why did he blow his alliance with stalin?

>>357428
Tito loathed non-whites.

>>357413

I've seen some individuals on here state that Communism in Yugoslavia worked quite well. Is this true?

>>357428
Stalin kept trying to kill him.

>>357448
It was market socialism from the start and it certainly did better than any eastern bloc economy.
But y'know at some point, someone has to be liquidated to answer the national question, and Poor old Tito didn't have the guts for roman peace.

>>357544
The Soviet Union was market socialism from the beginning mate. Value form. Wage labour.

>>357544
GDR and Czechoslovakia were much richer than Yugoslavia.

>>357546
ain't no wertkritiker around that confuses world markets with national markets bruh

>>357607
Point of production chap.

M—C…P…C'—M'

If it exists: it is fucking capitalism.

It is the easiest fucking analytical process in the world. Wage labour + value form = capital.

'no'

t. bulgaria

>>357624
Austria of the Balkans

>>357616
You know that commodities have exchange-value, right? And that this value is tied greatly to circulation, right?
Maybe I should ask: could you perhaps define "market"? Of what relation does it have to commodities and their circulation?

>>357643
The "market" is the point of realisation. In the Soviet Union competing commercial concerns marketed consumer products to realise the value circulating through them. Without interruption. From November. I mean this is in Volume 3.

>>357600
These are exceptional cases. Both were well developed industrially beforehand, and continued to be so despite Soviet gutting post-war.

>>357659
Ah, yes, the point of realization. Good. And where does the Ruble, a fixed rate currency exchangeable for fixed price commodities in domestic circulation, find its valourization? The ruble ain't pound sterling, bruh.

>>357671
The ruble finds its valorisation on the production market for raw materials and fixed capital, where production prices set using market mechanisms are paid (despite healthy trust and state loans). It also finds its valorisation in exchange for proletarian labour power.

You should really know this. If you don't, read Strauss (1941) on the economic structure of social history of Soviet Life to 1941. Then follow up with Simon Pirani for the circulation of value to 1921 at the point of production.

>>357688
You have not answered fully. You've completed M-C, but not M-C-M. We must know the point where the capitalist (in our case, the party taken as a whole) becomes either rubles, foreign currency, or exchangeable commodities. Without a means of valourization, raw materials and machinery don't become variable and fixed capital. It ain't capital if you ain't cashin', know what I mean?

I mean, I suppose I should say that I am in agreement that soviet production was fundamentally capitalistic. We both agree that these operate as capital, as the produced commodities find their realization on the market. And that the prole receives less than he gives as labour-power. However, variable and fixed capital cannot become such with valourization, and it most certainly did not find such in the domestic sphere, as it can (and does) in western market economies, and in this case the yugoslavian economy. It's the difference of speaking of "capitalist" and "capitalists".

Cool, the book is on MIA. In the meantime, I don't suppose you have anything covering the post-war years?

>>357757
C'—M' completes doubly, in sector I in the production of fixed capital for sale at production prices to firms, largely on the basis of state and trust loans.

In sector II it completes through party, worker and general stores.

Post-war I'd recommend Miklos Haratszi's _Worker in a Workers' State_ a factory floor report from the mid 1960s by a maoist sociologist in Hungary sent down to blue collar work for anti-revisionism.

I'm also not seeing your problem with valorisation. Occupying the flow of positions in expanded reproduction is evidence that the social relation is one of value, ie: that the material and human relationships are valorised. The completed circuit demonstrates valorisation, as does the repeated sector II production crises in the 1930s: the failure to achieve plan amounted to a sectoral depression.

>>357781
It's a matter of fixed-rate currencies and fixed-price commodities as opposed to floating/commodity/commodity-backed currencies and market-adjusting commodities. Consumer good shortages in the soviet union did not correspond with currency shortages, while in western market economies (and the world-market in general) the opposite is usually the case.

The individual capitalist has the luxury of naming his price in comparison to other individual capitalists, a price that responds far more rapidly to changes in production than a soviet fixed-price, and therefore realizes an exchange-value roughly on par with what is received by other individual capitalists. The Soviet capitalist only has the black market and the world market as a point of reference where "individual" (in the sense of capitalists confronting each other as capitalists, regardless of actual individuality) capitalists make such a comparison with each other. In the domestic sphere, no such comparisons can occur, because prices and exchange rates are fixed from the start. Simply put, the ruble is simply not a good platform for valourisation in the domestic sphere, as fixed value is fundamentally opposed to the realization of exchange-values in its valourised form, as more money than has been input by the capitalist. Meanwhile trade of domestically produced commodities for foreign currency and commodities was a far more reliable means of accumulation.
Our disagreement is merely in what sphere soviet capital is realized, in domestic markets or world markets.

>>357988
>The Soviet capitalist only has the black market and the world market as a point of reference where "individual" (in the sense of capitalists confronting each other as capitalists, regardless of actual individuality) capitalists make such a comparison with each other.
Nah mate, read Strauss. Production prices resolved on a market of volume and price. And when price variability was restricted but access to credit remained constant, volume and quality ("the use nature of the commodity") resolved the price problem: people paid partly fixed prices for goods of variable volume and quality.

>because prices and exchange rates are fixed from the start.

Not at all. Not at bloody all. The NEP and 5-year plans had floating value currencies, so much so that in 1927 (IIRC) the Soviets had to devalue their currency to resolve a monetary inflation crisis.

Perhaps it changed after 1949. I'm most familiar with the Soviet Economy up to the Rajk purges, after that I'm most familiar with the "soviet-style" economies.

>>357988
I have to say, it is unusual to find someone as passionate about the actual structure of Soviet economic relations. I am loving your posts.

>>358005
And, funnily enough, pre-1949 soviet economics is where I'm most in the dark. Just looked up the date for price fixing, 1961 with the fixing of gold content in the ruble (itself at a fixed price, ironically)
so yeah, we've been arguing two different eras. Sorry, that was my fault.

>>358035
n.p. I suppose the state capitalist / international realisation argument was most prominent after 1961 anyway. Apart from Cliff didn't the Sweezyites have a variant? Anyway, I'd still argue that varying the nature of the commodity (utility) and the volume per price are "price" mechanisms even with a fixed ruble value.

>>358019
autism propagates autism propagates autism, and I am apparently not autistic enough yet
>>358057
It's a matter of if our capitalist got more than he input. I know only that the soviets tried to valourise its capital as raw materials and finished goods in the world market after introducing fixed-rates, I don't know if it actually worked, and my gut says "no". Idk how it was before, but 60's after the USSR was really shitty at capitalism.

>>357448
well, for a communism. It was less rigid and Yugoslavia gained a lot by standing between Blocks. (IMHO all Easter and Central European countries would be much better with communism but without being USSR colonies)

Josip Bro Tierto

>>357537
After breaking from his influence

Yugoslavia played that between the blocks card very well. After split with USSR, USA saw the great opportunity for creating a regional ally in southen Europe. Yugoslavia was a communist state but Tito knew that he can't last if he's not protected by at least one great power so he made a deal with Americans gaining military and food aid with some cheap loans that powered the growth of the economy. 60's and 70's were great for the Yugoslavia and Tito with his staff planed to completely open yugoslavian market to the world because he was convinced that Yugoslavia had one of the best economies of the eastern bloc, so they made some studies that showed that Yugoslavian economy was in the rank of bulgarian and that western loans that fueled the economy would be impossible to pay in next 10-15 years. Yugoslavian leaders than had two options: start a numbers of reforms in state owned firms that employed way too many workers, give more money to the most developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia to kickstart new and sustainable growth or pretend that economy is great by fueling the other problem, ethnic hatred between people of republics. They choose the second scenario that resulted with demonstartions. Tito changed the constitution after that giving republics legal opportunity to leave Yugoslavia and that would be crucial in 1990's. After Tito's death economy crumbled. Food,gas shortage and inflation were normal for the 80's, Yugoslavia was not so interesting for the west like in the 60's so there were no aids in food or cash leaving the state without means to return that loans and growing interests. In 1989. Ante Markovic beacme prime minister and he did a good job by stopping the inflation ( there's a rumour that European Union guaranteed Yugoslavia membership in couple years) but it was too late for Yugoslavia, Milosevic prepared ground for the making of Great Serbia that included major parts of Croatia and whole of Bosnia and that would mean the end of Yugoslavia.