Are the mind and body separate?
Well we have the brain, when people think you can see different portions of their brain light up with activity when its scanned. Of course I'm not familiar with the arguments for the mind being separate so I'm still open to the possibility that the mind could exist separate but as of now I see no reason why it could
Which mind?
>>428894
>mind is in the brain
>brain is in the body
>mind is the body
Hypothetical Syllogisms are always valid
>>428894
no
what there is can be broken down into consciousness+object+affect. then, most people being not equanimous, you tack on this the mind and its products of deliriums/fantasies/abstractions.
I believe that treating the "mind" as an object or substance is a category error. Cognition is a function of the brain, which is an organ. It's akin to how respiration is a function of the lungs and digestion is the function of the stomach/intestines. People with damaged brains have impaired cognition which supports this idea. Death by head injury is basically a cascading failure in the complex system of the human body, of which the brain is a top-level node.
I should add, though, the brain and spine are just the centralized part of the human nervous system, and the peripheral nervous system must be included for a full understanding of interaction between the brain and other organs, obviously.
>>428947
>mind is in the brain
Rad category error there, chum.
>>428894
They definitely aren't identical. But separateness implies something stronger than non-identity. Software is non-identical to hardware but does not exist without being 'run' by this hardware, and so cannot ever be separate from hardware. For a mind to properly be considered 'separate' from the brain, it would have to be an object in its own right, and since the mind is not the brain (or any other physical object), it would have to be something like a Cartesian soul, which is super implausible.
So no, the mind is not separate from the brain, though they are not identical. This means that something like either functionalism or property dualism (i.e. non-reductive physicalism) is probably true.
One "thing" but two views of it : Itself, and the idea of itself.
>>428894
this is the phenomenology from the dhamma. it is said that once you understand the dissatisfaction in every conditioned phenomena, you reach nibanna.
>>428894
sure it can happen.
>>428894
Is the software sepated from the hardware?
Yes.
t. Astral projector
>>432958
Is /his/ an articulate /x/ now?
Anyway OP, no.
