Why did the Schlieffen plan fail?
>>667772
they didn't listen to based schlieffen and put the entire army in the west with one paraplegic pomeranian in the east to defend prussia
>>667777
checked
>>667772
It may have been a very well drawn out plan, but German generals had near autonomy, and sometimes their movements did not comply with the strategy, even if they were successful.
>>667772
Dark ages communications issues
>>667777
>paraplegic pomeranian
waaat
>>667772
The French managed to form an entire new army from their forces holding the East, managing to prevent an encirclement by the west, while still holding on (although barely) in the East.
They were lucky to have good generals this time around.
>>667772
Everybody's got a plan 'til they get hit in the face
hole in their lines before marne and overextended supply lines (strachan or stahel or someone wrote about this, the western german force was terribly low on supplies)
>>667772
Real life and logistics got in the way. Shocking I know.
Lack of communications, overstretched supply lines, Moltke exercising very little command control, going on the offensive in Alsace, diverting troops East that weren't needed (they arrived after Tannenberg), Moltke giving supplies to a Grand Prince Rupprecht at Nancy instead of the 1st, 2nd&3rd Armies.
>>667772
They didn't keep the right wing strong
i.e. some troops were left defending the Germany-France border when Schlieffen wanted all the troops to march through Belgium to Paris. Although I'm sure new technology was also a problem.
>>667845
Someone didn't savescum their vicky II
>>667772
It was a dumb plan.
>let's go through this marshy and under-developed country real quickly to kill france
>oh and this country is neutral so everyone will hate us
kek
>>667772
The thing with the Schlieffenplan was, that it was infeasible from the get-go. It was drawn up pre-war as a case study and included armies that only existed on paper.
It's final version concluded with a statement that germany didn't have the necessary resources to carry it out and that it would only succeed under very favourable circumstances.
By the battle of the Marne, the Germans were completely overextended and major gaps had formed between the individual armies. The faster-than-expected mobilization of Russia had also diverted considerable resources.
>>667772
not enough soldiers due to the Emperor not allowing all soldiers as has been probably stated and they were held up in Belgium for far too long and were intercepted by the British who made it hell for the northern prongs to advance any further, if they had the soldiers they asked for the British would have probably been overwhelmed before they could reinforce, things definitely would have been different
Walter Bloehm, a reserve officer in the German 12th Brandenburg Grenadier Regiment which suffered heavy losses in its attack against 1st Royal West Kent’s at St Ghislain, wrote in his memoir entitled ‘Vormarsch’: ‘Our first battles is a heavy, unheard of heavy defeat, and against the English, the English we had laughed at.’
For the first time the Germans encountered the facility with which the British troops used their rifles; the ‘Mad Minute’ in which individual soldiers could fire up to 30 aimed rounds in a minute from their .303 Lee Enfield rifles. This fire coupled with supporting machine guns decimated the advancing German formations.
The Boer War in 1899 to 1901 taught the British Army the importance of concealment when under fire and the art of concealed movement around the battlefield. The British infantrymen were in well-hidden trenches and positions in the urban landscape from which they poured a devastating fire on the advancing German infantry.
The pattern of the day was repeated along the canal line from east to west; initial German attacks by massed infantry formations that were shot to pieces, followed by more careful, but increasingly heavy attacks, using open formations of infantry supported by artillery fire, that increased in weight and accuracy during the day, and by machine guns.
By the end of the morning the 8 British battalions engaged along the Mons Canal were still in place in spite of the efforts of 4 German divisions.
The main area of crisis for the BEF in the day’s fighting was the Mons salient where the British battalions were subject to attack and fire from front and flank, although the main influence on the future deployment of the BEF was the increasing withdrawal of Lanrezac’s 5th French Army on its eastern flank.
It was clear that the BEF II Corps could no longer maintain a position ,Orders were issued to II Corps to withdraw to the positions prepared to the south of Mons and behind the Haines River.
>>667772
For a large part because they didn't expect Belgium to resist that much.
>>667772
it did in WW2
also
>Alsace Lorraine
>french
>ww1
horrible map
>>667777
"Based Schlieffen" was a Pomeranian himself. The Schlieffen family is a Pomeranian noble line.
>>667772
Thought Belgium would let them through and didn't think Britain would get involved and instead focus on her empire.
>>668089
>belgium
>under-developed
wew
It worked the second time.
>>667772
>Why did the Schlieffen plan fail?
Because it was not a plan at all. Probably more like a thought exercise on Schlieffen's part. Moreover, it was obvious that the plan actually couldn't work. Schlieffen actually "cheated". He parachuted entire reserve corps into positions they couldn't possibly reach with existing road and rail networks, even assuming they weren't destroyed.
Brought Britain into the war
The plan was to split german armed forces into two, something like 2/3 would take care of the west while 1/3 would hold russia. when france surrenders, the 2/3 would move to the east and kill russia.
it was a good plan, good planning, details were fine but what went wrong was that the brits got into the war and that made it the western front look shit for germany. the forces in the west were stuck with fighting with britain. there werent enough units to pull an offensive against russia.
and then there's italy.
>>667772
>>667772
Communication issues and Belgians destroyed vital rail networks and it took weeks to fully repair them, slowing down the Germans.
>>667772
Schlieffen's plan was good, but it was un-Clausewitzian.
It was too tight on the schedules and didn't accommodate for the things that could go wrong sufficiently.
It was too much of a gamble. Had it worked out, we'd likely be calling it military genius right now.
>>667772
Among other things
France was to be attacked and beaten with most of Germany's forces before Russia could mobilize(with its huge size and lack of tech)
the kaiser at literally the last second decided he didn't want to risk Prussia so he split up the forces DURING mobilization
>>667862
This guy gets it. Also no trucks they were fucking marching all this distance.
>>668285
>Lorraine
just Moselle, horrible knowledges
>>668089
Belgium back then was filthy rich like Switzerland today
>>669261
This, armies until after Ww1 (and even.in ww2) were limited to walking pace of men and horse, marching a million men still has them going like 20-30 miles a day, tops.
Against a man with machine guns that's just fodder.
Germany as well as everyone else underestimated how defense oriented warfare was becoming.
this
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_von_Kluck#World_War_I
>tl;dr general von Kluck decides not to follow the Schlieffen plan to the letter and deviates from his course. Instead of taking Paris he commits most of his force to flank a retreating French army. The French military commander of Paris Gallieni notices that Kluck is now vulnerable as his forces are stuck between him and the retreating French 5th army. A new Army, the 6th is quickly formed and attacks von Kluck's rear/flank. Kluck panics and retreats abandoning Paris
Because there was another country in the way
>>671174
Occam's razor right here. I have trouble seeing how Britain would've gotten involved so early if it wasn't for Belgium
>>667772
Because:
>Russia mobilized much faster than expected
>Germany underestimated Belgian resistance
>They overestimated their logistical capabilities (This is the big one)
>Tactical mistakes from German generals
>France punching above their weight
Of course, hindsight is 20/20. How could the Germans have known that Russia would fold so fast? They were a much bigger threat than the French, being so close to Berlin.
Of course, getting the UK (and later the US) involved just because of the schliffen plan was fucking stupid.
>>669127
>there werent enough units to pull an offensive against russia
There wasn't supposed to be an offense against Russia at that stage in the war, the Prussian commanders had different plans than the general staff.
>>669536
Wikipedia Strasburg you knuckledragger
>>669635
>paris
>important
France was centralized enough that the country wouldn't shatter if the capital fell. Unlike Germany which is why losing Prussia even temporarily was a huge deal. The french command was already moving the new capital down south
>>672330
>French
>Not surrendering
