Which is it, /his/?
Monads.
>>346596
There are some theories that say that consciousness is the act of several parts of the brain communicating and debating with itself, instead of just merely reacting to external stimuli
My money is on funtionalism. Conciousness is *probably* a mechanism to help us survive and preform the same tasks all other mammals on earth effectively. But from that we birthed existentialism, which comes with it's own sleu of problems.
But with that being said I could also see it being a quantum thing, or simply the conciousness exists in another dimension of sorts that we just can't discover yet. I believe fully mapping the brain will give some powerful insights. Ultimately whatever we think is probably wrong, and we will never be certain of anything. I lean towards nihilism in that sense, but I certainly hope and have faith in science and Neurology.
Neurology will consume all other biology/philosophy/psychology eventually
>>346596
how are users of a Taiwanese wood carving site qualified to make such corroborations?
Functionalism
Brb breeding
>>346596
Functionalism.
>>346654
>Buddhism, but that's mainly due to religious upbringing and ontological introspection.
Define consciousness.
>>346710
>unwilling to gather experimental data
property dualism or you're playing a suckers game
Substance Dualism, Pan Psychism, and Buddhism are the only ones that take on the hard problem of consciousness and offer logically consistent explanations. None of them seem likely though, so I don't know.
So are we going to have 100 posts arguing over an undefined term, or are we going to break the pattern this time?
>>346596
>Retarded, dodges the question, retarded, pants on head retarded
>Reductionisticaly retarded, retarded, dodges the question, retarded
>Mind-numbingly retarded, maybe, maybe, retarded
Damn.
>>346834
>or are we going to break the pattern this time?
Don't suggest we have freewill.
>>346834
You know how this works champ
*Hegel turn on his grave*
>>346596
Functionism and Higher-Order Theory sound synonymous.
>>346596
>Emergent dualism
Emergence does not imply dualism. Mind as a physical property of matter also does not imply dualism. Mind is an emergent, physical property of matter. No dualism, just matter with multiple behaviors at multiple scales.
I just get around the issue by denying the actual existence of the physical, or at the very least it's primacy. Where some describe consciousness as arising out of matter, I describe matter as arising out of consciousness like an emergent property.
In this I guess I could be described as a substance monist.
>implying there is a question to be asked
Come back when you can at least formulate it properly, qualiafags.
So a primal definition that we can all agree on is that consciousness is a constant that is for some reason measured by the human brain. The mysteries are, how does it measure it and what does measuring it accomplish exactly?
>>346596
Functionalism and behaviorism.
>>346917
Do you feel things?
Explain why those feelings are relevant to the deterministic mechanisms of the body and physical reality in general.
>pro tip: they aren't
Why do these feels exist, given their seemingly utter irrelevance?
>>346957
How the fuck are feelings irrelevant?
>feel pain: remove your hand from the fire dumbass
>feel fear: run from the tiger idiot
>feel love: take care of your children dickhead
aufhebung
>>346957
It appears you are trying to disconnect feelings from the actions of the body. Protip: Typing about feelings is an action of the body, thus any attempt to argue that they are disconnected is self-contradictory.
>>346965
you could program a robot to remove his thermal sensors from a fire in response to the registration of heat.
That doesn't mean that the robot actually feels anything, or that it even needs to. The human body is basically just a very complicated machine, and considering this truth it is actually hard to find an answer to the question of why we are conscious of our sensations and perceptions at all.
>>346975
What the hell is an "actual" feeling.
>>346975
If a human who has lost the ability to "actually feel" anything sticks their hand in a fire, how will they react?
>>346971
>Typing about feelings is an action of the body and this is relevant because reasons.
I could be an unfeeling robot for all you know, and if you think about it for a second you'll see I'm not arguing against the disconnection but rather I am simply raising the question as to why there is a "connection" in the first place.
Matter acts in a deterministic manner, and consciousness in this manner of thinking has no reason for being.
>>346980
Are you just retarded, or are you actually a robot who has a reason for not really knowing what it is I'm talking about?
>>346980
haha oh wow
Great post, champ. You're right, phenomenology has been awaiting your Sam Harris-level genius for hundreds of years.
>>346995
Are you claiming that something exists while at the same time claiming that it's impossible to provide evidence of its existence?
>>346991
Please don't try to talk about consciousness if you aren't familiar with qualia and the philosophical zombie and the chinese room.
Jesus
>>346995
I can't be a robot, I passed the captcha.
But no, I don't think you can show the existence of "what you're talking about". Yes the human body is a complicated machine, and since we're not made of silicon, the process of making me remove my hand from the fire involves my brain releasing certain hormones and adopting a certain pattern, which is "pain." I don't see much anything other than that.
Maybe the internal monologue, but a robot can do that too.
>>346991
In the exact same way, the sensory neurons in the hand would register the sharp increase in temperature and tissue damage. Following the exchange of ions, the electro-chemical signal will travel along the sensory pathways to the spinal cord and there will be an automatic reflex expressed as a recoil.
But you will not feel the pain. The pain will register in the relevant areas of the CNS, but you will not be aware of it.
I suggest that phenomenological awareness is not actually a necessary process or state, and yet it seems undeniable that it is present in humans, or myself at the very least.
This is unexplained.
>>347018
>MUH
>QUALIA
Gotta love those ill-defined terms about stuff you can't show exist, but they do exist, it's obvious I swear!
Do you believe in forms too?
>>347018
Ah yes, the classic "I've lost the argument, so I'll claim victory" strategy.
>>347033
Well yeah that's how it works for short pains where a reflex is enough to get it, but if you endure a long pain then it's obvious all your cognitive abilities must be assigned to making it stop.
>>347023
>the internal monologue
And why should you be anymore aware of one body's internal monologue than another's? Why are you conscious of "your" body as opposed to another body, or both?
Why is the awareness of the internal monologue even necessary on a biological level, when the base matter of the body will operate in a purely deterministic fashion of it's own accord, independent of any conscious action?
>>347033
Will this human who lacks "actual feelings" still claim that "actual feelings" exist?
If no, then we have demonstrated a difference between him and a normal human. If yes, then you need to explain where the idea of "actual feelings" comes from because you claim they don't need to exist in order for the concept of them to exist.
>>347036
I'm not the same poster you were arguing with.
At least a few people think you're stupid.
>>347051
As a p-Zombie, I claim to experience actual feelings.
>>347047
>but if you endure a long pain then it's obvious all your cognitive abilities must be assigned to making it stop.
Lol, what?
>>347050
Because internal monologue produces an actual effect on the actions of the body.
>>347047
>all your cognitive abilities must be assigned
So? Can you not conceive of a flesh bag capable of these same cognitive and physical abilities (since they are essentially one and the same) while at the same time lacking in totality any overarching awareness of it's actions?
Like a man on a complicated autopilot, with nobody upstairs if you will.
>>347050
>And why should you be anymore aware of one body's internal monologue than another's?
Because I'm not connected by wifi to other people.
>Why are you conscious of "your" body as opposed to another body, or both?
Yeah, same thing.
>Why is the awareness of the internal monologue even necessary on a biological level
Seems pretty useful for speech. The ability to rehearse and all that.
>>347064
No. If said meatbag wants to be able to write history essays, he's gonna have to have an internal monologue and abstraction capabilities and all that fancy stuff.
>>347051
Of course, if that is the course of the deterministic path the universe has been set on since the dawn of time.
Does a billiard ball know that he is on a collision course? Of course not, and why should he?
It begs the question then why we have that awareness.
>>347064
But this "man on autopilot" will still claim to have consciousness, which causes a paradox.
>>347070
Because we're not just billiard balls that get bounced around, we're complicated digestive tracks with legs who are designed to do one thing: dump their entropy on the external world.
And that takes thinking and a sense of self-preservation.
>>347069
>gonna have to have an internal monologue to write
Of course. But why is it necessary for him to be aware of this monologue for the monologue to continue? Won't a room of monkeys banging on typewriters eventually reproduce the written works of man by complete accident, and without any conscious intent or presence? Imagine a similar process reproducing the human brain.
You are confusing so called higher cognitions for consciousness. This is not the case.
>>347085
>we're not just billiard balls that get bounced around, we're complicated
We are bound by the same physics as that ball.
>a sense of self-preservation
Why is a "sense" of self-preservation necessary when a few sub-routines genetically inborn will do the trick totally better?
What is this "sense"?
>>347098
>You are confusing so called higher cognitions for consciousness.
Oh no, I'm aware of the difference: one exists and the other is made up.
>Plato: look at those cups
>Diogenes: yes I see them
>Plato: there is something that links them, the form of cup-ness
>Diognes: I only see cups you dumb shit
Literally the exact same argument as qualiafags
>yes I see an apple
>no, you see, you are experience the qualia of apple-ness
It's not there you crazy loonies.
>>347106
Pretty sure billiard balls don't have any significant amount of transforming chemical energy into heat or kinetic energy, or electrical energy.
>>347076
>claim to have consciousness
No it doesn't. I can make a computer program that will repeat repeat "I am conscious" forever and ever, and it will not make it conscious.
>>347098
>aware of this monologue
What does that mean? What's the difference between "being aware" and "not being aware" of the monologue.
>>347106
>Why is a "sense" of self-preservation necessary
Biological imperative underlined and enforced on every level of life from simple to complex.
>>347114
Are you saying that the P zombie won't claim to have consciousness, or did you somehow misread the post?
>>347110
Based Diogenes.
>>347110
>I see an apple
Here, let me scoop out your brains and see if you still see the apple. I don't actually understand why you can't accept that a hologram of sufficient quality will trick you into believing you see a real apple, when in reality all you can know is that it seems to you that there is an apple there.
Dio wasn't the end all be all by any strech, and his criticism of the forms is completely irrelevant here.
>>347122
>What's the difference between "being aware" and "not being aware"
That's the question. There does not seem to be a meaningful difference between the two in terms of the continuation of the monologue, or any need for this awareness in the first place.
So why are we aware?
>>347145
>So why are we aware?
Are we aware?
>>347138
It's relevant in that we're facing the same problem: people asking a bunch of mysterious questions about something they can neither define nor show exists. Of course it's gonna be mysterious, since it's made up.
>I don't actually understand why you can't accept that a hologram of sufficient quality will trick you into believing you see a real apple, when in reality all you can know is that it seems to you that there is an apple there.
Now that is irrelevant. Does your consciousness that I apparently lack gives you the power to see through optical illusions?
>>347145
I can answer that question, but first you need to tell me whether or not the P zombie will claim itself conscious.
>>347153
I am, not certain about anyone else though.
>>347156
If this P zombie is bound by the same universal laws of physics that our bodies are, then yes clearly it's mouth and tongue will make the exact same movements that ours will.
>>347110
>the qualia of apple-ness
You don't actually seem to know what qualia means.
>>347154
>mysterious questions
>I don't get it, must be made up to trick me!
Do you claim to see a real apple?
[spoiler]it's not a real apple, your senses lie to you all the time[/spoiler]
>>347145
Eyh m8 you cut my question and then pretend we're asking the same thing. I'm asking why you think "being aware of the monologue" is something meaningful. If it's meaningful "not being aware of the monologue" would mean something.
>>347169
Therefore you claim that the idea of consciousness is not contingent on the existence of consciousness.
I shouldn't have to explain what is wrong with this.
>>347178
>trying to spoil on /his/
Also I already addressed your point. Yeah, sense are limited, big whoop. Don't see how "consciousness" helps with that.
>>347181
It's not meaningful for a materialist, that's the point.
But if there is no reason for it's existence, why is it still there?
>>347186
>I want to believe
ok
Normal people get into astrology, they don't pretend to do philosophy to get their supernatural kick.
>>347157
I don't know Anon. I think even the assumption that the individual is self aware is an act of faith.
>>347183
You should explain, because it follows from your implication that ideas are contingent upon their existent source that the idea of say, God is contingent on God's actual existence.
An interesting proposition.
All of qualiafag's points have been thoroughly addressed. No more purpose in replying to them. If they continue to bait replies, they are a troll.
>>347199
I accept the Cogito as a thing.
>>347205
I never even said the word "qualia" you massive fucking degenerate.
Where the hell is Non-Dualism in the pic? Matter arises from consciousness imo.
>>347219
my man
>>347200
They are continent on the existence of a source, but the idea doesn't have the be an accurate reflection of the source. Consciousness does not accurately reflect any source, because consciousness is a fabricated term(twisted from a mixture of sources).
>>347228
So God exists.
Also unicorns, and square circles. It's just that our ideas about them aren't entirely accurate.
>>347264
No, they're fabricated terms. They do not accurately reflect anything in reality.
>>347279
>a fabricated term
please define and explain what makes some words fabricated and other words natural.
>>347288
A fabricated term does not point to anything in reality. Basically, incoherent.
>>346605
The monads don't exist and everyone knows it
>>347292
>does not point to anything in reality
how do you know? Are you omniscient?
Also, perfect circles do not exist in reality. Are you to say that the entire practice of geometry is a sham or a fabrication simply because the discipline relies upon the idea of "circle"?
how can the brain be in any way in a causal relationship with conscious experience when the brain itself is an object of, and is apprehended through, conscious experience
you have to end up positing that the brain caused it's own existence
>>347292
>>347228
Every word is a fabricated term created to describe the nuances of a situation. Conciousness is the word we use to describe the indescribable control and presence we seem to have over our bodies, the internal monologue, the ability to ask existential questions and the simple state of being *aware* in whatever your consciousness might be. Perhaps that's not the medical definition, but
If we don't fabricate terms to discuss things what else are we to do? As long as everyone is on the same page of what we are referring to when we are discussing something who gives a flying fuck what the term used is?. I don't understand your logic at all. Your logic was created using fabricated terms.
>>346910
you would be described as an idealist
>>347110
>you are experience the qualia of apple-ness
oh I see, you're one of those retarded peopel
>>347339
>Conciousness is the word we use to describe the indescribable control and presence we seem to have over our bodies, the internal monologue, the ability to ask existential questions and the simple state of being *aware* in whatever your consciousness might be.
Except it's not, because something without consciousness will still have a concept of consciousness, for some reason.
>>347367
You can write the definition of consciousness into a computer's memory banks you know.
It don't mean shit.
qualia just means the sensation of something
such as how x object looks x colour, or how something feels to touch, or the sound of music
basically everything you are aware of involves qualia
it just means the 'feeling' of something
Quantum consciousness
>>347372
But it's possible for a computer to lack a concept of consciousness. A P zombie necessarily has a concept of consciousness just as much as a normal human.
Quantum consciousness/property "dualism"
>>347367
but that avoids the actual point... the point is regardless of the exceptions, whatever semantics you want to describe on the word consciousness, what we are talking about here is the human experience, and you know what without playing devils advocate.
if we cannot define our ideas accurately, we must discuss them abstractly and place the closest word to describe the effect. we "fabricate" a term and all get on the same page of what that means. that's where scientific terms are invented, because language has barriers.
So stop using "fabricated terms" as a way to diverge from a point.
>>346596
id put money on it involving quantum shinanigens
>>346596
It is nothing. It doesn't exist. At best it is some try to integrate a collective human process into an individual.
There's been too long since I've studied philosophy of the mind on an academic level so I doubt I can defend my position.
HOWEVER, I remember thinking Property Dualism being the one that makes most sense, based on Searle's writing (who is a property dualist no matter what he's trying to argue) regarding the philosophy of the mind, mainly due to the Chinese room and it's critics. And I know I'm biased because I took his "construct of the social reality" to hearth when I studied sociology and social-psychology.
Consciousness doesn't exist. It's an illusion like free will.
Sent from my iPhone
>>347526
Then what is that which is undergoing the illusion?
>>347526
> Consciousness doesn't exist. It's an illusion.
> You're not thinking, you're merely thinking that you're thinking
This is what I'm reading, feel free to correct me.
>>347604
the second part makes sense but then what would you call that state of being awake, alive and aware you are interacting with the environment?
don't put too much thought into the meaning of consciousness. it's a simple thing itself
>>346957
>Why do these feels exist, given their seemingly utter irrelevance?
Arguments about "actual feelings" aside, you make the mistake of assuming that everything has to have a purpose. Evolution is not an optimal process. Our brain works the way it does because of a very long series of mutations occurring over time, and the organisms carrying those mutations managed to pass their genes on.
There doesn't have to be real reason why you feel feels. You feel them because your ancestors mutated that way.
>>346596
By that chart I'd have to say Higher Order Theory.
>>347018
Your brain is a series of Chinese rooms linked together. No individual neuron/room understands Chinese or any other language. The system as a whole "understands" Chinese.
Today it acts as functionalism, but most likely occurred as an accident like all biological processes, so epiphenominalism.
There are no mental events, you are only imagining them. ;)
>>346596
i don't know shit about this but i'm going to say just looking at this image that it's simply a funcion that our brain performs (functionalism), that relate with physical events we can see in brain scans. (identity theory)
it's not really an "accidental" side-effect of our brain but it's related to physical processes in the brain. not sure if it's the main objective or just a side-effect, but it's definitely not "accidental"
>>346596
Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, Pan Psychism and Buddhism are all obviously false. The rest have some scatterings that are confirmed by experiment, while also having some weak parts to the theory. We dont know and philosophising wont help that much here.
Hell, we dont really understand how large scale neural nets work and they're only a fraction of what we see in the brain, let alone "conscious".
>>346596
Why is there a hole on the side of that dude's brain?
Am I stupid if I think there is no hard problem of consciousness? We don't understand shit right now, to make distinctions of sensations based on nothing but sensations seems stupid to me.
Epiphenomenalism
>>346596
Epiphenomenalism is probably the most shitty position, and functionalism is the most safe, if alone because it's rather flexible. So, I'll go with that.
>>349070
>we don't understand shit
>therefore, there is no hard problem
Eh
>>346596
I'm going functionalism
>>346596
That's not identity theory you fucktards.
The answer is it's not an object and shouldn't be treated like one.
Consciousness is simply the state of being awake - I.E being conscious. The fact you can make a noun out of it doesn't force you into to any metaphysical commitments whatsoever. It's just how English works.
>>349098
>we don't know how consciousness works
>but there is a problem with our formulation
eh
To everyone saying "functionalism", the problem is WHAT function, the moment you give up and just handwave everything mental as "a function of the brain" you've lost. If you want to go any further and actually describe what kind of function and how it relates to others and to brain states, you are in the realm of all the other options right away.
TL;DR: Functionalism is a handwave.
>>349070
You are right that there is no hard problem, but not for those reasons jesus fuck
>>349127
That's what makes it true, no problem.
>>349128
Go on...
Would be better than acting high and mighty.
>>349117
>we can't get the fact that we experience reality in line with the reality we're experiencing
>doesn't cast any doubt on, well, our capacity for formulation as such
EH
>>349135
No, that's what makes it an empty position that has 0 power to explain phenomena and actually ends you up in more problems than you started with. The value of any theory is in how it improves our understanding, functionalism fails that test.
>>346596
Higher order theory seems the most likely to me.
>>349112
>consciousness is just being conscious
No shit sherlock, and what does that mean?
>>349166
If it is true, what is a thought?
>>349201
You are in a state of consciousness when you are awake.
You understand what being awake means right?
>>349209
I wanna say association of stimuli.
>>349162
But functionalism does improve our understanding by making explicit the relation of brain and consciousness: the latter is a function of the former.
>>349219
>You understand what being awake means right?
In a vulgar way, yes, but explicating it seems to require some theory of consciousness.
>>349237
So then consciousness is the association of stimuli "about" the association of stimuli?
That doesn't seem to make sense.
>>349244
Right, but it blocks us from saying anything more than that without recourse to an entirely different theory.
A function in terms of what? What does it do? What are the "inputs and outputs", so to speak?
>>349253
Why? There is nothing wrong with the "vulgar".
The fact you think there needs to be anything more is a fucking prime example of language on holiday. Just because you can make a noun out of something doesn't ascribe it ontological status.
>>349258
All of that really seems to boil down to the hard problem, which functionalism admittedly doesn't solve. Its grace lies in not loading itself with metaphysical garbage in the attempt.
>>349259
>There is nothing wrong with the "vulgar".
Of course there is, it doesn't contain an understanding of what's going on. Being awake means being neither asleep nor dead, a state where you have conscious perceptions and thoughts. It doesn't explain what it means to perceive or think consciously.
>>349274
I'd say the opposite, it dodges the hard problem fine but fails with the soft problem.
Functionalism lacks the grace of a proper response by saddling us all with "function" as a metaphysical concept that we now have to explain and quantify.
You don't have to do that. There is no hard problem to begin with.
>>349292
And neither do any of those theories in OP's image.
There is no weird metaphysical baggage you need to posit to explain, for instance, being awake, or looking at something, or thinking about something. Those are all just different states a person can be in.
>>347132
The real Diogenes would be a hundred times more hairy, scraggly, unkempt, dirty, and shit-caked.
>>349256
>That doesn't seem to make sense.
Well, I can't think how to explain it really, but don't imagine it like a two levels structure, more like a thousand levels. I would make an example but it seems too laborious a process tbqh.
>>349305
>Those are all just different states a person can be in.
>states
>a person
>can be in
Neither of those are in any way obvious. Explain what exactly you mean by those, and we'll see wether you actually have an alternative to the options in OP's pic.
>>349311
How is there a hard problem?
>>349315
That sounds more like emergence theory than higher order, consciousness emerging from a system being sufficiently complex or something.
Personally I see the mind as simply being the workings of a computer that is self aware. You are aware that you exist, you are aware of some of your processes (thoughts) and you are aware of the sensory input (the senses).
That's all there is to it.
TIL I am a Buddhist
Higher Order Theory and Substance Dualism both make a lot of sense but daaaaaang the Buddhist one is what I have experienced, even if it s a bitch to wrap my mind around
>>349323
I'd go with a token identity theory, but OP's image gets identity theory wrong so fuck it.
You understand things being in various states, don't be disingenuous. Awake, asleep, talking, walking, happy, sad, shitting, etc. If you understand that you understand what I mean by a person too.
It's all common language shit. There is nothing mysterious going on.
>>349354
How do those two fragments prove in any way there is a hard problem of consciousness? Did you link the right posts?
>>349349
Physical states are no problem, but talking about mental states presupposes a theory of consciousness, as does the concept of a person. The fact that we use such concepts everyday just means that having some sort of theory of consciousness is inescapable.
>>349335
Well but aren't they essentially the same thing? They just use thought and brain state instead of a common term.
Pretty sure epiphenomenalism is the correct answer. At least it's congenial to me.
Natural selection clearly has selected for bigger and more complex brains without "knowing" that this could cause self-awareness.
>>346596
Pan Psychism
>>346736
haha nahhh
>>348877
> Property dualism
> False
Why is it "obviously" false?
>>346596
What's the difference between emergent dualism and functionalism?
>>349548
Brain activity can be scanned and measured. We already know it is firing of neurons, it isn't some magical unknown thing "like electromagnetism"
>>349582
Functionalism is a completely empty position, it doesn't really state anything other than "It's a function", so it's compatible with almost all of the other ones.
Most of the descriptions are wrong on that image by the way. Choice of words is really fucking important here
>>349597
Yeah, I kind of figured the image was shit. This is why I should consult doctors about consciousness and not 4chan philosophers
>>349594
The description given in the image is wrong actually, that's not what property dualism is.
>>349604
Why not consult actual philosophers? Its not like a doctor is going to be able to help you with something this vague and theoretical, unless he's also studied philosophy of mind.
>>349610
Because doctors have actually studied the mind, philosophers haven't. They sit in an arm chair and come up with a hypothesis that is untestable or that they never test.
>>349548
If you think in addition to all the neurobiological features of the brain, there is an extra, distinct, nonphysical feature of the brain then that is up to you to prove
>>349637
And philosophers have actually studied theoretical questions of ontology/metaphysics, whereas Doctors haven't.
Fuck, a doctor is just going to help you get better, maybe he'll prescribe you some fucking medicine but he's not even the person you'd go to for technical advice here.
A neuroscientist can help you with the nitty gritty of our current understanding of the functions of the BRAIN, a psychologist can help you with how we think the MIND functions, but a philosopher will beat both on a question of metaphysics like the "problem" of consciousness.
It's like the difference between asking for an engineer to fix a plane, or a pilot to fly it.
>>349661
consciousness is just a reflection of the senses you kekold.
when you lose your eyes, you stop seeing, when you lose your ears, you start hearing, etc. time = space-movement, or distance-movement
when you sleep you lose consciousness because all your senses are shut off and no perception of time = unconsciousness hence why consciousness is literally dependent on bodily processes
>>349678
Oh, we actually agree, lel.
Still, you'd be surprised how few people get that right, including neuroscientists, psychologists, etc. The whole reason people think there is such a problem with consciousness is due to lazy thinking that is practically built into the way EVERYONE talks about mental phenomena nowadays.
>>346596
only unfalsifiable answer is high order theory.
also
>>346966
this basically
>>349661
A doctor can prescribe you medicine or a treatment to help you get better. They can perform medical trials to see whether a drug will help people with a certain ailment get better.
A neuroscientist can study the brain to see how it functions.
A pyschologist can study behaviour.
All of these disciplines can produce falsifiable hypotheses and prove or disprove them, even bloody pyschology with all the nonsense that is written in its name.
Philosophy, if you are getting really reductionist, can't go any further than "I think therefore I am" before it breaks down into unfalsifiable assumptions.
I'm not necessarily having a pop at philosophy here, it is a fascinating subject, but this conceit that you are showing about your subject or even whether things like "metaphysics" are something someone should even care about are to a certain extent unwarranted.
>>349953
Philosophy can go a lot futher than that, it deals with the boundaries of knowledge in every single field, with the basic catagories that we apply when we do, for example, neuroscience, psycology, etc.
BUt all that is beside the point. OP's question is literally one that only philosophy can answer because its a question specifically of metaphysical definitions. I never said anything about "metaphysics" being anything someone should care about, jesus fuck, I just said if you want an answer to a philosophical problem, you should probably fucking ask a philosopher and not a doctor.
>>349678
you are still conscious during sleep
>>349990
cück
>>349988
Sorry, but I disagree. It deals with what some philosophers consider to be the boundaries or knowledge in fields.
Without wishing to make a "it's 2015" argument, if you think philosophers are still making any sort of contribution to the boundaries of say cosmology, then you are seriously mistaken, it ain't 1500 AD and they simply aren't.
The subjects of neuroscience and pyschology are still in their infancy but they are already well in the process of taking away any claim philosophers have to be at the forefront of studying the mind and consciousness as well.
>>349988
What the world is made of was once also a philosophical problem, I bet some philospher in bumfuck AD said that empiricism can't answer that question.
Philosophy will literally never go beyond the current understanding of the problem.
Neuroscience has a chance at the least.
>>346975
The robots hand would still melt dummy
>>346596
Neutral Monism
the work of option 1 and the second from the last one.
How about a development of survival to try and rationalize our own existence?
Only a few of them even try to answer the hard problem of consciousness. Namely the different forms of dualism and pan-psychism. But they seem implausible. So who knows.
>>346596
very few of these seem mutually exclusive, does anyone else see that? some of them are obviously shit (buddhism, pan psychism,behaviourism), but combining several seems to paint a better picture than any one approach.
