>>1250565

>but after Rommel had succeeded in beating back allied forces he kept on going... Why?

Because Rommel was a glory hound with a very poor appreciation of overall strategy or logistical reality. He was an amazing tactician, won some battles when he made his initial landing, and kept assuming that if he could keep the magic going, keep winning battles, he'd win the war (or at least front) on pure virtuoso.

>I've heard the argument that the continuing of the campaign in Africa might have assisted in diverting allied resources from the other fronts

Honestly, he could probably do that better with an elastic defense around cyrenica than either of the alternatives you post. Also, the western Front when Rommel was on the offensive (1941-42) didn't really exist as such, and his overall force, of 3 German divisions and I think 5 Italian ones, would have been pretty small potatoes on the Eastern Front.

>Did he disrupt any real supply lines of note in Egypt or was it all for not?

It was all for nothing. The supply lines feeding Egypt pretty much went around Suez.

If you're interested in the subject, I would recommend The Path to Victory by Douglas Porch.

>>1250626
That was really informative, thank you anon. Could I get your thoughts on the campaign itself? Was Rommel victim to a number of tragic accidents (injuries and illness forcing him to take leave from Africa) and unforeseen events (SAS sabotaging of supply lines and American reinforcements) or was his loss a result of poor planning and lack of foresight as you suggested earlier?

>>1250695

>Was Rommel victim to a number of tragic accidents (injuries and illness forcing him to take leave from Africa) and unforeseen events (SAS sabotaging of supply lines and American reinforcements) or was his loss a result of poor planning and lack of foresight as you suggested earlier?


I would go more with the poor planning and lack of foresight. Another good read on the campaign's logistical side is this.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf

And yes, there were raids and problems all along the rear lines. SAS, strikes out of Malta, RAF forces taking potshots at things, but those really are foreseeable events, especially when your main supply tether is a hundreds of kilometers long "road" along the coast. He was spending some 30-50% of his fuel just having trucks going to the front and back from Tripoli hauling up all of the other stuff he needed to keep the advance going.

And a large part of it was, Rommel never really had to do this kind of thing before, he was a divisional commander along a main front, suddenly thrust to a theater command of a tertiary front. Before, at least for his career, getting supplies was a matter of making your case to your superiors that you needed them more than the next unit down the line, and how much you got from the goody bag was a reflection of your skills in persuasion and delivering results. If you could fight and win decisively, your superiors would be more inclined to be generous with fuel and munitions. Then he's pitched into a war where to get anything, you need to run past British raiders. And you only have one port of any size. And it's hundreds of kilometers away from where you're fighting. And you only have so many trucks, who themselves need to be fueled, maintained, cleaned, etc. It was one of the most logistically challenging theaters of the war, and this is a man with 0 logistical background put in charge of it all.

>>1250725
Thanks man I really appreciate the info and help.

>>1250725
I do have one last question before I go though if you wouldn't mind answering it. Rommel is often heralded as being one of the Second World War's greatest generals by the general public (not too sure of how he is seen in the rest of his historical community), often finding himself on or above the level of other greats in the conflict such Patton, Manstein, and Guderian. Are there any merits to such claims? I've always seen him as a man who while cunning, found the majority of his success in simply executing the Blitzkrieg effectively.

>>1250565
It kept the western allies busy and away from Europe. Hitler wanted to hold the mountainous areas of Tunisia for a year so he could focus on the Soviet Union and not worry about an allied landing in Italy or France.

>>1250815
>(not too sure of how he is seen in the rest of his historical community),

Answering this part first, no, military historians almost universally have a far more negative view of Rommel than what pop-history has.

>I do have one last question before I go though if you wouldn't mind answering it. Rommel is often heralded as being one of the Second World War's greatest generals by the general public (not too sure of how he is seen in the rest of his historical community), often finding himself on or above the level of other greats in the conflict such Patton, Manstein, and Guderian. Are there any merits to such claims?

The only one I would consider him on the level of is Patton, who is similarly overrated. But no. He was a great tactical executor. (He wasn't really much of an innovator, but he took ideas and really made them work), but lacking in almost all other areas of generalship.


Mostly, IMO, it comes from two major reasons. He did win some very dramatic, if strategically unimportant battles on a highly visible front. The North African campaign could adopt a kind of chivalry that the rest of the war couldn't; you didn't have a lot of dead civilians on your battlefields, and because of the long lines of communication, and the difficulty of delivering a knockout blow for either side, you could have multiple struggles with the same people, which adds to an air of romanticism to the whole thing. Plus, he's regarded as the "clean" German general, due largely to his involvement in the July 20th plot. You can utter an admiration for Rommel in a way that you can't for a lot of others, because of their perceived taint by the Nazi regime.

>>1250851
Thanks anon for answering my question, I really do appreciate it. Have a good one!