>war hero from WWI
>comes to France in 1940 and lays waste to the French in his tanks
>handpicked by Hitler to lead the Africa Korps
>asswhoops the Brits in North Africa
>once back home gets involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Hitler
>knows that assassinating Hitler would only spark civil war and would make him a martyr
>after plan fails and is discovered even Hitler himself is too pussy to kill him
>instead forces him to suicide
why aren't you worshipping based Rommel /his/?
>>381450
>asswhoops the Brits in North Africa
Correct me If I'm wrong but did the Nazis lose the North African theater?
He's a fucking trashbag nazi
fucking scum, I hope he rots in hell
>asswhoops the Brits
Kek, based monty kicked his ass, are you shitting me naziboo?
>>381471
He came very close to winning. Only Tobruk was remaining to be captured, but a lack of fuel made him withdraw
Why was Mussolini starting random wars in Africa, failing at them and involving germans to send great generals, troops and machinery out of the European fronts?
>>381478
>market garden
>>381501
Attempts to seize control of the Suez Canal and oil and gas fields in the Middle East in order to supply a seemingly prolonged war.
Most overrated general ever.
He's the one who got his ass whooped in North Africa, and God damn will you look at this shit.
>>381603
>Most overrated general ever.
That would be Patton.
>>381450
Because i'm already worshipping Guderian
Overall he was evenly matched in North Africa. It went back and forth a bit. I read a big problem to brit advances was hidden anti tank guns kept stopping them, which prevented the brits pushing back quicker. I might be wrong about that though
>>381489
>extending beyond your supply lines
When will Germany learn the power of logistics?
Great tactical commander though.
>>381450
Hitler wasn't afraid to kill him. He knew the political ramifications and backlash he would face if he did. Remember, a good number of soldiers and generals weren't members of the Nazi party.
Because I don't worship people
>>381603
But muh honor and clean no warcrime nazi
Bernard Montgomery slapped his shit
>>381450
>>asswhoops the Brits in North Africa
>naziboos believe this
Did that fucker even win a single battle? He's a literal meme and his entire legacy stems from the hype Allied propaganda created.
tbqfhf nazis and confederates are the only armies to ever have a positive k/d facing the invincable burgers and their love of b-29s
>>381489
Close to winning is not winning.
>>381450
Rommel operated with next to no supplies in Africa for most of the fighting there. Considering this disadvantage he did a good job, although his ambitions were flawed at a strategical leve.
Tactically Rommel was a genius, if you doubt that read up on his undertakings in Italy in WW1.
In total I think generals like Guderian and von Manstein did a better job.
>>381489
Taking Tobruk wouldn't have won in North Africa, taking it in 1942 did jack shit for him.
And overrunning your supply lines is stupid.
>>382690
They had a bad k/d against the Americans, almost 1:3.
>>382723
We talking about the same battles?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAjXCWHVJh8
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Normandy
The net k/d was like 1.05 which is pretty bad for holding a defensive advantage, but it was positive.
>>382747
Yes, we are, you're just cherrypicking.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dragoon
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aachen
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colmar_Pocket
Not to mention the enormous breakdown that was the German army in Germany itself 1945.
For instance, you cite just the landings at Normandy, when the entire Overlord invasion had a way better ratio for the Americans, given that the whole "landing on beaches is hard" thing, while ignoring the breakout and follow up where you inflict most of your casualties as the attacker.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
>>382778
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_landings
landing on beaches isn't that hard
>>382690
>k/d
The biggest meme statistic of them all. It's like saying "I used less tools to build my house so it's the better house."
>>381450
Rommel lacked some strategic wisdom but he was probably the most effective battlefield commander of all time. Just look what he did in WWI. In the war characterized by bloody frontal assaults where progress was measured by the yard, he alone managed to fight battles of maneuver, slipping past enemy lines to attack them from the flank and rear. No commander fighting from the front could do or has done what Rommel has done. Just don't put him in charge of an army group.
>>382796
>k/d
Just makes me think of some neckbeard who thinks COD is how real life wars are fought.
>>382813
I think this is exactly the reason to be honest. In real life, soldier is pretty much a tool. It doesn't matter whether he lives or not as long as the objective is achieved, just ask the Russians.
Meme general
Won a few battles in the desert that did jack shit to affect the course of the greater war
Lost in sandbox while whining about "muh supplies" because hes a terrible logistician and can't get along with higher ups and peers - people who have a more reasonable understanding of their responsibilities.
Regarded the war against Bolshevism to be the most important thing of all time but got sent to irrelevant front to build sand castles on the beach for "muh Atlantic Wall" against allied invasion
Defenses fail to stop Allied landing (oh what a surprise static defenses don't work) and "muh decisive counterattack" never happens because >no aircover and gorillions of ground attack planes shred the roads.
Gets wounded like a faggot and betrays his boss "wahhhh if I were in charge we would win because I am the bestest"
Made to kill himself for "muh honor" rather than straight up tell Hitler hes a cunt.
Wehraboos and 14 year old Warthunder gamers worship him because hes the closest thing to a politically correct "clean" Nazi. Put Rommel on the Ostfront with some Einsatzgruppen under his command and he will be just as filthy as the next German Field Marshall on that front.
Good division commander but terrible for anything with more responsibility
>>382813
I am only claiming that they where pretty combat effective for the most part.
>>382856
>I am only claiming that they where pretty combat effective for the most part.
But K/D ratio is the wrong way of showing they were combat effective.
>>382846
>only good in charge of a division
What matters isn't the size of the unit but how much space they physically occupy. A full panzerarmee may only be made up of ~400 tanks which can be concentrated in a relatively small area comparable to the space an infantry division might be asked to occupy. A Panzer Schwerpunkt is best led by an aggressive front line commander like Rommel. So I say Rommel was still aptly suited to command any tank formation up to an army.
>>382931
Not the guy you're responding to, but you're hugely oversimplifying the equation, based primarily on frontline tactics.
A panzerarmee might indeed occupy less space on a battlefield, but in terms of personnel, even 400 tanks is going to require crews, maintenance staff, a huge logistical apparatus for all the fuel, parts, different types of ammunition, etc. It's actually got a lot of people in it, most of whom aren't frontline combatants, and your Panzerarmee commander is going to need to know how to deal with that too.
Rommel? Not only was he logistically inept, he didn't give a damn. When Halder asked him how he was going to feed and supply all the men he wanted for an offensive all the way to Egypt, Rommel's infamous reply is 'That's your pigeon'
Rommel never really got beyond an understanding of logistics beyond "Complain to HQ to send me more stuff", assuming that it was more a matter of making your case and prestige to divert resources to you as opposed to someone else; the notion that they might simply be unavailable or undeliverable never seemed to occur to him, despite it being the fundamental reality of combat in North Africa; you're at the end of a contested sea route, with no railroads, trying to fight hundreds of miles from your only real port.
A divisional commander can get away with that kind of non-chalance. A corps commander, especially one that's in charge of a front, even a marginal front, can't. Rommel never went into strategy, and that's inexcusable for an army commander, whether tank or infantry.
>>381450
I definitely am worshipping Erwin Eugen Johannes Rommel!
I can highly recommend this book as a good start. http://www.amazon.com/Mythos-Rommel-Maurice-Philip-Remy/dp/3471785728
>>381478
>He's a fucking trashbag Nazi
That's a good joke desu senpai.
>>383012
He was rather closely connected to Hitler, always running to him to smooth over his conflicts with his Heer superiors.
>>382931
That may be, but the heart of the criticism about Rommel is that he was trying to do strategic things well above his level, and without operating through proper command channels.
He over prioritizes his operations when he is just another cog in the system.
What he is oblivious to, or selfishly disregards, are all the external factors such strategic realities, bureaucracies, industrial limitations and of course leadership priorities.
>Luftwaffe needs fuel, planes and runways and is engaged on many other fronts with heavy losses. Stalingrad happens around the same time as Alamein, supply priority drops, and planes are lost.
>Supplies are being shipped, but without proper escort and fucking Malta they get sunk. Rommel cannot change this.
>Supplies that do get there are hundreds of miles away from the front. Rather than pace himself to concentrate his supplies, he gambles big on bold but risky endeavors.
>Italians are shit tier but your job isn't to fucking meddle with politics. Do your fucking job even if it means working with ravioli.
>Eastern Front is top priority and garners the most effort by far. North Africa, while an interesting potential strategic opening to vital resources, cannot be conducted on the same level as in Russia.
>The royal navy still exists. The US air force still exists. Your meme tanks and 88s cannot win the war.
>Atrocities are taking place under his organizations name, even if not under his direct command. Whine about this and do nothing, or do something about it, don't fucking half ass it if you want to be a moral leader. He half assed it.
>The Allies ARE qualitatively and quantitatively better than the Germans. He can either whine about this fact like his higher ups can do anything or accept that Germany will lose and he is just buying time and doing his part.
Rommel is just a tank commander and only good as a tank commander, but with the way he bitched and moaned you would think he was someone of much greater power.
>>382846
basicaly he is remembered fondly because Germany NEEDED someone to be a hero during world war 2 apart from the white rose organization and the july 20th plotters. Rommel fit because he didnt do any war crimes/ didn't shoot jews/other holocaust victims and did some decent/military tactics. plus he was implicated in the july 20th plot and had to off himself to save his family from ruin/or death. he is certainly an interesting figure.
>>382486
Monty only took over well after Rommel's high water mark.
Very easy to win when your army is being supplied and when you have bigger, stronger friends help you. Oh, and don't forget that your foe is getting virtually no supplies and reinforcements.
Had Hitler not been a complete idiot, a well supplied Rommel could have pushed right through to Syria and Iraq. The French would have had their asses handed to them again and uncle Adolf can go back to preparing for Barbarossa with Rommel sweeping North towards the Cacasus, the oil fields, and the southern Russian border.
The Soviets wouldn't have survived THAT invasion.
>>383198
>Very easy to win when your army is being supplied and when you have bigger, stronger friends help you. Oh, and don't forget that your foe is getting virtually no supplies and reinforcements.
Which is why Battleaxe and Gazala failed, amirite?
>Had Hitler not been a complete idiot, a well supplied Rommel could have pushed right through to Syria and Iraq.
Had Rommel not been an idiot, he would have realzied that Hitler had literally sent all the supplies he could, you had shit piling up in Italian harbors unable to be delivered. Greater committment will yield you nothing, you don't have enough harborage and you have not a single kilometer of railroad track. You can't just push a button and send more supplies, and as it was, Rommel wasted most of what he got.
>Rommel sweeping North towards the Cacasus, the oil fields, and the southern Russian border.
Have you ever looked at a map? This is completely unfeasible, if for no other reason than you don't have a rail link between Syria and Iraq in the 1940s, so everything will have to cross over the desert on its way up through Turkey, which I guess you'll be invading.
>>382965
>>383051
I think ultimately the problem is that Rommel was so aggressive that he didn't even know how to fight a defensive war. But Germany could not win the war fighting on the defensive and Rommel knew that. Realistically speaking after a certain point before Alemain the North African campaign had already been decided. Pulling back to more defensible lines with better logistics would have only delayed the inevitable. Rommel was all about go big or go home. There wasn't another commander that would have increased their chances of taking the Suez canal and that's what matters to me.
>bad at logistics
I have to disagree with a lot of the analysis here. The reason he didn't give a damn about logistics was that his style of warfare did not require a solid logistical base; he had won previous victories despite very poor logistics in the past. Had he been more concerned with logistics then he would have had to slow down his operational pace which is what made him so successful.
>me first
That's common for all commanders. Everyone wants more resourcess, plain and simple.
Long story short, if you want to fight a rapid offensive manuever campaign then Rommel is your guy. If you need another campaign he's not. But since offensive maneuver warfare is the most difficult and important variety of warfare, I don't see Rommel's lack of defensive skill to be such a detraction.
>>383266
>I think ultimately the problem is that Rommel was so aggressive that he didn't even know how to fight a defensive war. But Germany could not win the war fighting on the defensive and Rommel knew that. Realistically speaking after a certain point before Alemain the North African campaign had already been decided. Pulling back to more defensible lines with better logistics would have only delayed the inevitable. Rommel was all about go big or go home. There wasn't another commander that would have increased their chances of taking the Suez canal and that's what matters to me.
ANd then you and he share the same problem.
There was no point, EVER, of having a chance to seize the Suez canal. Declaring that as an objective is non-feasible. North Africa's only viable objective is to defend as long as you can, getting the most out of your limited resources, while the war is hopefully decided on more favorable fronts. Economy of force is what is needed, and the ability to bleed the Allies and stall them as long as possible.
Rommel didn't do that. Rommel didn't want to do that, he wanted to conquer Egypt, and as such, he was not the best commander for North Africa; someone like Kesselring would have done a lot better.
>The reason he didn't give a damn about logistics was that his style of warfare did not require a solid logistical base; he had won previous victories despite very poor logistics in the past.
No, he didn't. He won Somnenblume near Tripoli where he had local logistical advantages (the whole desert problems working against the British instead of for them), then languished for months near Tobruk before being rolled back at Crusader, and then pushing on ahead again in 1942, again near his own base; the only break in the pattern is Gazala, and one that even Rommel admitted was a fluke.
1/2
>>383266
>>383295
>That's common for all commanders. Everyone wants more resourcess, plain and simple.
Yes, but good commanders, especially front commanders, realize they're both the users and planners of the logistical salutation. Rommel never bothered, never adopted anything but a user mentality.
>Long story short, if you want to fight a rapid offensive manuever campaign then Rommel is your guy. If you need another campaign he's not. But since offensive maneuver warfare is the most difficult and important variety of warfare, I don't see Rommel's lack of defensive skill to be such a detraction.
Because he was in a theater which couldn't and ultimately didn't support an offensive maneuvering war, and didn't bother to adapt to the situation, just tried to bull over his style and hoped that it would work. Furthermore, he displayed a profound non-understanding of Germany's strategic needs by trying to prioritize his theater over the Eastern Front, which was what was really going to decide the war.
You might find this an interesting read. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf
>>383295
>no point of seizing the Suez Canal
Are you serious? Are you do unimaginative that you don't see what an Axis controlled Suez could have meant? In 1941 capturing the Suez was still a possibility in the minds of the participants.
>Stall them as long as possible
That's still part of a strategy where Germany loses the war
>only mentions Rommel's campaign in Africa
Are we so quick to forget about Rommel's exploits in France as commander of 7th "Ghost" Panzer Division?
>>383298
>didn't support manuever wafare?
Except he did successfully fight offensively in the early part of the campaign. Rommel was failed by the Italian and German navy and air forces who could not capture Malta and it bit Rommel in the ass. He's right to blame them
>doesn't see strategic needs
You think Kesselring didn't ask Hitler for more resources that could have been used for the Eastern Front? Kesselring was good at defending Italy but he was delusional in thinking it would lead Germany to ultimate victory.
>tfw you will never live in the alternate universe where America sided with Germany and Japan in WW2
>>383361
>Are you do unimaginative that you don't see what an Axis controlled Suez could have meant? In 1941 capturing the Suez was still a possibility in the minds of the participants.
Because Rommel was delusional. He had trouble projecting more than 100 tanks past Tobruk, some 1,200 km from his base of support in Tripoli. It's another 968 to Suez, and the problems will get worse, not better, the farther you advance. Its not feasible.
>That's still part of a strategy where Germany loses the war
Loses the theater, yes. Their only hope in winning the war was to break the Soviets. When they didn't pan out, all strategies lose the war. (And itw as a pretty desperate hope to begin with)
>Are we so quick to forget about Rommel's exploits in France as commander of 7th "Ghost" Panzer Division?
You mean where he violated orders, committed unsupported armored attacks contrary to German doctrine, and was out of touch with his parent units who couldn't rely on him to coordinate chases against the fleeing French troops? Well, I wasn't going to mention it, but now that you did, his conduct in France was pretty lame.
>Except he did successfully fight offensively in the early part of the campaign
Near Tripoli. Then he ventured far, far beyond it, and look, got into trouble, unable to advance or even easily retreat.
>Rommel was failed by the Italian and German navy and air forces who could not capture Malta and it bit Rommel in the ass. He's right to blame them
Except that Malta's loss to overall supply situations was never more than what he was burning trying to ferry shit over from the Rommelbahn, with its enormous toll on his trucks and truckers. Which is again, entirely his fault.
>Lead to ultimate victory.
No amount of offensive posturing was going to lead to "Ultimate victory", especially not in North Africa, where all the material factors are in favor of the British, not you.
>>383410
>no amount of offensive posturing was going to lead to ultimate victory
So pretty much the main critique is that Rommel tried to win a campaign that was rigged against him from the start and ended up failing. If the German high command thought North Africa was an unwinnable situation and intended to only fight defensively then obviously they made a mistake sending Rommel over who would invariably attack because that's all Rommel knows how to do. But if I'm putting an army together to WIN a campaign then Rommel is the guy I'm putting to lead the vanguard over any other possible choices. That's why he's not an overrated commander; no one was better at rapid manuever wafare.
>>383298
>http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf
that link is broke dude.
>>383524
working here
>>381450
He didn't get involved
He was chosen by the conspirators
>>383484
>; no one was better at rapid manuever wafare.
why was rommel outrunning his own supply constantly if he was supposedly so good at attacking
>>383524
It's a download and it worked for me.
Anyways its filled with typical American analysis which underestimates the impact of rapid decision making against more concrete measurables like logistics.
>>383537
>Why was he out running his own supplies if he was so good at offensive warfare
Isn't that how you KNOW you are successful? Going do quickly the trucks behind you are still catching up? Besides he would often capture enemy supplies and fuel because he was moving so rapidly they didn't expect it.
>>383484
>So pretty much the main critique is that Rommel tried to win a campaign that was rigged against him from the start and ended up failing. If the German high command thought North Africa was an unwinnable situation and intended to only fight defensively then obviously they made a mistake sending Rommel over who would invariably attack because that's all Rommel knows how to do.
Pretty much, yes. Although several of Rommel's shortcomings in infelxibility and logistical mismanagement would have gotten him into trouble pretty much wherever he went. To effectively function at above a divisional level, he really needs someone who will, on occasion, tell him "No, bad idea." or "No, too expensive" rather than letting him do whatever he wanted.
>That's why he's not an overrated commander; no one was better at rapid manuever wafare.
Manstein, Guderian, Rundstedt, just for Germans in WW2 all strike me as having better records in rapid maneuver warfare.
>>383524
It works for me. Try searching for it by name on Google "Rommel's Desert War: The impact of Logistics on Operational Art.
>>383544
>>383530
are you guys in America or something? Im getting an error name not resolved.
>typical American analysis which underestimates the impact of rapid decision making against more concrete measurables like logistics
Im still interested though since I gotta write about it for school.
on another note: Do you guys think the war in Africa was usefull. Did africa have any tactical advantages? wouldn't it have been better if the Italians just defended the coast of Europe?
>>383555
Not really. Keeping and holding your objectives is how you know you are successful. Grabbing territory that you'd have to give up later at great cost is actually a sign that you're a bad attacker, that you don't know when to stop, and don't have strategic priorities straight.
> Besides he would often capture enemy supplies and fuel because he was moving so rapidly they didn't expect it.
His biggest haul of the entire war in North Africa, after Gazala, was some 5,000 tons, with 1,400 of that in fuel. That's less than 1/6th of what he got that month, (and the battle took 25 days, so yeah). People make a lot of mention of what he seized, but it was a tiny drop in the bucket next to what he was receiving through normal channels.
>>383565
yurop here
>>383555
i dont think having to stop an offensive because you cannot get supplies is being successful
>>381450
>loses to the Brits in North Africa
Fixed that for you. At least try and be historically accurate.
>>383559
>Manstein
No doubt he was excellent as well. If I'm putting together this army I'm making Manstein the overall army group commander. He was excellent in that role. Rommel would be his subordinate.
>Rundstedt
Another army group commander
>Guderian
Now if you ask me Guderian was the overrated one. Similar style to Rommel and probably had an even larger ego. But Rommel was even more decisive in the attack than Guderian. It's only by virtue of Guderian's literature that he became so important.
>>383565
>Do you guys think the war in Africa was usefull.
How are you defining useful? Are we talking from an Axis perspective or an allied one?
>Did africa have any tactical advantages?
For whom?
> wouldn't it have been better if the Italians just defended the coast of Europe?
On a purely operational level, if you're concerned solely with the defense of Europe, yes.
However, if you cede North Africa without much of a fight, you run into other costs, some directly military, some softer/political.
For starters, the Allies overrun Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, turning those places over to the Free French; they'd probably get Dakar too. That provides resources, especially recruitable manpower, for the enemy war effort.
Secondly, while the logical continuation from a successful allied campaign to North Africa is to hit Italy, it's not their only option. Historically, after Tunisia fell, Germany sent 7-8 divisions to Greece, and something like 12 to Yugoslavia, in addition to the forces dispatched to Italy, to guard agiainst potential entry onto Europe in those places; the attacker calls the shots, and the defender has to protect anything that might be attacked, even if it ultimately isn't.
Thirdly, if North Afirca falls, you cede a ton of airbases all over the Mediterranean to the allies, which can be used to contest the sea extremely effectively, not carving it up into zones of control based on who had nearby airbases. It will lead to at least easier British shipping through the sea instead of often having to divert around Africa.
Lastly, Italy's political structure in the war was relatively unstable; early reversals, especially not long after the war was entered into, very possibly could have collapsed Mussolini's government, which wouldn't be good, the Italians were pretty lame-tier fighters, but they still turned out thousands of planes and millions of troops, which you'd be hurting without.
>>383580
>i dont think having to stop an offensive because you cannot get supplies is being successful
Exactly! Where other commanders would have stopped an attack because of lack of supply Rommel would often push on.
>>383615
you have it exactly backwards - he was forced to stop, as in he had to, because he ran out of fuel, because he kept pushing on, and his forces were left in a much more precarious position than had they been in supply
that is not being successful
>>381478
It took Monty fucking forever to succeed at El Alamein, even with far more troops, supplies and backing. Hitler didn't concentrate as much on Africa as much as the Brits did.
I am a big fan of Monty, but he didn't beat Rommel out of pure genius that's for sure.
>>383640
It took 18 days to win El Alamein. It took 25 days to win Gazala. "Fuckign forever" my ass.
And Monty pretty badly outmaneuvered him at El Alamein; in addition to outweighing him. He called where Rommel would turn north from his flanking attempt and had his artillery and anti-tank guns positions right for a kill blow.
> Hitler didn't concentrate as much on Africa as much as the Brits did.
Hitler COULDN'T concentrate on Africa as much as the Brits did. He didn't have a completely secure port in Suez, or a railroad to ferry supplies and troops up from that.
>>383627
>precarious position
Yet how many times was Rommel defeated/battered immediately upon running out of fuel? The driving force behind his style of warfare was moving so quickly that the enemy couldn't react to your movements such that after a daring offensive the enemy was in no position to launch a successful counterattack. The only example in my mind is the Battle of Arras in 1940. Yet even there Rommel was successfully. Rommel never was defeated by a counterattack in these so precarious positions immediately following an offensive. Only after the enemy had time to regroup.
>>383198
>The Soviets wouldn't have survived THAT invasion.
The only alternate history that would see Germany surviving the Eastern front is one in which Germany doesn't attack Russia.
>>383668
The failed attack on Tobruk in 1941 springs to mind. And the 1st Alamein was hardly a resounding success, Rommel got quite a bloody nose.
Furthermore, why does the counterattack have to be immediate? In both instances, Rommel couldn't advance and also couldn't easily retreat once he took the big gains in the desert, which necessarily set up his dual catastrophes of Crusader and the 2nd Alamein. The enemy had time to regroup, precisely because his attacks couldn't be supplied well enough to follow up on initial successes.
>>382386
Therefore afraid. Not as in shit in his pants trembling afraid, but afraid of the ramifications and so forth.
>>383689
>failed attack on Tobruk
This was a failed GERMAN attack. The difference being a failed attack here simply means falling back to your lines. What I'm talking about is the sort of counterattack against a supposedly vulnerable position such that you are forced to abandon equipment and fall back. The difference between the two is pretty huge.
>Why does it have to be immediate
Because I'm only evaluating Rommel's ability to conduct an offensive. At the point where you have a lull in fighting and the enemy switches to attacking it's now a defensive campaign.
>>383729
>Because I'm only evaluating Rommel's ability to conduct an offensive. At the point where you have a lull in fighting and the enemy switches to attacking it's now a defensive campaign.
But if your offensive carries you too far ahead to be holdable, it's a bad offensive. Especially if you can't easily retreat, because to do so would make you vulnerable. You should have turned back sooner. Rommel overextended himself on both of his big offensives in the Desert War. That's not good.
War isn't like (American) football, where you switch off to an entirely different team when you go from offense to defense and back again. Your offensive situations put you into defensive positions and vice versa, quite often frequently if the battlefield is fluid. You can't look at the two in isolation.
>>383729
>Because I'm only evaluating Rommel's ability to conduct an offensive.
but isnt an offensive where you run out of supplies or outrun your supplies an inherently bad or at least severely flawed one one
>>383746
>comparing this to a football game
This is a terrible analogy. In a war the relative strengths of each side change. And in the case of WWII it was always moving away from the Axis. Had Rommel turned around he may as well have admitted there was no chance of ever taking Egypt.
>>381450
implying i dont
>>382931
Everyone always forgets doctrine manj
>>383785
>Isn't.
>War isn't like
>Had Rommel turned around he may as well have admitted there was no chance of ever taking Egypt.
And if, like the overwhelming consensus of post-war analysis would indicate, that there was no chance of ever taking Egypt in any event, then admitting such is the right move, not the wrong move.
