If you were convinced that your world wasn't real, and that you had to destroy it in order to return reality to what you thought it should be against the wishes of everyone living in it, then would the moral soundness of your goal merely be dependent on whether or not you were right?
It is as it should be. All is well with the cosmos.
Wouldn't the utilitarian be concerned with providing the most benefit to the most people? If you're acting alone against the wishes of all, you are not doing that
>>437138
If you thought it wasn't real you wouldn't think there was anyone in it wishing against its destruction.
>>437215
What if the all were illusions?
Depends.
I'd weight my option on whether I would have any benefits of staying, other people would have any benefits, any negatives, and finally finally personal opinions.
If cost analysis of benefits/negatives turn out better for synthetic, I'd go for it. If it turned out negative, I'd go for real.
>>437229
Well I'm obviously not an illusion and I've no reason to think anyone else is. Go away atheistic Descartes.
>>437138
utilitarianism doesn't work because you're making moral decisions based of some arbitrary perceived need rather than justice and good itself
utilitarianism can justify any action as good or bad, which renders it redundant
>>437371
It obviously cannot justify any action you think will do harm and ends up doing harm.
>>437371
Ideal of Justice and "good itself" are purely arbitrary as well. Whereas utilitarianism judges each situation accordingly and thus provides better framework to work with.
>>437363
Can you prove that?
>Figure out which world is better for me
>If the Matrox is better, stay there
>If the reality is better, then see if the cost of adoption makes it worth switching
I can say that delusion on that level is fine because I am aware of the truth, and that most of my life is lived in fiction anyway.
Well you are dooming millions for no reason so no
just because one world exist doesn't mean the "real" world doesn't
