Why does it seem that interest on the Pacific/ China theater is so overlooked? And discussion of it almost always dissolves into a dick measuring contest against any other country?
>>272059
Because Americans don't realize or care that the war was more than Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and other island hopping campaigns, and the Brits don't realize or care that the war was more than Burma and Singapore.
>Why does it seem that interest on the Pacific/ China theater is so overlooked
Weeaboos want to ignore it, and non-weeaboos don't care about Japan.
> And discussion of it almost always dissolves into a dick measuring contest against any other country?
Disrupts their existing narratives.
You know what I would fucking LOVE? Someone needs to write a book looking at non-Japanese participation in the IJA and role in war crimes seriously, and through the participants perspective.
>>272059
because it had horrible balance
aircraft carriers OP, pls nerf
>>272092
What am I looking at?
>>272092
Is that a map of all the IJN shipwrecks? Care to share the data?
Better question is:
Why is the Atlantic Theater so overlooked even though it decided the whole war?
>>272098
non-merchant vessels sunk by the US
I've been scouring all over the damn internet, can anyone help me?
I'm looking for more information and pictures about the "Asano Detachment" an all Russian volunteer group that fought for the Emperor against the Soviets.
>>272111
Hey look, we got 5 posts in before the dick-measurer showed up.
>>272131
What the fuck does that even mean? I'm just saying that everyone forgets about Atlantic Theater and how crucial it was to the war effort in Europe.
>>272059
Because quite honestly, the Japanese never provided much of tactical or strategic significance or interest.
The war in China had very little direct battling, and a lot of occupation and counterinsurgency.
The war against the various western powers was about 7 months of overrunning colonies with tiny defenses, followed by 3 and a half years of the Americans and British pushing the Japanese shit in on islands that were indefensible but kept at it anyway because there was nowhere to run to.
Literally the only engagement I think that was interesting or surprising in the Pacific Theater was the Malaya campaign, and there's only so much you can squeeze out of that.
>>272111
Because it's not overlooked and it didn't decide the war? I mean, it's not like the u-boats had much of a chance anyway, there's only so much you can squeeze out of ambush predators like that.
>>272111
in Britain the merchant navy and the sinking of the hood etc are mentioned quite a lot
>>272197
If germans spent their naval budget to more ocean going U-boats instead of useless battleships/heavy cruisers which were bogged down in their ports most of the war anyway, I'm pretty sure Allies would be fucked
>>272092
>>272113
Why do Shipfuckers fuck their ships when they all sucked and sank?
>>272181
There were plenty of interesting battles in Pacific
New Guinea, Guadalcanal, Midway, Okinawa, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima etc.
>>272235
Tarawa, Saipan, New Bougainvillea, Betio, corrigedor
>>272213
>Eh. Tactical or strategic significance isn't that interesting to me.
Then what is interesting?
>it's basically a look into a world where WWI never happened.
To be fair, a lot of the stresses that dominated WW1 don't really apply to the theaters that Japan fought in. massive lines that stretch from coast to coast and dominated by artillery isn't really feasible in a pacific island hopping campaign, nor can that kind of kit be readily moved through all the mountains and jungle they were campaigning around.
>>272216
If the Germans spent their naval budget on long range u-boats, the Allies literally do the exact same thing they did historically, which is convoy up, build a lot of small boats, and have air cover over the vital atlantic route. They might accelerate their occupation of the Azores if things got bad, and told Portugal to stuff it.
The Germans never really came up with a way to attack a well defended convoy with u-boats alone; Donitz's entire strategy focused around finding soft areas and re-assigning submarines there, avoiding the better defended convoys.
Unless you can change that balance somehow, the shipping war only ends one way.
>>272092
>N-NIPPON S-STRONK
Japanese decisions always leave me so confused, Why didn't they developed stronger infantry weapons and more smgs? Why couldn't they use more chemical weapons against American invasions?
Seems the natural choice. I root for IJA and wish better happened for them.
>>272253
>Then what is interesting?
Formation and subversion of national identities, interplay of various states of industrialization on the war, transnational classist and anti-communist assumptions, and the transition of global opinion from imperialism from a Good Thing to a Bad Thing.
>To be fair, a lot of the stresses that dominated WW1 don't really apply to the theaters that Japan fought in. massive lines that stretch from coast to coast and dominated by artillery isn't really feasible in a pacific island hopping campaign, nor can that kind of kit be readily moved through all the mountains and jungle they were campaigning around.
There's that, but there's also just the fact that Japan never had direct experience with WWI, but did learn about it indirectly. As a result, they came up with some weird reactions to it that, in a lot of ways, paralleled Pershing's ideas:
Small, light infantry detachments, skilled in massed long ranged rifle fire, that emphasize mobility both at a tactical and strategic level. It was a really neat idea if it wasn't in the era of mechanization.
>>272235
>New Guniea, Guadalcanal, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Saipan, New bougainville,
All island campaigns where the Japanese couldn't stop the Western Allies from funneling in as many men and as much fire support to squish them no matter how determined the resistance. Inevitable outcomes happened inevitably.
>Midway,
I mean, everyone talks about it as the "BIG TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC", but I mean honestly, if things went differently, the Essex class carriers come out in a few months, and Japan is boned anyway. Not to mention that carrier warfare in the Pacific was a lot like playing Battleship for real. Find enemy before they find you and send the bombers in enough times until some slip through.
>Leyte gulf.
Turkey shoots are boring. Overwhelming American fleet crushes vastly inferior fleet. Who cares?
>>272282
>Japanese decisions always leave me so confused, Why didn't they developed stronger infantry weapons and more smgs?
Basically, because they took very different lessons from the stalemate of the western front than everyone else.
Rather then volume of fire at close range, their infantry doctrine called for troops skilled at long ranged mass rifle fire, because close combat was entangling.
The idea was to stay at long range, fire and move, and allow for mass infiltration.
>>272092
american penis too big for tiny jap battleship
>>272282
>why didn't they developed stronger infantry weapons and more smgs?
Because they had a tiny industrial base, and a lot of what resources did exist were going to the navy and airforce, leaving little funding or attention for the IJA.
>Why couldn't they use more chemical weapons against American invasions?
Because chemical weapons kind of suck, especially against dispersed troops in the open with access to gas masks. Its tactical effectiveness would have been marginal.
>>272290
>Has shit opinion
>Write up huge post to justify shit opinion
You might as well be wearing a trip.
>>272227
Underrated post. I expect to see that image on /tg/.
>>272282
>I root for IJA and wish better happened for them.
>rooting for the Axis in WW2
Not sure if /pol/ or /int/. Leaning towards /int/ though.
>>272290
I think the land battles in the Pacific are the most interesting. It's like a WW1 remix but with Islands and slightly better tanks.
>>272660
>I think the land battles in the Pacific are the most interesting. It's like a WW1 remix but with Islands and slightly better tanks.
But unlike WW1, where you had tactical equality of fire matched by each side being able to funnel more and more men into the theater, in the island hopping campaigns, you had.
A) One side vastly, vastly outgunning the other, even on the tactical side.
B) That same side being able to reinforce and resupply at will, while the other can't really do much more than take it.
WW1 offensives usually had casualties within 10% of each other's losses. Island battles in the pacific were usually 8:1 in favor of the Americans if not more. About the only thing remarkable about them is to the extent that Japanese resistance persisted even when it was hopeless.
>>272688
>not being amazed at how good the japs were at inflicting casualties even when horribly outgunned and outnumbered - see Tarawa
>>272698
They weren't good. The ratios approach what the Soviets inflicted on the Germans when they were being encircled in cities like Kiev, Smolensk, and Minsk.
Tarawa featured poor application of U.S. support, especially in naval gunfire, and they still got crushed. It's a natural consequence of fighting in close quarters like that. You can't really point to anything the Japanese could have done better and learned from; it's entirely a one man show, with almost all variables in the equation being under the control of the U.S.
I've always found it amusing that the biggest fears of marines in the early war were banzai charges in the night. To think that the enemy's most terrifying weapon in the 40s was a ton of dudes in a bayonet charge.
>>272113
Like a fly on a windshield.
>m-muh nippon steel....
>>272688
>Japanese resistance persisted even when it was hopeless.
that got me thinking about Hiroo Onoda and his buddies
>get told to holdout on a island and conduct guerilla warfare
>hide in mountains and do exactly that
>in 1945 find a leaflet saying that the war is over and that japan surrendered
>think its a clever ruse and that the allies are trying to trick them to come out of hiding
>spend 30 years living in the mountains raiding the police every know and then ALONE
>all his friends where dead or hade deserted
>a japanese student makes contact with him and tries to convince him that the war is over
>his former commander has to go find him and deliver the orders personally that he is relieved from his duty
>surrenders to the local government
>gets pardoned for all of his guerrial actions carried out over the past 30 years
>>272842
Primarily because night engagements are always disorienting, especially before night vision, and even more so for the defender. You don't know where the enemy is, where he's coming from, and if he's gotten into your lines.
I'm have a hard time trying to make the Japanese seem cool in WW2
