How realistic was the chances of Operation Sea Lion /HIS/ ? This has often been a vain of discussion amongst my friends and I. I think it could have happened but that Germany still would have lost. What about you fellow /HIS/torians
>>547716
>How realistic was the chances of Operation Sea Lion
chances of it happening?
Plausible if the German High Command throws teddy out the pram
chances of succeeding?
Non-existent
>>547716
>How realistic was the chances of Operation Sea Lion /HIS/ ?
Not at all.
>I think it could have happened but that Germany still would have lost.
The odds are pretty much 0 percent of it succeeding in anything but extremely bizarre and far-ranging alterations from the historical timeline.
If you're talking about a 1940 invasion with the war starting in September 39 more or less like history, it's not going to work. Germany doesn't have the airpower to completely control the channel, the ability to stop the Royal Navy from fucking things up if they did, the landing craft to ship enough troops over to survive a British counterattack, or the experience in naval landings to make something like this work.
When the Normandy landings happened in 1944, the beaches were hit with the equivalent of about 5 divisions. Germany didn't have a tenth of that fleet. And the British weren't helpless either. You hear a lot of people focusing on how hard it was to get across, but even if they somehow did, the British aren't going to roll over and die.
http://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/webeasycms/hold/uploads/bmh_document_pdf/40.09_Order_of_Battle_UK.pdf
What are the Germans going to do when 2 armored divisions roll down on them on the beaches?
>>547716
There is a reason why Britain was invaded during the 17th-20th centuries, and the Germans managed to find all of them.
>>547716
well they would need air superiority, which they didn't have, naval superiority, which they couldn't even dream about, and make the landing big and well executed enough that it wouldn't just get destroyed by the first counterattack
also there's always Uncle Stalin knocking on your eastern border if you commit too much to Britain
>>547825
This is 1940 though, before the war in the east had started...
>>547825
They would need air supremacy, mere superiority probably wouldn't be enough given that the Luftwaffe would need to pull triple duty of CAS, naval interdiction, and land interdiction as it was. Adding defending even against relatively weak sorties by the British would have overloaded them if the previous three didn't.
And, to be fair, you wouldn't need to commit that much in the way of ground forces to attack Britain. If you can get 30 divisions over (somehow), you'll probably take the country. That still leaves you with 150 or so to guard against Stalin.
All them Brit armchair generals itt. These plans were drafted by the same generals who slapped your army across Europe and Africa despite the odds.
I deem it highly unlikely that this would have been successful in the early 40s either, but certainly not at 0%.
Now give it some time, late 40s with no Barbarossa, and the story looks different.
Britain wouldn't have stood forever against a whole continent.
>>547837
i meant that if Germany commits too much in a prolonged conflict with the UK Stalin could seize the opportunity to roll over unguarded land
>>547837
i think he is implying that the soviets might have taken the opportunity of a westwar turned germany to attack them
which i dont think is particularly likely seeing as they were in no shape to do that, not for a couple of years anyway
>>547716
Don't capitalize /his/. Ever.
>>547843
>Now give it some time, late 40s with no Barbarossa, and the story looks different.
>Britain wouldn't have stood forever against a whole continent.
the problem is, late 40s with no barbarossa the USSR would be far to strong for Germany to stand a chance
>>547843
>we won the battle of france rather easily
>that somehow makes up for the fact that we don't have the naval nor air capabilities for an invasion necessary to beat britain, simply by virtue of us being the very same generals who won in france
>>547716
It was realistic in that there was actual planning, actual developments (albeit minor) aimed at it actually happening. It was not realistic in that it could not have succeeded barring extremely unrealistic alien space bat magic happening. The Germans lost the battle of Britain, they had virtually no naval assets useful for the invasion, no way of countering the home fleet or even holding a miraculously conjured beachhead etc.
>>547843
>All them Brit armchair generals itt. These plans were drafted by the same generals who slapped your army across Europe and Africa despite the odds.
They pummeled the British into Dunkirk and then let them go, and then seesawed in the desert for a year and a half before getting shitstomped. Exactly how did they "slap the British"?
>Now give it some time, late 40s with no Barbarossa, and the story looks different.
Assuming the German economy doesn't collapse, you'll still lose in North Africa and have to at least deal with Mussolini screaming to help you guard him from attacks into Sicily. And of course, the U.S. is likely to join the party by that point.
And even when faced against "the whole continent", Britain outproduced Germany on vital things for Sealion like planes and ships historically.
>>547858
That's not what I'm saying. Just pointing out that it's the plan of battle tested and successful generals. I find the conviction with which it is dismissed simply audacious. It's not like they would have just plunged their troops into the sea. Of course they would have prepared and mustered for the occasion.
>>547871
You mean like the preparations they did historically?
>We'll throw together a bunch of river barges and pack troops on board and have them be towed along behind real ships to the beaches. That'll work, right?
>>547868
>They pummeled the British into Dunkirk and then let them go
not even that really. The Germans broke through against the French and cut off the BEF's route of retreat anywhere else but back to the UK. And the idea that Hitler deliberately ordered the Heer to allow the BEF to retreat is stupid
>>547896
Well, he didn't deliberately order the Heer to let them go, but he did order most of his pursuit capability up against the French, confident that the Luftwaffe could keep them pinned down.
>>547902
He ordered them to go after the French because the French were the only thing that actually mattered.
>>547920
Well of course, but ordering the guys who could have actually dealt with the BEF and hoping that some stukas could keep them from embarking was tantamount to letting them go.
>>547927
>Well of course, but ordering the guys who could have actually dealt with the BEF
Debatable. Dunkirk was well-defended and the Germans had by and large outrun their logistics tail. It's doubtful whether the Germans actually could have destroyed the BEF
>>547871
Well of course they would have prepared and mustered.
And found out the RAF had beaten them in the skies, which prevents an invasion altogether.
Disregarding that, they would have realized the British fleets were still operational, which prevents an invasion altogether.
Disregarding that, they would have found they simply did not have the assets to mount a sizeable naval landing operation, which prevents an invasion altogether.
But even disregarding all of those above points, they would have then found that even if they managed to somehow successfully land all the forces they possibly could, these would be driven into the sea by an enemy vastly outnumbering them, in supply, with armor support etc.
The British wargamed this in the 1970s, with Adolf Galland, Friedrich Ruge, and Heinrich Trettner as German umpires: http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
The result was a devastating German defeat:
>Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
>The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time.
>The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment of reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British attacks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.
>>547716
Not in the slightest. You're in the utter wrong and either ignorant or willfully ignorant
Go read "Why the Allies Won" before you ever try to discuss WW2 again
>>548376
Fucking this. It's a shame that Germany didn't actually try. Britain's military reputation would have risen to new heights, Germany would have shattered much of its military strength and reputation etc.
>>547825
>well they would need air superiority, which they didn't have
It was my understanding that the RAF was taking unsustainable losses during the Battle of Britain until Germany gave up the idea of invading England and decided instead to target civilians in order to get Britain to sue for peace.
>>548521
The RAF was taking a bunch of losses early on in the BoB; but mostly it was from planes on the ground being bombed, not being shot down in the air.
1) This doesn't eliminate pilots, which are often harder to replace than new planes.
2) the British were considering, and really could have at any time, pulled their fighter bases up into the midlands, out of me-109 escort range, where bombing them would have been extremely dangerous, which solves most of the problem.
So the British could have cut their losses any time they wanted, at the risk of giving a worse response time against raids over southern Britain. The idea that the RAF was in mortal peril is something of a meme.
>>548396
funny enough, I have.
>>548521
This is a meme. The RAF could have simply relocated literally all of its aircraft out of German range in the north of England if losses were unsustainable.
It was a compromise between reaction time and acceptable losses.
>>548376
The best part is, those games were made to favor the Germans. They were run using German estimates of British strength, rather than actual British strength.
>>548611
I thought it was the reverse: British estimates of German naval capacity rather than what the Germans actually had.
>>548635
Could be. I distinctly recall though, that it didn't represent actual capacity in a way that favored the Germans.
>>548536
>>548598
Britain moving the planes to bases further back would have been the first step in a German a invasion plan. The combat effectiveness of planes goes down as the further their take off and landing points are.
I skeptical when discussing this stuff due to Brits just wanking themselves off.
>>548655
>Britain moving the planes to bases further back would have been the first step in a German a invasion plan. The combat effectiveness of planes goes down as the further their take off and landing points are.
Yes, it would. It would create roughly a 20 minute longer response over southern Britain, and a correspondingly lower amount of time they can stay over target before having to return to base to refuel.
So? What?
It's not like a Sealion would be a German victory in a day. Overlord went about as well as could be expected, and it still took close to 2 months to build up to the breakout phase, Cobra.
The British plan was, in the event that FG11 had to pull back, to sit there and wait for an invasion to show itself, and then move them back south, attack at the supply lifeline to the invasion rather than try to keep them off the shore.
>>548655
At no point did the loss of planes for Britain outnumber those of Germany.
At no point did the loss of pilots for Britain outnumber those of Germany.
At no point did the production of planes for Germany outnumber those of Britain.
Manstein said that the only possibility was in the month following the fall of France. Any longer would result in the lack of favourable sea conditions and allow the British to form a coherent defense. I have a full copypasta I made up but I'm on mobile
>>547716
>How realistic was the chances of Operation Sea Lion /HIS/ ?
None. /his/. Punctuation immediately comes behind the thing punctuated in English, you horrible French speaker.
Go read Alison Brooke's account.
>>548670
>>548673
Upon further reading, there was a period in mid August 1940 where Britain was losing both more pilots and planes than it could replenish. Furthermore, though Britain's recruitment was high and training rate was high (though still lagging behind fighter production), the losses of experienced pilots in France and Norway put Britain at an initial disadvantage and most new pilots died in combat against the more numerous experienced German pilots. If losses had continued at mid-August rates then the RAF would have been left a shell.
Despite Germany's greater number of experienced pilots, Germany didn't have the same recruitment levels. It doesn't seem like German command took Operation Sealion seriously. Additionally, though mid-August was bad for Britain, German losses were above average too. Maybe if they had been putting as much effort into training more pilots they could have depleted the RAF eventually, but Luftwaffe seemed ultimately doomed without approaching Britain's pilot training rates.
Part of the reason Germany seamed so noncommittal in the Battle of Britain probably had a lot to do with a lack of radar. They were certain the RAF was on the ropes but always overestimated their successes and never had a good idea of how much fight the RAF truly had left. Had Germany had radar they may have had the intel necessary to confidently press their advantage to a sufficient degree.
>>548727
He also proposed that the Luftwaffe abandon the strategy of destroying the RAF prior the amphibious operation and instead launch all its aircraft in a massed attack at the same time an amphibious operation was taking place, preserving its strength rather piecemeal attacks for weeks in advance.
