So, as I understand it, Japan's plan, such as it was, against the U.S. in WW2 was basically to beat them up for about 6 months that they predicted they'd have the advantage, expand as much as they could, and try to bargain to a peace with honor based on the assumption that America would be unwilling to take the kind of losses that would be needed to dig them out of their chain of island fortresses and drive to Japan.
If their whole strategy hinges around negotiating to victory, why didn't they ever at least threaten to hold lend-lease hostage? It was well known that Europe was FDR's priority, and as the pic shows, the biggest port of call for Lend-Lease was Vladivostok, right where the Japanese could have easily cut if off, had they wished to do so.
It might have worked, probably wouldn't have, but the thrust of what I'm getting at is that as far as I'm aware, the Japanese never tried it, and never even seemed to consider it. Does anyone know why? I mean, if it occurs to a tipsy shitposter here, surely someone in the Jpaanese military establishment at least had the thought cross their mind.
If u-boats couldn't shut our shipping down theres no way the Japanese could. Their subs were crap, so they had no ability to make good on that threat.
>>1131862
You wouldn't need u-boats, or Japanese shit subs. You're sending convoys out into the Sea of Japan, within land based air range of a zillion Japanese bases.
You could have a dozen cruisers hanging off around Vladivostok, which would be way more effective than submersibles, and not affect the carrier based main fleet actions much. And if the Americans start escorting these convoys, you have almost unlimited land-based airpower that can join in.
The material resources were sure as shit there to cut the Pacific lend lease route.
>>1131883
Becauae japans were retards who couldnt cooperate and got btfod instanly when they wasnt "fighting" against defensless farm workers and children
They deserved those nukes and should hav gotten some more
Weebs and other autist, blow me
>>1131883
>a dozen cruisers
Half their remaining cruisers dedicated to preventing US from sending our own supplies somewhere else that wasn't invading them?
Seems questionable to say the least.
>>1131961
At the outset of war, Japan had 40 cruisers. A dozen is hardly half, and go look up the service records of those cruisers. They never did much, ferry troops around for the most part, because it turns out that in a war dominated by aerial commitments, cruisers aren't good for much.
And again, the point is that this is extremely important to FDR. It's a negotiation point for ending the war, you go to peace, and we have no reason to keep sinking your boats. And if the convoys are attacked, you might lure the American fleets into a confrontation where they have to pit their carrier planes against lots of your land based planes, something they were always cautious of.
>>1132020
>at the outset of the war
>when they weren't interested in suing for peace
>when they were focused on the the south pacific
>before they got wrecked
>and go look up the service records of those cruisers
actually kind of interested in this, we'll see if my autism wears off before I get through them.
>>1131780
>If their whole strategy hinges around negotiating to victory, why didn't they ever at least threaten to hold lend-lease hostage?
The Soviets would buttfuck them.
>>1132289
>Before the war with Germany is over?
Yes. They wouldn't like it, and wanted to avoid it, but if push came to shove, the Soviets could reach Busan with the forces they had there.
>>1132301
You had, according to which sources you believe, 700k-1.3m troops scattered around an enormous perimeter, most of them not along the two railroad axis that could support an advance.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=149223
You're not going on the offensive without a pretty significant diversion of resources from the main front in Europe, and it strikes me as unreasonable for the Soviets to do that as a punitive measure, since it won't actually stop the Japanese if they're really dead-set on this blockade.
>>1132315
And the Japanese had less troops, spread across the same area, with even weaker logistical support.
>it strikes me as unreasonable for the Soviets to do that as a punitive measure, since it won't actually stop the Japanese if they're really dead-set on this blockade.
"Punitive Measure" seems like an odd way to phrase the Soviet Union responding to an act of war against them.
>>1132336
>And the Japanese had less troops, spread across the same area, with even weaker logistical support.
I'd need to dig around for an exact citation, but I'm pretty sure Kwangtung had about 1.3 million men for most of the war before they started having troops yanked out to shore up islands in 44 or so. (And then of course, the Soviets pulverizing them in August Storm)
And when you're on defense, you have different priorities. You don't need the same degree of logistical support when you have interior lines of communication, and at least in the 1945 attack, you had most of the Japanese forces either on that railroad line heading to Harbin, or in the east around that juncture where the North Korean/Chinese border is today.
I don't have info on say their 1943 deployments, but I don't' have reason to assume it's different.
>"Punitive Measure" seems like an odd way to phrase the Soviet Union responding to an act of war against them.
It's only an act of war because of a diplomatic fiction where everyone pretended American ships were actually Soviet. Furthermore, say the Soviets did do it, and it worked, beat the tar out of the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea. It wouldn't actually stop the blockade, they're not getting into the Sea of Japan. At best, it's a coercive measure to inflict enough pain on the Japanese to get them to re-think their plans, it's not going to stop them in the same way they stopped German advances, those troops were simply dead, and no amount of greater commitment would see the Germans in Moscow.
>>1132205
>>1132020
Only made it through the 18 heavies before the autism ran out.
Furutaka, south pacific, Sunk 42
Kako, south pacific, Sunk 42
Aoba, south pacific, beaten up 42, back to south pacific, beaten up 43, defense of japan, sunk 45
Kinugasa, south pacific, sunk 42
Myoko, south pacific until 42, aluetian islands, south pacific, Scuttled 46
Nachi, south pacific until 42, aluetian islands, south pacific sunk 44
Haguro, south pacific, aleutian islands, south pacific Sunk 45
Ashigara south china until 42, Battle of Java Sea then troop/guard duty, sunk 45
Takao Class: South China, a couple went to aleutian, rest of time spent in south pacific, All sunk in 44
Mogami Class: Dutch East Indies, one sunk at midway, rest sunk/scuttled in 44.
Tone Class: Fouth all over, pearl harbor, indian ocean, solomon islands, etc. one survived war, other sunk 44.
Pretty much all toast by 44, only one of them was slacking off during the war.
>>1132402
>It's only an act of war because of a diplomatic fiction where everyone pretended American ships were actually Soviet.
Additionally, because the entire idea of this blockade means that the Japanese Empire has decided that it is in their interest to aid in the German-Soviet War by military means, because the Japanese-American war is inseparable from that conflict.
The diplomatic fiction was maintained because Japan was interested in avoiding conflict with the Soviet Union.
>Furthermore, say the Soviets did do it, and it worked, beat the tar out of the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea. It wouldn't actually stop the blockade, they're not getting into the Sea of Japan.
OK, let's say that does happen. It's not an ideal situation for the Soviets, but let's talk about the Japanese.
How do the Soviets holding Harbin or Seoul help secure their grip on Northern China, which was the goal of every military operation from 1937 onward? Even if the U.S. was incline to negotiate, at this point, they'd also have to negotiate a withdrawl of the soviets from this territory, and have to set about fighting with the Chinese, who they never managed to defeat, after suffering crippling losses to their army. How does any of this help Japan?
Sure, if Japan wanted to, they could swing around and inflict all kinds of damage to the allies, if that was all that they wanted to do, but none of this helps the Japanese war aims.
>>1132433
WHich means that from 42-43 at the very least, you have plenty of vessels.
Besides, you would think blockade efforts start with the lights, and only graduate to the heavies if the U.S. starts protecting the convoys And if the U.S. really goes full bore in making sure they get through, the battle is likely to be carried by airplanes, not naval vessels.
>>1132458
>Sure, if Japan wanted to, they could swing around and inflict all kinds of damage to the allies, if that was all that they wanted to do, but none of this helps the Japanese war aims.
Because you're making a number of extremely pessimistic assumptions as if they're certainties. It is not clear that the Soviets would start another war while they're already losing one over sunk American ships. It is not clear even if they do decide to declare war that they can actually pull the sorts of stuff (especially logistical assets) to mount a major offensive when they need that same stuff to fend off the Wehrmacht, ESPECIALLY if the single biggest artery of Lend-Lease is being closed off in the interim. And these offensives will take time, which is very much not something the Soviets will want to hear that it might months or even years before they can get the bulk of that badly needed aid.
Thinking that the Soviets would rather negotiate, or put pressure on the Americans to negotiate isn't that ridiculously optimistic, certainly no more so than the other flights of fancy the Japanese were entertaining. And it helps the Japanese because it gives them precisely what they needed but never actually managed to find, a bit of leverage to force the Americans to the bargaining table, something they can give away as a cookie to help get recognition for their claims in Asia.
>>1132669
.Because you're making a number of extremely pessimistic assumptions as if they're certainties. It is not clear that the Soviets would start another war while they're already losing one over sunk American ships.
It is a fairly safe and reasonable assumption that a blockade would be regarded as an act of war by another nation. And your argument is now at odds with itself:
If the matter is so irrelevant to the Soviets that they won't even fight about it, why would the Americans surrender over it?
>Because you're making a number of extremely pessimistic assumptions as if they're certainties.
Evidently, it was, because you're maintaining a flight of fancy.
>And it helps the Japanese because it gives them precisely what they needed but never actually managed to find, a bit of leverage to force the Americans to the bargaining table, something they can give away as a cookie to help get recognition for their claims in Asia.
Except for the Phillipines, Guam, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, the cessation of hostilities, and the resumption of free trade throughout Asia. Those were pretty good bargaining chips.
>>1132669
>the battle is likely to be carried by airplanes
This isn't a moba m8.
>>1132748
>It is a fairly safe and reasonable assumption that a blockade would be regarded as an act of war by another nation.
We're at war with America. We all know those are American ships. We sink American ships, it's what we do.
>If the matter is so irrelevant to the Soviets that they won't even fight about it, why would the Americans surrender over it?
Of course the matter is relevant to the Soviets. Extremely relevant. The question is whether they have the capability, especially when you have things like Case Blue crushing down the front door, to actually do something about it.
>Except for the Phillipines, Guam, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, the cessation of hostilities, and the resumption of free trade throughout Asia. Those were pretty good bargaining chips.
No they aren't. Even the Japanese knew that defeat was a question of when, not if, should the Americans stay committed. Sure, a few million people will probably die, and a lot of misery all around will be spread, but honestly, that's not a big deal to the sort of strategic calculus that dominates military thinking. None of those issues are time sensitive, and with enough time, the U.S. will get all of those without having to bargain.
Lend-Lease IS time sensitive, because there was a very real worried in the Western Allied camp that the Soviets would crumple without aid, or come to a separate peace with Hitler, which is way more important than what's going on in Asia. Every day that Vladivostok remains closed, you have a lot of materiel that the Soviets badly need that isn't getting to them.
>>1132802
Are you seriously claiming that naval warfare (broadly speaking) in the Pacific wasn't dominated by air power?
