supplemented by Newton's commentary and original research, which challenges a number of widely accepted ideas about this pivotal battle.
>>929641
The worst part is that German reconnaissance aircraft could see a lot of the fortifications they were building, and yet the still went ahead with the attack.
>>929362
Importance of the Battle of Kursk - http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia_us/
Host Marshall Poe talks with eminent military historian David Glantz, who analyzes the battle.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzfO8h5USwo
>>929362
>Was Kursk the biggest blunder for the germans?
The battle of Britain was ze Germans biggest blunder.
>>929474
They could have tried another Manstein backhand attack.
Wait for the Soviets to attack, feign retreat, and when the Soviets were exposed counter attack.
Hitler would have none of that and demanded every inch of ground be defended so there was no ability to pose an elastic defense.
>>930461
Except there was no guarantee that would work. The Soviets were learning extremely fast, to the point that any trick that worked once probably wouldn't work again. The Demyansk/Stalingrad airlifts were a good example of this, as were every major operation after Third Kharkov.
Letting the Soviet attack would have just led to another rout followed by the Soviets stopping in their tracks long before they're overextended enough for another major counterattack to have any effect.
It's exactly what they did in the Lower Dniepr offensive and Bagration.
>>930482
Look. Attacking a heavily fortified is a bad idea no matter the outcome. They would have fared much better if they focused on what they were good at which was mobile warfare.
They would have had a better chance with an elastic defense and counter attack than either attacking fortified positions or holding every inch of ground.
>>930489
Yeah just like how they should've focused on massed tank attacks against the British instead of fiddling with all that air battles or amphibious landing plans.
>>929970
I was looking for more videos like this on the channel, but it looks like the channel is mostly for conspiracy theory videos.
Any other similar channels that go more in depth? Perhaps with maps?
>>931466
This one gets posted from time to time, those its about the Eastern Front in general.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg
It's not the full presentation, but you can find his notes and the packet he talks about in the video here:
http://sti.clemson.edu/publications-mainmenu-38/commentaries-mainmenu-211/cat_view/33-strom-thurmond-institute/153-sti-publications-by-subject-area/158-history
>>929362
Any good audio books on the subject that anyone could recommend?
>>931466
This is a pretty good one on the 'Muh Wehrmacht' view of ww2, and the guy talking is pretty fucking eminent, works with Glantz, US military and does LOADS of military history stuff.
It's also not shit to listen too, and a fairly fluid presentation.
>>932901
oh shit forgot to link the talk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I98P1AxQRUM
>>929419
Did the Germans really hope to 1) be able to contain that large Soviet contingent and 2) to prevent any outside attempts to break the encirclement?
I mean they weren't even capable of meeting in Kursk so why the hell did they even hope to be able to hold it from being taken by attacks from both sides?
How long would the Soviet army be able to hold out in the encirclement assuming it couldn't have been broken? How long til the lack of supplies would render it weak enough to accomplish the German goal?
And what was the German goal? Have the Rooskies surrender? Have them destroyed? Would they have even been able to do that?
>>929624
>soviets still lost 3 times as many soldiers
Last ditch attempt to gain an upper hand again.
Could anyone recommend a good basic introduction to the battles at Kursk. Something in the vein of Anthony Beevor on Stalingrad. Cheers lads
>>933283
One soviet soldiers life wasn't worth shit, so they didn't receive any training, unlike the elite Panzer and SS Corps that were the vanguard of the assault.
Soviets could literally fill any gaps they wanted with their huge reserves until the germans exhausted themselves.
>>933283
>>soviets still lost 3 times as many soldiers
The enormously unbalanced Soviet:German causalities rates stem largely from different ways of counting causalities.
Germans counted: dead and wounded (i.e. wounded carried out from the field). The Germans did not count slightly wounded and concussed who could return to the field after first aid applied.
The Soviet counted irreplacable casualities (dead, crippled, heavily wounded and wounded who would recuperate after x months) and replacable casualities (wounded who could return to the field immidiately or under less than x month).
Two different way of counting produce hugely different data that uninformed authors mindlessly compare.
The Soviets HAD much higher causality rate, especially during the first months of Barbarossa, but it doesn't comes close to what many people believe.
>>934115
source? i always thought the k/d was a bit weird
>>934181
It was in all seriousness something like 13 dead soviets for 10 dead germans
Pretty removed from shit you can still hear people say today. I swear Ive seen faggots say figures like 30 to 1 which is absurd since germans still lost like 10 million men. Red army definitely didnt have 300 soldiers LMAO
>>934619
Yes that was supposed to be 300 million
>>934619
>It was in all seriousness something like 13 dead soviets for 10 dead germans
This seems very unlikely for the whole war. Also, the Germans didn't lose even close to 10 million men in the East.
on the topic of casualties on the eastern front, the one chief culprit in the sometimes overly crazy ratios is one simple fact - about three million (some folks go up to 3.6) of soviet kia or mia troops were POWs dying in captivity
which suddenly brings the eastern front casualties to a more reasonable ratio of somewhere around 4.5 million (all axis i think? i forget and cba to look it all up now - but it's not including dead POWs, that's the point) vs. somewhere around 5.5 - 6.5 million
>>934782
>4.5 million (all axis i think?
ah just looked it up its just germans actually, about 5 mil with axis minors
>>929698
>There are a million other places to launch an assault in Russia.
name one
>inb4 slightly to the left
your public education system has clearly failed you
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union
For some further reading on Soviet casualties. Apparently the issue is still not fully researched yet
>>934874
I read somewhere that an alternative plan would have been to attack the Steppe Front, don't know if it's legit though
>>930489
>Attacking a fixed target is a bad idea no matter the outcome.
Universal qualifiers almost never apply to affairs of war.
