fbi cracks it whenever they want.
no problem if you aren't committing a crime like reporting news as a journalist.

>There are people still using 2000s era memes like Tor and TrueCrypt.
>2016 The yea of Coptic resurgence

>>55320084
No, US gov owns the vast majority of nodes and if they have the entrance and exit the wntire point of tor goes out the window.

It's safe. Just never enable JavaScript or any plugins because then you're probably fucked.

>>55320222
Checked, but not accurate info.

Owning an exit node allows sniffing and capture of outgoing packets. If the packets contain identifying information, like in the headers or cookies, then an observer knows who is sending those packets.

Owning an entrance node allows sniffing and capture of incoming ENCRYPTED packets, which you really cant do shit with unless you have supercomputers and a good fucking reason to spend that much time and money brute forcing each packets encryption.

As soon as you add a logless vpn into this stack, it becomes very anonymous and difficult to trace where the sender is physically. The more vpns, the more impossible the problem becomes, until the cost of tracing outweighs old fashion social engineering. Thats how almost all of the lulzsec guys got caught - talking about ops on irc channels to spooks and correlating the timing of events.

Tl/dr: tor is fine, use a vpn, loose lips sink ships

It's a tool. It isn't intrinsically safe in the same way that a hammer isn't intrinsically a nail pusher.
You have to use it right for it to do its job.
You're not going to be hammering in any nails if you're holding the wrong end of the hammer.

>>55320084
Safe for what? What's your threat model?

Tor has always been clear about what it can and can't defend against. It's held up to those expectations generally pretty well.

No, it hasn't been compromised or any bullshit like that, despite what Jake would want you to believe because he's a vindictive shit.

Yes, it will have a problem with global attackers. No, there isn't anything clearly better. Use as part of your nutritious breakfast of OPSEC, Tails, minimising exposure, and as much mitigation as you can.

It really depends on your threat model, anon. If someone's going to try to swing 0days your way, or try global traffic confirmation, just using Tor is no panacea.

>>55320084
Yep, but I'd recommend you to run it in a separate and dedicated workspace using Qubes OS or in a non-persistant TAILS workspace that is deleted once you reboot your computer.

As said by anons, never allow Javascript or install plugins. You may pay VPNs such as privateinternetaccess.com anonymously with bitcoins; do it (once your TOR workspace is done).

If you mean to share files remove metadata with mat: mat.boum.org.

And don't leak metadata with IRC chans or Twitter accounts, such as when you post anything, because you may be tracked in a huge number of ways (cell phones, human investigation, etc.).

Remember first world encrypts data so it becomes less valuable than the money spent in getting it because NSA + NGA (Geocell) is fucking hell in Pakistan. It all depends of your threat model, but if you really want to screw them up do as I said.

>>55320084
yes

>>55320106
>TrueCrypt
Nothing wrong with it. It's been audited and passed it with few non-security bugs. Even Steve Gibson uses it.

You're on several watchlists just for asking that. Be careful, kiddo.