>>1338842
because his supporter America suspended the aggressive policy against the communists, for to defeat Japan was expanding the hegemony in East asia came to a first priority for America.

>>1338842
He isolated the peasants which consisted of a big majority in China.

And he failed to shake off the "LE PAWN OF THE FOREIGN DEVILS" image.

To be fair, the CCP had that problem too. Which is why the Sino-Soviet Split Happened.

The US federal government cut funding and gave it to Mao and friends after left leaning journalists painted Chiang an pals as being (more) incompetent (than they were) and that the Reds were better able to clog up the Japanese war machine.

>>1338955
>The US federal government cut funding and gave it to Mao and friends after left leaning journalists painted Chiang an pals as being (more) incompetent (than they were) and that the Reds were better able to clog up the Japanese war machine.
>Le McCarthy was right meme.
Everyone fighting nips received funding from the Americans.

The ROC emerged from WWII militarily better off but politically weak.

>>1338842
>Why did he fuck up so badly against the communists? Was it because the Japanese weakened his forces

You answered yourself.

>>1338955
I thought it was because Chiang told Mao to get fucked in the negotiations after Japan was defeated. In US presence no less. And then he got fucked all the way to South China Sea by Lin Biao.

>>1338842

To begin to answer this question, you need to understand Chiang's rise to power. The KMT was one of a number of warlord factions that sprung up as the Qing dynasty started to fall apart, and their core region was kind of a west to east corridor running from Shanghai to Chengdu. Through a combination of bluff, some military strategy, and propaganda, they managed to bring pretty much all of the other warlords to heel, and "unified" China. But they never managed to take that next step, and their governance of China still was rooted in the warlord system, of essentially being a roaming military apparatus demanding tribute. They never really put their own people into other provinces, they just demanded period tributes of money and soldiers, and left a great deal of local governance intact.

And when trouble started in places like Guangdong and Fujian from the Communists, Chiang had a hell of a tough time even before the Japanese showed up. Sure, after several campaigns he forced Mao to take the Long March, but he never managed to put his own people in there when they left, and his influence in the former Communist strongholds remained minimal.


tl:dr Chiang lost the war to the Communists primarily because he was unable to translate his battlefield successes into political control. As long as that is lacking, he can't win the war.

Shorten version: Good military leader, shitty president.

>>1339278

"Good military leader" is seriously debatable. His "long columns" plans often seemed more about postponing defeat than actually trying to seize victory, and he was a compulsive supply hoarder, often to the point where military stores would be captured by the Japanese rather than used against them, out of fear that he would expend ammunition or vehicles that he could no longer replace.

And that's on top of all the organizational and training issues his forces perennially had.